TELOS

Number 102 WINTER 1995

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Review:

Seth Farber: Undermining Community

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Back Issues available: ns. 13, 17-18 20-51, 53-101 at $13.00 each ($30.00 for institutions). Foreign orders, add 15%. All payments must be in U.S. currency. Out of print issues (ns. 1-12, 14-16, 19, 52) can be obtained in microform or facsimile through University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 48106, US.

Telos number 102 corresponds to Vol. 27, No. 4. ***Telos*** is published in the Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter by Telos Press Ltd., 431 E. 12th Street, New York, NY 10009. Second Class postage paid at New York and additional mailing offices. Postmaster please send address changes to:

Telos
431 E. 12th Street
New York, NY 10009
© 1995, Telos Press Ltd. ISSN 0090-6514 tel. 212-228-6479

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Reflections of a Partisan: Julien Freund (1921-1993)

Gary Ulmen

Julien Freund was a French intellectual. Intense and introspective, he was never without a cigarette, as though there was some relation between tabacco and thought. But Freund was not typical. He did not live in Paris and was not embroiled in its various idiosyncratic polemics. Most of his life was spent in or about Alsace-Lorraine, until the end of WWI a German imperial territory (Elsass-Lothringen), consisting of the former French province Alsace (with its capital Strasbourg), and the German Lorraine (with the capital and fortress of Metz). This particular land had long been a pawn in struggles between France and Germany — a characteristic Freund appreciated not only in his regional concerns[1] but also in his incidental writings on Alsatian cuisine.[2] His name, like the town where he was born on January 9, 1921 (Henridorff) is half French and half German. His outlook also bore this kind of dual citizenship. Unlike his French mentor,

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1. Julien Freund, "Propos sur la regionalisation — La tradition alsacienne," in *Revue des sciences sociales de la France des l'Est* (Strasbourg), 1972, No. 1 pp. 3-11; "Alsace, terre de recherche," in *Le C.N.R.S. en Alsace — Album du Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique* (Paris: C.N.R.F. 1974), pp. 4-5; "Route des Sauniers ou route des Sarmates? — La fin d'une légende," in *Annaire de la société d'histoire du Val de Villè* (Villè), Vol. 4 (1978), pp. 65-67; "L'Alsace, un lieu de haute culture," in *Culture et communication* (Paris), No. 25 (1980), pp. 11-19; "Les migrations entre l'Alsace et la Lorraine," in *Les Annales de l'Académie d'Alsace* (Kolmar), No. 23-24 (1980), pp. 16-20.

2. Julien Freund, "Eloge de la choucroute," in *Saisons d'Alsace* (Strasbourg), Vol. 11, No. 20 (1966), pp. 509-513, reprinted in *La gastronomie alsacienne* (1969), pp. 83-87; "Quelques aperçus sur la cuisine alsacienne," in *Revue des sciences sociales de la France de l'Est* (Strasbourg), No. 9 (1980), pp. 59-75; "La cuisine alsacienne et la cuisine à l'alsacienne," in *Bulletin du Club Prosper Montagné* (Colmar), 1981, pp. 13-23.

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Raymond Aron, he was short in physical stature. Like his German mentor, Carl Schmitt, however, he more than made up for it in intellectual stature.

Having passed his baccalaureate in 1938, Freund enrolled in the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Strasbourg (the same university from which Schmitt received his Doctorate of Jurisprudence in 1910, at age 22).[3] Unfortunately, Freund had to interrupt his studies and did not receive his doctorate until he was 47. The eldest of six children, following the death of his father he had to help support his family. But the decisive factor was the German occupation. In July 1940, an incident provoked by the young Freund led to the death of a German soldier. As a result, Freund had to report to the German military commander several times a week. After the upheaval of November 11, 1940, he was marked by the Gestapo but succeeded in escaping to the free zone of France. In June 1942, he returned to his *alma mater* at Clermont-Ferrand and completed his degree. In January 1941 he had joined the resistance movement Libération founded by Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie (1900-1944) and the logician, Jean Cavaillès (1903-1944), Freund's teacher.[4] In March 1942 he became a member of the "Groupes Francs de Combat," which carried out a series of actions against the Vichy regime and French collaborators.

These partisan activities landed Freund in prison on June 27, 1942 at Clermont-Ferrand, then in Lyon, where he was a co-defendant with Emmanuel Mournier (1905-1950), founder of the journal *Esprit* and the movement by the same name. After he was acquitted in June 1944 he rejoined the resistance and eventually became a soldier at the Basses-Alpes and finally in the Département de la Drome, where he participated in panzer assaults on the outskirts of Nyons. He participated in the liberation of Strasbourg in November 1944. Toward the end of his life, he said that his education "in the life of the underground, of the partisan," had become a subject of reflection and then a concern with the study of war.[5]

In 1986, in discussing his partisan activities, Freund said he first enter-

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3. Julien Freund, "Elauche d'une autobiographie intellectuelle," in *Revue europèenne des sciences sociales* (Geneva), Vol. 19, Nos. 54-55 (19881), pp. 7-47; "Wie Enttäuschung zur Erfahrung führt," in *Was meinem Leben Richtung gab: Bekannte Persönlichkeiten berichtung über enscheidende Erfahrungen* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag 1982), pp. 45-56; *L'aventure du politique*, Julien Freund entretiens avec Charles Blanchet (Paris: Criterion, 1991); and *Julien Freund: Philosophie et sociologie*, Suive *d'une bio-bibliographie par Tommisssen* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Cabay, 1984), pp. 457ff.

4. Julien Freund, "Les débuts de la résistance des étudiants de l'Universitie de Strasbourg à Clermont-Ferrand," in *Courrier des Marches* (Colmar), 1976, pp. 31-36.

5. *L'aventure du politique*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

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tained the notion of joining the Communists, but rejected their abstract ideology in favor of the true partisans' grounding in a particular territory.[6] At that time he was not altogether aware, however, of the fundamental changes the concept of the "partisan" as a paradigmatic political figure of post-French Revolution Europe had undergone as a result of its instrumentalization by Marxist-Leninist *Realpolitik*. Later he learned from Schmitt's "theory of the partisan" that Lenin, "the professional revolutionary of global civil war," had turned the "real enemy" into an "absolute enemy."[7] In so doing, he had also corrupted the new political figure of the partisan from a pre-modern defender of local autonomy, particularity and otherness (against Napoleonic expansionism first and Western imperialism later) into an agent of that very same pseudo-universalism it originally opposed — this time identified with communist ideology rather than the French Enlightenment. Not only did Lenin instrumentalize the concept of the partisan, he also destroyed the traditional limitation of war achieved with the *jus publicum Europaeum*. From a localized struggle among states, "war became absolute war and the partisan the agent of absolute enmity against an absolute enemy."[8] It became a universal "class struggle" where the enemy (*inimicus*) — an opponent to be treated as an equal in a legitimate conflict where two "rights" confront each other — became a foe (*hostis*) — a demonic figure to be exterminated everywhere by whatever means.[9] This, however, entailed a distortion[10] of the true

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6. Julien Freund, "Der Partisan oder der kriegerische Friede," in *Complexio Oppositorum: Über Carl Schmitt*, edited by Helmut Quaritsch (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988). pp. 387-391. Some of Freund's incidental remarks at the conference in which this paper was delivered have not been published.

7. Carl Schmitt, *Der Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (1963), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975), p. 94.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

9. On the relation between enemy and foe, see Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, tr. by George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), pp. 26-29; G. L. Ulmen, "Return of the Foe," and George Schwab, "Enemy or Foe: A Conflict in Modern Politics," in *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987), pp. 187-193 and 194-2-1 respectively.

10. Three years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Freund said: "the figure of the partisan has become ambiguous because the historical concept now includes the revolutionary as well as the fighter in the Vendée or the guerilla in Spain." He located the source of this confusion in the Marxist-Leninist distortion of the figure of the partisan into a fighter for "universal human emancipation" advocated by communist ideology rather than the original "particularity, specificity and otherness" associated with its tellurian character: "The partisan, especially as a revolutionary figure, is the fighter of a bellicose peace. This has been the situation since the last world war, be it in Asia, Africa, America or Europe. The People's Democracies in the East are partisan states. It is no longer a question of wars of liberation but of latent internal civil wars — legitimacy against legality. " See Freund, "Der Partisan oder der kriegerische Friede," in *Complexio Oppositorum*, *op. cit.*, pp. 387 and 389.

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concept of the partisan which, according to Schmitt, "has a real but not an absolute enemy" and has a "tellurian character," i.e., he defends a piece of land with which he has an autochthonous relation."[11]

Schmitt sought to explain the new political phenomena of wars of liberation (connected with anti-colonialism) and how this had altered international law.[12] The Marxist-Leninist strategy of world revolution, which seemed practically invincible during the three decades after WWII (but which underwent an irreversible decline following the involution of the Cuban, the Chinese and other Third World revolutionary movements) had succeeded precisely because of the instrumentalization of the figure of the partisan. At the time Schmitt wrote, the contradiction between the partisan's particularity and Marxism Leninism's pseudo-universality had yet to come to a head, thus relegating the communist instrumentalization of the partisan to a phenomenon typical of the golden age of modernity. What remains is a postmodern figure of the partisan, with all the characteristics Schmitt identified, now redefined, among other things, by its opposition to the new pseudo-universalism of "human rights," liberal democracy's bureaucratic centralism, and the therapeutic state.

In an international context in which the partisan was identified exclusively with anti-fascist movements during WWII — a politically heterogeneous movement subsequently distorted and redefined as primarily "communist" — Schmitt traced the origins of the concept of the partisan back to the Spanish and Prussian anti-Napoleonic struggles of 1808-1813 (culminating in the Spanish *Reglamento de Partidas y Cuadrillas* of December 28, 1808 and the Prussian *Landstrum* of April 21, 1813) when the partisan first appeared as a paradigmatic *tellurian* figure. It was the birth of a territorially-grounded concept of political identity contraposed to the universalistic pretenses of the French Revolution understood as the *Ideenkleid* for the new republican French imperialism. Tracing these ideas back to Clausewitz' 1909 critique of Fichte, Schmitt's contraposition of local particularity and autonomy to Enlightenment universalism and French imperialism prefigured what is finally coming to the fore as the main political confrontation between New Class universalism tied to the

11. Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen, op. cit., p. 93.*

12. *Theorie des Partisanen is* not only a comment on the concept of the political but also a comment on *Der Nomos Der Erde* — a work in which Schmitt attempted to prefigure new political agencies to replace the traditional European concept of the "state," which he considered obsolete as a result of the disintegration of the *jus publicum Europaeum*. The fragmentary theories of *Grossraum* and the *partisan* are the results of some four decades of reflection on the meaning of new 20th century geopolitical developments.

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traditional 19th century political formation (the nation-state, which becomes weaker the more it attempts to become what Schmitt called the "total state"), and postmodern populism predicated on territorial particularism and the pre-communist figure of the partisan. Already at the end of WWI "conventional war between states, predicated on European international law" was obsolete, soon to be replaced by "a global civil based on revolutionary class struggle,"[13] but now there is a new political conflict in the form of regionalism, postmodern federalism and the vindication of direct democracy within territorially-defined communities against central state power increasingly perceived as a distant, foreign domination by an illegitimate New Class elite. To use another set of Schmittian concepts, it is the vindication of the primacy of legitimacy over a reified legality which has degenerated into a new mode of domination.[14]

Every knowledgeable Schmittian, said Freund, knows the sense in which Schmitt examined the "theory" of the partisan as a *Zwischenbemerkung* to the concept of the political.[15] Schmitt's intention was not to provide a general theory but only a concept useful for jurists. "Power as regularity provides grounds for a legal concept; power as irregularity, only for a theory. Theory is an undetermined idea, but no concept."[16] For Schmitt, the figure of the partisan is an archetype of irregularity who seeks to vindicate a prescriptive legitimacy against a positivistic legality. As an irregular fighter, the partisan occupied the same ground as the jurist because law is also tellurian — it is only for a particular land. The terrorist

13. See Carl Schmitt, "The Legal World Revolution,' in Telos 72 (Summer 1987), pp. 73-89.

14. According to Schmitt, the dominant legal positivism based on the omnipotence of the legislator does not know "that legality was originally a constituent part of western rationalism and a decisive form of legitimacy, but not its absolute antithesis. The general neutralization of values is part of the general functionalization and turns democracy into the *Weltanschauung* of a fundamental relativism." Cf. Schmitt's notes appended to "Legalität und Legitimität" (1932), in Schmitt, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre* (1958), 2nd. ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973), p. 346. In further reflections, Schmitt wrote: "The transformation of right [law] into legality is directly followed by the transformation of legality into a weapon of civil war. This was also no German invention [Hitler]. Lenin proclaimed it sharply and clearly"; also: "In the constitutional development of continental European states the antithetical split between legality and legitimacy has become the fate of the state." See Schmitt, "Das Problem der Legalität" (1950) in *ibid.*, pp. 447 and 449 respectively. On what Schmitt called the "political surplus value" of this "super-legality," see Ulmen, *Politischer Mehrwert: Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt* (Weinheim: Acta humaniora, 1991), especially chapter III/3.

15. *Freund,* "Der Partisan oder krieerische Friefe," *op. cit.*, p. 389.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

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fights less for land than for an idea. As Freund noted, for Schmitt terrorism was not a genuine political problem but only an instance of the criminalization of politics. Schmitt never attempted to develop a philosophy of history. His problem was to determine the historical presuppositions of concrete situations. The Marxist-Leninist instrumentalization of the figure of the partisan not only signalled the transition from armed to bellicose peace but also the criminalization of war, which created the danger "that one might no longer be able to speak of an enemy or enmity and both would be outlawed and damned in all forms before the task of destruction can begin."[17] The *leitmotif* of all Schmitt's work culminates in his theory of the partisan: the problem of the state of exception and of the relative antinomies between norm and decision[18]

In June 1946, disgusted with political corruption and having tried his hand at journalism, Freund began teaching philosophy first at the Collège de Sarrebourg (October 1946-September 1949), then at the Lycée de Metz (October 1949-September 1953) and the renowned Lycée Fustel de Coulanges de Strasbourg (October 1953-September 1960). In 1948 he married the younger daughter of the painter René Kuder (1882-1962). In October 1960 he was appointed to the Centre Nationale Recherche Scientifique. The end of his contract coincided with the defense of his doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne on June 26, 1965. In addition to his patron, Aron, his other examiners were Paul Ricoeur, Jean Hyppolite and Raymond Polin. Also that year, Freund began teaching at the University of Strasbourg. He subsequently founded a Center for Research and Study in the Social Sciences (1967), an Institute of Polemology (1970), a Laboratory of Regional Sociology (1973), and the *Revue des Sciences Sociales de la France de l'Est* (1972). In 1975 Freund lectured at the University of Montreal, but refused other long-term offers from German and American universities in order to concentrate on his work (although he did deliver guest lectures in Germany, Greece, Italy, Belgium, etc.).

In August 1988 Freund retired to the village of Villé. There he wrote *Philosophie philosophique*,[19] in which he explained his earlier works[20]

17. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 388; cf. Schmitt, *Der Theorie des Partisanen*, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
19. (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1990).
20. Freund's broad interests can be seen in works such as *Qu'est-ce que la politique?* (Paris: Seuil, 1967); *Le droit d'aujourdui* (Paris: P.U.P., 1972); *Les théories des sciences humaines* (Paris: P.U.P., 1973); *Pareto: La théorie de l'équilibre* (Paris: Seghers, 1974); *Utopie et violence* (Paris: Revière, 1978); *La fin de la Renaissance* (Paris: P.U.P., 1980); *Sociologie du Conflit* (Paris: P.U.P., 1983); *La Décadence: Histoire sociologique et philosophique d'une catégorie de l'experience humaine* (Paris: Sirey, 1984).

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and their interrelation. His partisan experiences in the French resistance are the reason why his *magnum opus, L'essence du politique*, is in some sense an attempt to understand the nature, function and finality of "eternal politics."[21] According to Freund, the fundamental categories of politics are: command and obedience, public and private, friend and enemy. He began with the *given* — the relation between politics and society, and the antagonisms inherent in social relations. But his most important contribution to what he called the "philosophy of politics" lies in exploring its *presuppositions*. Elsewhere he said he had wanted to be a "theoretician," as all great philosophers had been. He wanted to recover "the specificities of the freedom of reflection essential to the constitution of humanity."[22]

More precisely, Freund understood the essence of philosophy as having to do with the freedom to choose presuppositions. Here he was not attempting to out-Schmitt Schmitt but rather to pursue the question of politics beyond the "juridical" dimension and provide it with a wider "philosophical" base. This base, however, had nothing to do with abstract universalism. As with the particularity of the partisan, metaphysical presuppositions also exhibited a kind of tellurian specificity. As nomological projections capturing the particular idiosyncrasies of the communities within which they were deployed, these metaphysical presuppositions ultimately constituted the basis of that particular community's specificity. Enlightenment universality cannot be articulated conceptually because the conceptual dimension is always necessarily one-sided. Thus it can only be lived and approximated in the particularity of concrete situations of determinate communities.

While in Villé Freund completed a "philosophy of economics," published posthumously under the title *L'essence de économique*.[23] There he argued that economics replicates the same pattern as politics. His approach remained the same, but this work lacks the systematic character of *L'essence du politique*. Politics was the core of Freund's work. Ultimately, for him politics is the responsibility to determine a community, to situate it in a particular area and to assure internal harmony and external protection. The three key factors for this intellectual partisan were the freedom of choice, the ability to decide, and the tie to the land. He sensed he was at the threshold of a new age[24] beyond the nation state, but he did not live long

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21. *L'aventure du politique*, p. 10. Freund's 759 page opus (Paris: Sirey, 1965) is a *tour de force* in which he exhaustively analyzes the "dialectics" of the presuppositions of politics.
22. Freund, *Philosophie philosophique*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
23. (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1993).
24. Cf. Julien Freund, *Le Nouvel Age: L'eléments pour la théorie de la démocratie et la paix* (Paris: Revière, 1970).

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enough to experience all the implications of the end of the 20th century and the prefiguration of a possible translation of his partisan outlook into a new *nomos* of the earth.[25] Had he been able to pursue all the implications of Schmitt's theory of the partisan at a time when the end of the Cold War also meant the end of the corrupted concept of the partisan into a tool of the class-struggle, he may have found himself in the unexpected company of postmodern populists in pursuit of political arrangements beyond the traditional state. Freund may not have gone beyond Schmitt in prefiguring new forms of political existence, yet his article on Schmitt's political thought demonstrates both the clarity of his perception and his debt to his German mentor.[26]

25. Freund, La Crisis del Estado y otros estudios (Santiago de Chile: Istituto de Ciencia Politica, 1982).

26. Cf. Julien Freund, "Schmitt's Political Thought," in this issue of *Telos*.

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

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*Schmitt's Political Thought**

Julien Freund

Carl Schmitt was what in German is called a *Staatsrechtler*, i.e., a specialist in public law (especially constitutional and international law). This is how he described himself. But he went beyond the confines of his discipline, asking questions about the global phenomenon of politics in terms of both its statist particularities and its general characteristics. This did not prevent him from also reflecting on the nature of law, as exemplified in his treatise on the three ways of conceptualizing it — as norm, decision and order, i.e., as a mode of behavior, a judgment, and a means of organization.[1] However, none of its modalities is exclusive of the others. Schmitt also tackled literary, religious, scientific, philosophical and other topics. This essay will be concerned primarily with the core arguments in his work — the political vision of a jurist.

Schmitt focused on the problem of the state because it is the modern form of political unity. This means the state is a historical construct which arose at a certain moment in history, was preceded by other types of political unity and is in danger of disappearing one day, to be replaced by a new type of unity. As such, the state is a specific political reality which should not be conflated with everything political in the sense of a universal and perennial institution representative of all past, present and future polities. Thus the Greek *polis* and the Germanic Holy Roman Empire are wrongly called states. One should not make the mistake of identifying the state and politics, as did many of Schmitt's jurist contemporaries, who

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* Originally published as "Les lignes de force de la pensée politique de Carl Schmitt," in *Nouvelle École*, No. 44 (Spring 1987), pp. 11-27. Translated by Deborah Cook, edited by Gary Ulmen.

1. Carl Schmitt, *Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934).

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developed their idea of politics in the form of a general theory of the state. Here the opening sentence of *The Concept of the Political* is decisive: "The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political."[2] In other words, politics should not be explained in terms of the state; on the contrary, the state should be explained in terms of politics: "In one way or another 'political' is generally juxtaposed to 'state' or at least is brought into relation with it. The state thus appears as something political, the political as something pertaining to the state — obviously an unsatisfactory circle."[3] Consequently, political literature provides many definitions of the state, some of which are pertinent, but only a few studies of the general phenomenon of politics.

There is no reason to find fault with the fact that jurists proceed in this way, since contemporary legal practice is compelled by the current state of affairs to refer to the state as the given institutional framework. Politically, the law in force is state law as defined by existing constitutional regimes and by various governments in power. It is therefore normal that jurists view social groups and associations in terms of their relation to politics and from the perspective of the state. Formulations of this kind "serve the needs of current legal practice. Basically they provide a practical way of delimiting legal jurisdictions of cases within a state in its legal procedures. They do not in the least aim at a general definition of the political. Such definitions of the political suffice, therefore, for as long as the state and public institutions can be assumed as something self-evident and concrete."[4] This practice is no longer justified, however, when the jurist believes it possible to equate politics and the state, since the former irrevocably goes beyond the latter. In this case, "the equation state = politics becomes erroneous and deceptive"[5] simply because, even in modern societies, one can find political processes which are not statist.

Toward the "Total State"

As an historical configuration, the state has evolved since its appearance during the Renaissance. It has not remained unchanged since its first form — the absolute state of the 17th century. Under the influence of liberalism, in the 19th century it became a neutralizing instance. For example,

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2. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trs. by George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1976), p. 19.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22, trs. altered.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

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it is still considered such with respect to social conflicts. Because of the predominance of technology today, this neutralizing tendency will continue to grow. In reality, technology is not neutral; by its very nature, the means are always at the disposal of the ends it serves. Thus the state accordingly utilizes technology as an instrument of domination.

More remarkable is the other evolution toward what Schmitt called the "total state."[6] Contrary to some interpretations, this is not a theory of the totalitarian state but an observation about the tendency toward hyperstatism in the sense that the state increasingly intervenes in all domains — the economy, culture, etc. — in the form of a welfare state. It no longer deals only with politics but tends to invade all sectors of social life. Thus there is a risk of identifying state and society. In Schmitt's view, even though this evolution might weaken the state, it is rooted in the state's inability to remain a purely political institution. The total state is likely to be established in countries which tend toward "mass democracy," even though the multi-party system opposes this tendency and acts as a break on the development of a totalitarian state of the Soviet or fascist type.

Schmitt's theory of the total state is ambiguous because it leaves open both the possibility of a political weakening of the state and of its reinforcement. The tendency toward the total state can be characterized by the monopolization of power in the hands of a single party or by the invasion of all society by a social and tutelary state under the cover of an increasingly interventionist democracy. This is why Schmitt's adversaries were wrong in characterizing him as an apologist for the state and in claiming he believed there should always be more state. His position seems to have been that of a defender of a politically strong state, fulfilling its state duties, not dissipating its power in non-political activities. The very fact that Schmitt saw in the state an historical configuration which, like any other political constellation, can disappear someday, refutes this interpretation. Even though the state is at present ubiquitous in society, it cannot be the last word in politics since it presupposes politics. However, as soon as the state constitutes the basic political structure it is essential it be allowed to play its role properly instead of becoming impotent by extending its powers to domains it cannot handle. In my conversations with Schmitt, he frequently used words like *"unterwühlt"* and *"unterminiert,"* meaning not

6. Carl Schmitt, "Die Wendung zum totalen Staat." This Study first appeared in *Europäische Revue* (April, 1931). It was reprinted in *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar — Genf — Versailles 1923-1939* (1940), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncher & Humblot, 1988), pp. 146-157.

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only that state authority was being sapped from below, despite its apparent omnipotence, but that an obstructing apparatus was gradually dislocating it.

Schmitt was no liberal; no one ever considered him one. Thus it is necessary to clarify his conception of things. In his 1930 study on the problem of the internal political neutrality of the state[7] he indicated that in modern industrial society, where economic questions generally determine domestic and foreign policies, the liberal doctrine of the neutral state (limited to diplomatic and military functions) is an anachronism, primarily because liberalism encourages all kinds of free associations. Given the strength of unions and workers' alliances, social conflicts were no longer pursued solely in the economic arena. They had become so political that it would be inconceivable for the state to give free reign to associations which contested it politically. Schmitt also objected to theories (such as Harold S. Laski's pluralist theory of the state), which advocate the depoliticization of society on the pretext that the state is only one association among others, with no specific responsibility or statutes other than those common to various economic or cultural associations. Toward the end of *The Concept of the Political* Schmitt writes: "Economic antagonisms can become political, and the fact that an economic power position could arise proves that the point of the political may be reached from the economic as well as from any other domain. The often quoted phrase by Walter Rathenau, namely that the destiny today is not politics but economics, originated in this context. It would be more exact to say that politics continues to remain the destiny, but what has occurred is that economics has become political and thereby the destiny."[8]

Schmitt's idea can be summed up as follows: the state is the ultimate political instance, indispensable for any real society. As such, it has the duty to intervene wherever politics is challenged by religion, art or the economy. If it intervenes in the economy, the state need not do so as an entrepreneur with economic authority but as a political agency which today the economy solicits constantly. In other words, while politics is not supposed to substitute for the economy, it is still incumbent upon the state to intervene politically if the situation demands. Were the state to intervene in the economic and social spheres as if it were itself an industrial or a charitable organization, it would risk its own power by dispersing its

7. "Das Problem der innerpolitischen Neutralität des Staates," in *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassuugslehre (1958)*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973), pp. 41-59.

8. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

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energy. Similarly, it shows its strength when it takes the necessary political decisions in economic and social affairs as the situation demands. Schmitt also took this occasion to attack the moralism of liberal thought when it accuses the state of being an instrument of violence or the product of vice. On the contrary, the state fulfills an ethical function since it protects citizens, as Hobbes taught, against the violence of civil wars and the threats of external enemies. Thus Schmitt stressed the prerogatives of the state, which must assume political responsibility without yielding to the superstition of the omnivorous state. Thus to understand the reality of the state means thinking of it not only in legal terms but also in terms of the clearest possible concept of the politics upon which it rests.

The Criterion of the Political

The Concept of the Political is not an attempt to define the essence of politics, only to find a criterion — a conceptual marker — to identify the phenomenon of politics. This criterion is the distinction between friend and enemy. It is not a question of elaborating a theory of ideal politics but of learning from experience that ever since men have practiced politics they have organized as friends within a particular community (tribe, *polis*, empire, state) and tried to preserve their identity against the threats of those who might want to destroy it. A people exists politically if it constitutes an independent political unity and in the name of this unity opposes itself to other kinds of unity. The main features of this Schmittian analysis are sufficiently well known. Here it is more fitting to explore its implications.

a) The dichotomy friend-enemy is not just a criterion for foreign policy. To the extent that they are political, domestic political concepts are also based on the distinction between friend and enemy, without which they would have no polemical significance. A republic or a democracy, however understood, are opposed polemically to other regimes, such as monarchy and dictatorship. There was nothing political in the social problem when it was limited, as in the past, to the charitable assistance of indigents, the disinherited and the sick. It became political once it developed into a confrontation based on the opposing demands of two camps or classes. Religion becomes political when it opposes another religion or when two ways of understanding the same religion conflict, as in the religious wars of the 16th century. Much has been made of the irenic respect for the notion of humanity. But "to confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of

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humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity."[9] Ultimately, the concept of humanity criminalizes a conflict — from the legal viewpoint, the enemy becomes a criminal. Politics is universal in the sense that it obtains everywhere. But in terms of its principle, it implies a *pluriversum* — a plurality of particular and independent collectivities or of divergent interpretations of the same universal idea (such as peace or happiness) without which enmity is not possible. As soon as the proletarian class is opposed to the bourgeois class, the conflict becomes irrevocably political — even if the goal is to destroy the state: "Should the proletariat succeed in seizing political power within a state, a proletarian state will thus have been created. This state is by no means less of a political power than a national state, a theocratic, mercantile, or soldier state, a civil service state, or some other type of political entity."[10] This even includes the notion of being apolitical, which becomes political when used to discredit or destroy one's adversary.

b) The dichotomy friend-enemy provides politics with its existential dimension because it poses the problem of life and death when it becomes bellicose. "The friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, moral, and other conceptions."[11] They determine the existence of a people or a state: "For as long as a people exists in a political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme case — and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it — determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. This is the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically."[12] Enmity can be actual in the case of a direct conflict, virtual or potential when the necessary measures are taken to safeguard political existence. "An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity."[13] Thus war is only the extreme case of opposition between friend and enemy. This opposition arises as much in diplomacy as in police actions to maintain order: "It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action, by no means as though every nation would be

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 54.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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uninterruptedly faced with the friend-enemy alternative *vis à vis* every other nation. And, after all, could not the politically reasonable course reside in avoiding war? The definition of the political suggested here neither favors war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism."[14] This means that in politics one must reason by considering the eventuality of possible struggle or the hypothesis of conflict.

c) The distinction between friend and enemy is specifically political. It cannot be confused with economic competition or differences of opinion. It is even useless to appeal to morality when the enemy has decided to fight against it. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that moral, economic, religious, aesthetic and scientific distinctions and disagreements are completely foreign to politics. On the contrary, they become political when opposition is so intense that it ultimately separates adversaries into friends and enemies. Here is an example from biology. The purely scientific controversy pitting Lyssenko against his colleagues became political when it reached the degree of intensity which led the Soviet government to exterminate physically those who contradicted Lyssenko. This process no longer had anything to do with scientific objectivity. Thus the shift to the political refers to the "the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations."[15] The reasons for and the grounds of opposition are of little importance: opposition becomes political if regrouping becomes a prelude to a test of strength.

d) The political relation is between collectives, not individuals. There is nothing political in homicide, which is only a criminal incident, except, e.g., in the case of a terrorist assassination which attempts to destabilize a group or collectivity. Here Schmitt proposes the distinction between the private and the public enemy. He discusses certain passages in the Gospel, from Saint Matthew or Saint Luke, often cited in support of a doctrine of political peace, which admonishes love for one's enemies. This love does not extend to members of another political community, only to those of one's own, brothers or neighbors, with whom there is direct contact even though there may be personal hatred. The two meanings of the word "enemy" — *inimicus* and *hostis* — should not be confused. The Gospel can be invoked in favor of pacifism or a political doctrine of peace only at the cost of distorting the meaning of words. The Gospel refers only to the private enemy,

14. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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with whom one is personally acquainted, not the public enemy, who may not be hated even during a fight. The Gospel doctrine "certainly does not mean that one should love and support the enemies of one's own people."[16]

This analysis of the configuration of friend and enemy reveals that all politics is fundamentally polemical, i.e., it implies a permanent struggle which takes the form of war only in exceptional circumstances. It follows that the state of peace is also characterized by tensions, rivalries and antagonisms which do not, however, take the form of armed conflict. Although pacifism presents itself as a doctrine of peace, it is polemical inasmuch as it fights a battle predicated on a distinction between those who militate in favor of peace and those who endanger it. There are others who invoke equally seductive ideas in order to justify their struggle, such as generosity, solidarity, justice, equality, etc. It is only possible to become aware of these manipulations if one refuses to be held captive by normative ideality, considering only what really happens. Here Schmitt insists on the equivocal character of most modern political ideas. On the one hand, they present themselves as apolitical, as belonging to morality, law or culture; on the other, they are part of the political struggle in a kind of clandestine way. "All confusions of this category of friend and enemy can be explained as results of blendings of some sort of abstractions or norms."[17] Given its imprecise meanings, politics plays on both levels: at times it presents itself directly as politics, at others it uses circuitous means which tend to erase all political intentions. Thus one tries to neutralize and depoliticize citizens in the name of all kinds of "purities," in order to more easily recruit them politically by making them feel good.

Proliferation of Indirect Powers

A distinction Schmitt frequently mentions in his writings without, however, devoting any particular chapter to it is that between the *potestas directa* and *potestas indirecta* whose protagonists were, according to Schmitt, Hobbes and Ballarmin respectively. In any case, this distinction is found in his famous "Hobbes-Crystal."[18] By indirect power, Bellarmin meant the power of the pope, who did not exercise his authority directly on subjects by means of command and obedience, as did kings and emperors,

16. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
18. Schmitt's "Hobbes-Kristall" appears in a note appended to his *Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), p. 122.

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but acted through recommendation, caution and interdiction. Thus there is no question here of what today are called "secret services." Schmitt returned frequently to this distinction during our discussions in Plettenberg, extending indirect power not only to the influence of different churches veiled by religion but also to many cultural and educational associations, etc. which, under cover of flattering ideas, distill by insidious means an ideology meant to obtain the good faith of those who listen to them. He was worried about the current proliferation of these indirect powers, which give a false impression of politics, sap state authority from below, and end up destroying prevailing attitudes, eventually even society itself.

In view of the dissemination of these indirect powers, Schmitt had no illusions about the way his analyses were received. He knew people were trying to discredit him precisely by invoking the humanitarian and benevolent ideas of peace, law and morality. "The political adversaries of a clear political theory will, therefore, easily refute political phenomena and truths in the name of some autonomous discipline as amoral, uneconomical, unscientific and above all declare this — and this is politically relevant — a devilry worthy of being combated"[19] The political reality remains: all these adversaries think in terms of friends and enemies. In their edifying discourses, their talent consists in denying the political enmity which lies at the root of their rhetoric. They speculate on the fact that men are more inclined to accept repeated slogans than positive analyses or, as Schmitt put it, they "cherish the illusion of an unthreatened peace." Reality, however, cannot be denied. If a people allows itself to be seduced by the denial of the enemy it is thrown headlong into political non-existence: "It would be ludicrous to believe that a defenseless people has nothing but friends, and it would be a deranged calculation to suppose that the enemy could perhaps be touched by the absence of a resistance. No one thinks it possible that the world could, for example, be transformed into a condition of pure morality by the renunciation of every aesthetic or economic productivity. Even less can a people hope to bring about a purely moral or purely economic condition of humanity by evading every political decision. If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear."[20]

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19. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, pp.65-66.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

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Some Salient Themes

Schmitt's originality is found in his will as a jurist to examine the state in terms of its political characteristics without, however, neglecting law. To do this, he varied his approach, enriching juridical perception with political analysis. He focused on dictatorship as much as parliamentarianism, democracy and the representative system, i.e., on the political and legal aspects of any constitution, on decisive concepts in the statist structure of power, on legality and legitimacy, on sovereignty, on the ideas which animate or once animated political life: romanticism, Marxism, Catholicism, Nazism. Thus Schmitt was interested in political writers — Machiavelli, Rousseau, Maistre, Tocqueville, Proudhon, et al. But above all he contributed to the rediscovery of Hobbes and Donoso Cortès.[21]

Sovereignty is a key concept for the modern state, even though today this is being challenged. In any event, the first theorists of sovereignty, Bodin and Hobbes, were also the first theorists of the modern state. Foreseeing the crisis of the modern state, it is understandable that Schmitt devoted one of his early works to this problem, first in an article which appeared in a collective work published in honor of Max Weber, his former teacher, then in a more substantive work, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.*[22] The title itself is already very revealing in that it associates sovereignty with theology and politics. Political theology was a constant preoccupation, as can be seen by the last work Schmitt published during his lifetime.[23] Finally, many contemporary criticisms of sovereignty all too quickly rebuff the political problematic it engendered. Were they not related to sovereignty, it would be impossible to understand the concepts of nation, national independence, self-determination, non-interference in the affairs of other states, decolonization, the demands of ethnic minorities, and by extension, federalism or supranationality. This failure to appreciate sovereignty results from a certain narrow-mindedness which conceives it only in terms of public law.

Schmitt broke with this trend by ascribing political significance to the

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21. One can gather an idea of the whole of his work by consulting Piet Tommissen's bibliography in the following three works: *Festschrift für Carl Schmitt* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1959); *Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1968); and "Miroir de Carl Schmitt," in the *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 44 (Geneva: Droz, 1978).

22. Tr. by George Schwab (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1985.) First Published in 1922.

23. *Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1970).

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juridical concept of sovereignty, thus reestablishing the broken links with the tradition of Bodin and Hobbes. He claims: "Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception."[24] The whole definition rests on relating "decision" and "state of exception" which, given the nature of law, jurists tend to ignore. If this exclusion conforms to the spirit of the law, it does not conform to the historical course of things. For Schmitt, Hans Kelsen typifies the trend toward the imperialism of law. Was he not the author of a theory of pure law, of a theory of law conceived for itself, which cleanses legal thinking of any extra-legal contamination? Schmitt countered that law does not generate itself, nor is it generated by jurists but by a political will outside law. The pure theory of law is intellectually seductive because of its ideality in legal matters, but it does not account for law's creation, its validity or its vocation in society. The juridical domain is objectively given, but only because there are scientific analyses of existing law. In this case, one forgets that jurisprudence deals with law as given, while the politician does not legislate on the basis of scientific considerations but in terms of social contingencies. Thus Schmitt constantly reiterates Hobbes' dictum: *auctoritas non veritas facit legem* (authority, not truth, makes law).

Even a state based on law never functions according to the prescriptions of pure law, for the simple reason that it is compelled to fulfil ever its political obligations. These exigencies obtain whatever its stripe: liberal, socialist, conservative or progressive, provided it does not want to be overthrown. The concept of sovereignty strikingly emphasizes this because it raises the question of politics in extreme situations, when law does not provide clear direction. Accordingly, if I understand Schmitt correctly, different politicians are either audacious or impotent depending on the works they read, i.e., depending on the legal, political, economic and scientific writings which influence their choices or encourage them to reflect on their behavior. The devil is one face of the divine or, in the language of secularization, the sacred.

Despite constitutional dispositions concerning the state of emergency or the state of siege, as well as the possibility of legislation by decree, these procedures are not exceptional situations in the full sense because they can be legally foreseen. By its very nature, the exceptional situation is politically and legally unpredictable: it arises spontaneously during the course of events, such as capitulation after a lost war. What legal texts

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24. Schmitt, *Political Theology,* p. 5, translation altered. The German text states: "*wer über Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.*" There is a problem in translating the preposition "*über,*" since it can mean he who decides *on* an exceptional situation or he who decides *in the case of* an exceptional situation.

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direct political will or simply clarify it in such cases? In every case, the exceptional situation is unprecedented and cannot be defined juridically. While there are always exceptions, they always occur in a different context. These observations are the strengths in Schmitt's analysis. For a jurist, the exception can only be a disturbance which should not happen. Politically, however, it brings about a critical situation which must be handled at all costs. It is not a matter of legal gaps which can be filled with appropriate dispositions but rather of a lack of power, of the law's inability to be constitutive. Since the exceptional situation demands not a norm but a decision, it is imperative to recognize that, no matter how good a jurist one may be, there are all kinds of extra-legal spheres — political, economic, religious, scientific etc. — that refer to their own norms (only secondarily to legal norms) and regulate disagreements or conflicts within these spheres. A scientific problem must be resolved scientifically.

The exceptional situation is characterized precisely by the fact that it cannot be handled through norms: this is what makes it an exception. It is "that which cannot be subsumed."[25] Moreover, it is important to handle the exception "for a legal order to make sense."[26] Legal theories of sovereignty assume law can suspend itself within the confines of preestablished norms. In fact, the exceptional situation suspends law and all its normative presuppositions. Consequently, one must recognize that law has limits — a legal order is not necessary for the creation of a new law. In this case authority, i.e., political decision-making, is tantamount to legislating. The notion of sovereignty only confers authority on authority. It is easy to understand why Kelsen, who thought only in terms of preexisting norms, asserted "the concept of sovereignty should be abandoned."[27] He was simply a pure jurist for whom law, rather than the state, is sovereign. Like the most general concepts, however, the basic norm cannot contain everything if one understands by this that decision-making is reduced to a simple deduction from preexisting norms. The exception illustrates that not everything is predetermined in the politics of a state. There is at least a margin of indeterminacy for which political decision-making must be held accountable in the absence of adequate normativity.

Although not explicitly spelled out by Schmitt, a decision taken contrary to the norms of a given order to establish another one must not be

25. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 13.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 13
27. Hans Kelsen, *Probleme der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrecht* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920), p. 330.

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confused with a decision whose verdict reestablishes the normativity disturbed by the exception, sometimes by introducing new norms. This decision may not be objective with respect to existing norms, but the order it determines will become objective from the perspective of positive law. If the state refuses to make a decision in an exceptional situation, it runs the risk that other forces will make one in its place and establish their own norms. This is what happens during a *coup d'etat*, a revolution or a rebellion if the *coup d'etat* fails. Schmitt says: "The decision becomes instantly independent of any argumentative substantiation and acquires an autonomous validity."[28] This does not mean that any decision will necessarily be good or effective. If it does not correspond to what is required by the given situation, it will be defeated by a more opportune one. All moral, legal, economic or scientific precautions are impotent in the face of the urgency to make a decision. If Schmitt agrees with Rousseau in recognizing that the sovereign will can do what it wants, he rejects the idea that it can never behave badly or wrongly. It is not clairvoyant. Sometimes making a decision, even an inadequate one, prevents an exceptional situation. In other words, the decision can be more important than its content. It is not that Schmitt disdains the norm, only pure normativism which does not take decision-making into account. In fact, as he shows in his treatise on the three ways of conceptualizing law, order is the result of a mediation of norms and decisions.

The Law May be Silent

The norm represents continuity; the decision is timely. In the case of sovereignty, however, the decision is the final recourse in the discontinuity and rupture introduced by the exception. The latter provokes and overturns, which is why one hopes that an exceptional situation never occurs. The jurist tends to privilege norms because they are conservative in nature — especially because they have the advantage of being impersonal and apparently objective whereas the decision is personal and apparently subjective. Yet exceptional situations do arise. Schmitt states: "Whether the extreme exception can be banished from the world is not a legal question."[29] The law may be silent. For philosophical, moral or ideological reasons, one may hope no decision will ever have to be made, but those who provoke the exceptional situation are not concerned with abstract wishes. Terrorists do not ask passengers on a plane if they have the right to highjack it. The law can anticipate who normally holds sovereignty, who is

28. *Ibid.*, p. 31, translation altered.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 7, translation altered.

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subject to it, but it cannot say in advance who is in charge in the case where no authority has been established any more than it can explain the will of whoever decides in this situation or provide directives. All this is the business of the decision made on the spot to meet the needs of a given situation. In the final analysis, legal dispositions hold for current situations which they rightly normalize. It is in this sense that most constitutions formally specify that sovereignty resides with the people. The exceptional situation calls this very sovereignty into question because, ultimately, it is characterized by a conflict between two sovereignties, the one in place and the other aspiring to replace it. In this situation, the sovereign is the one who makes a decision to resolve the conflict to his own advantage. As with all politics, conflicts have to do with power relations: in normal situations, these relations are stabilized; in exceptional ones, they become explosive.

In politics, things happen as follows: the one who wins a conflict between sovereignties reestablishes order or sets up a different one. *Ex post facto*, he relinquishes the momentary power he exercised as sovereign in solving the conflict and generally gives it back to the people, formally recognized as the legitimate sovereign. The conceptual strength of Schmitt's definition is immediately obvious. While legal definitions are inflexible, often abstract and fictitious, the one he proposes is eminently political. In fact, it closely follows empirical reality. In concrete cases sovereignty is flexible because it sometimes has to define itself or vacillates between the formal and serene sovereign who obtains in normal situations and the effective one in exceptional cases who decides in the last instance. No law can say whether an exceptional situation must happen, can happen, or when, nor can it determine the authority of who will decide in the last instance. In this case, as in the exceptional situation, the decision is a question of the moment which cannot be legally "transcribed." One may regret this, just as one may deplore the damage caused by a cyclone, but the norm cannot stop the cyclone.

The problem of decision remains the background in Schmitt's study on legality and legitimacy,[30] but from another perspective. Although in the very first sentences Schmitt explains that he does not want to intervene in the political crisis shaking Germany, this crisis remains latent like a shadow across the pages. The general theme is the anguish of liberal politics in the 19th century. He analyzes this in terms of the legislative

30. Cf. Carl Schmitt. "Legalität und Legitimität" (1932). in Schmitt, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze, op. cit.*, pp. 263-345. Supplemented by the final notes in *Legalität und Legitimität* (1932), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968).

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state in contraposition to the jurisdictional state (which privileges judges' verdicts) as well as the administrative state (dominated by functionaries or the bureaucracy). In reading the text today one is struck by the foresight of Schmitt's observations, which prefigure today's situation.

To understand how the liberal representative system went astray, it is helpful to recall the ideal it sought to realize and the convictions behind it. Its proponents were convinced that, if they could not succeed in eliminating politics completely, they could at least reduce it to a few secondary functions. To this end, one had to have absolute confidence in law — the only thing worthy of rule, an act of enlightened reason rather than blind and arbitrary will. Liberals did not intend law as a particular disposition meant to regulate evolving situations but as a general and impersonal norm advancing human progress. Thus the source of law was to last forever. So understood, the goal of law was to develop an immense rational and universal system of norms able to predetermine the future.

On Law and Universal Norms

These general norms and universal laws, rather than particular norms or individuals, would govern. In other words, particular norms would not be the mere outcome of legislative acts but the special application of these general norms. The result would be a closed system of sovereign legality, needing no legitimacy because it would not be grounded on any presuppositions. It would be automatically legitimate, fulfilling the desires for peace, freedom and justice. Later conceptualized by Max Weber as one of the three types of legitimacy (in addition to the traditional and the charismatic), legality here is legitimacy. Legality and legitimacy coincide. Consequently, law requires no control since it is necessarily good as the concrete application of a general system of norms.

Until the ideal is realized, the authority of power must find a substitute in the free debate of parliamentary legislators, who have no other concern but to redeem, by the light of reason, the paths most apt to lead to a general system of norms, thanks to the totality of legislative acts accumulated in this fashion. Proponents of this doctrine went so far as to cherish "the illusion . . . that one could find a legal way and a legal procedure for even the most radical and revolutionary aspirations, goals and movements without recourse to violence or upheaval — a method that would simultaneously provide order and yet be functionally 'value-free'."[31] The

31. Schmitt, "Legalität und Legitimität," *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

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rule of general norms was thus conceived in quantitative terms, not only as accumulated progress but also as debates between the majority and the minority in parliament. However, this latter distinction lacks substance because it deals only with discussions concerning the best methods to realize goals with which everyone supposedly agrees: "The state is law, law is the state,"[32] meaning that the empirical characteristics of politics (such as power, command and obedience) or the enemy could be eliminated. Men would bow spontaneously to such a regime without really obeying, to the point where all rights to resistance could be abandoned.

Schmitt's criticisms are first and foremost theoretical. Can law, as a legislative act, ground a system of universal norms? In fact, law is not without limits because it is not possible to legislate on everything, and not everything can be subjected to a norm. Some areas fall outside legality and are even resistant to it. In any event, law cannot be reduced to the totality of laws as assumed by the legal positivism underlying liberal thought. Apart from classical natural law, there is common law, which liberalism wrongly considers retrograde. Whatever the case, neither laws nor norms constitute the whole of law. The idea of a presuppositionless legitimacy is just as debatable. Liberal doctrine presumes a harmonious and preestablished congruence between law, legality, justice and freedom, as if human relations are not subject to constant contradictions, tensions, obstacles and conflicts. The freedom this doctrine recommends would, in the long run, be exercised in a vacuum, outside the obstacles which require struggle in order to guarantee freedom. Is it true, as liberalism supposes, that everything would be better under a benevolent progress which would in principle establish peace and eliminate the authority it sees as the cause of social problems? Finally, liberal thought believes the people's representatives are necessarily devoted to the public good because they have been elected by the people (itself necessarily innocent and good) so that all legislative control proves superfluous.

This ideal, noble in its intentions, does not correspond to historical experience. Resistance and opposition have not come only from the adversaries of liberal thought but also from within it, from its practice, because politics cannot be conducted by pretending to ignore the inequalities inherent in it. Some of Schmitt's criticisms may seem minor because they find support in everyday situations, but they are not for this reason any less embarrassing because of that. Consider some examples. Once power has been acquired legally, nothing guarantees it will be exercised

32. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

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legally and that the legality in force will not be transgressed not only by authoritarianism but under the pressure of daily obligations. This theme recurs so often in Schmitt's work that his adversaries sometimes call him an "occasionalist." It is not altogether impossible that this accumulation of laws may modify, by its very mass, the system's original outlook. Corruptive time must be reckoned with. In any case, history has not confirmed the decline of the will in favor of reason. Rather, the opposite seems to have happened: authority has shown itself to be indispensable. In addition, states have been forced to create a control for legislative acts — in the form of constitutional courts or state councils — in order to counteract the incoherence of legislators and to guarantee their faithfulness to the norms they themselves established. In any case, liberals were confronted by the force of circumstance with normatively unpredictable and exceptional situations which contradicted the logic of the system and obliged it to take other than purely legal measures. One need only consider the means used by a majority to block the action of the minority. The latter is often only a formal partner in parliamentary debates, given that the opposition often appears as a political enemy whose aim is the liquidation of all liberal ideas and freedoms. Schmitt's whole work is sprinkled with reflections of this kind, sometimes by mere allusion and sometimes in a more sustained fashion. However, the main objective of his criticism is the general development of contemporary politics — a development which weakens the speculations of liberalism.

a) The idea of law has lost its former prestige: it is no longer inscribed in a system of norms but in changing circumstances. Today one seldom legislates in order to edify a temple of norms because what is essential is immediate utility. Consequently, the idea of law has deteriorated through trivialization. Many factors have played a role in this. Increasingly, parliamentary majorities are no longer simple majorities but coalitions between parties whose compromises, indispensable for cohabitation, supersede the rectitude of law: "The momentary will of a given parliamentary majority has long been based on a compromise between thoroughly heterogeneous political organizations, and parliament has become the theater of a pluralist system."[33] These debates have lost the character of free discussion about the best ways of promoting the public good and have become increasingly more or less confused attacks of opposing camps with the aim either of weakening the ruling government or of supporting it, provided

33. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

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only that parliamentarians abandon their innermost convictions. They degenerate into polemics and shouting matches. Thus the relation between majority and minority has assumed a new form. Schmitt insists on what he calls the majoritarian "premium," which he defines as a "*superlegal premium based on the legal holding of legal power.*"[34] By this he means that the majority party which exceeds the threshold of 50% enjoys a superiority which can endanger the country's established legality. The premium consists in the 1% or more which exceeds the threshold so that the majority can change the rules of the game, overthrowing society and establishing another system of reference against the 49% minority — even against the opinions of most citizens. Here it is unnecessary to cite historical examples. On this point, Schmitt recalls the classical distinction between the *tyrannus absque titulo* (the illegitimate usurper of power) and the *tyrannus ab exercitio* who, in his exercise of authority, legally abuses power by profiting from the majoritarian premium in order to impose his partisan views, often by monopolizing power through intrigues or other more or less trustworthy maneuvers.

b) The degeneration of law is also due to other factors. Law has been trivialized not only by a prolific accumulation of legislative dispositions dealing with anything and everything, but also by the proliferation of non-legislative dispositions which have the force of law because they entail constraint. These are the innumerable regulatory measures, decrees and other ordinances. Schmitt insisted at great length and on many occasions on this short-circuiting of legislature because it endangers one of the basic principles of liberalism: equality before the law. Not only is the discretion of authority thereby reintroduced surreptitiously, but legal equality is destroyed: "There is no 'equality before the decree' as there is 'equality before the law'."[35] It would be ridiculous to claim that opportunity could play the role of law. Schmitt explains: "Obviously, it would be grotesque to proclaim and execute the verdict of a tribunal in the name of a decree instead of in the name of the king or the people or the law, or to swear someone in with measures of this kind."[36] What does legality mean if non-legislative ordinances have an authority analogous to law? Is this not a case of extra-legal — thus extraordinary and possibly exceptional — options resulting in a breach in the legalist system of norms? At any rate, the legal normality of the liberal ideal is in the process of losing credibility with this

34. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

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increasingly frequent recourse to regulatory measures and decrees.

c) The accumulation of non-legislative regulations undermines the legalist monopoly as the source of legitimacy. The problem of legitimacy has been displaced. It is no longer a question of the old conflict between monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, but of a competition between various models of the state structure: parliamentary state, jurisdictional state, administrative and bureaucratic state. Here that the fate of the state plays itself out. Schmitt emphasizes the advantages enjoyed (rightly or wrongly) by modern technology or, in more contemporary terms, by technocracy, to the extent that the latter is no longer merely bureaucratic but intervenes directly in the functioning of the state and its decisions. Technology plays the role of an axiologically neutral functionalism; it presents itself as pure instrumentality endowed with competence to the point where it can pass itself off as "non-political politics"; in contemporary parlance, as politics without politicians. It is almost self-evident that it would find its legitimacy outside parliament, in another kind of rationality — the prestige of efficacy and competence in a world increasingly complex and irreducible to a general norm. At the same time, it rehabilitates elitism while laying claim to the liberal egalitarian principle, especially the equality of opportunity.

The Rise of Referendum

d) Nothing speaks more powerfully to this point than the fragmentation of closed legislative legality and the diffusion of sources of legitimacy resulting from the increasing popularity of plebiscites or referenda as opposed to parliamentary institutions. From 1932 on, Schmitt considered this the major political tendency in the contemporary world. This is a rupture, full of new conflicts, which signals the end of the liberalism of the last century. In fact, the difference between the parliamentary system and the system of plebiscites or referenda is insurmountable. Referendum imbues a momentary will, affirmed on the spot, with a legitimacy which liberalism cannot question since it expresses the immediate will of an entire people. This is not the case in parliament, which is elected for a determinate length of time and can revise previous decisions. In these circumstances, parliament appears as the ordinary legislator concerned with current affairs, whereas referendum introduces an extraordinary and singular legislation. If parliament can claim continuity in a rational process, referendum gives priority to the discontinuity of will assembled in the expression of an immediate and irreversible decision. In fact, referendum is an irremediable decision-making device which urges caution on those

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who want to use it. Failure in a referendum is a condemnation, so to speak, whereas a vote of no confidence in parliament can be compensated. On the one hand, there is a choice (*Wahl*) which is unique, decisive and irreversible; on the other, there is a sorting out (*Auswahl*) of different opinions which then can be accommodated in various ways. Referendum only accords validity to a single response, given that "the question can only be asked from above and the answer can only come from below,"[37] whereas parliament can tergiversate, send the issue back to a commission and bide its time. In this case a decision may not even be taken and a compromise may be found. Conversely, referendum is a decision, as the German term *Volksentscheidung* indicates.

According to Schmitt, this is an "intermediary situation" characterized by the coexistence of two legitimacies: one, parliament; the other, referendum. It is necessary to recognize that since the last century politics has developed in the direction of a refusal of the general system of norms as the only source of legitimacy. The new way of thinking tends to juxtapose "the system of parliamentary legality and plebescitary legitimacy."[38] This situation is obviously rife with conflict, depending on whether one privileges the norm or the decision. Whatever the case, the liberal system of the 19th century gave birth to a "pluralist splintering"[39] which paralyzes the state because compromises between political parties substitute for law and are negotiated to their benefit with no consideration for the hierarchy of urgencies and priorities. In this turn of events, the state has become a mere "social configuration" which ignores the imperatives of politics and dabbles in everything but what is essential. In this connection, Schmitt again mentions evolution toward the total state, which is impotent because omnipresent in society: "A pluralist state composed of parties becomes 'total' not out of strength but weakness; it intervenes in all spheres of life because it must fulfill the demands of all interested parties."[40] Incapable of satisfying everyone, it pretends to succeed by inflating the bureaucratic administration entrusted with responding to all these demands. Schmitt was not taken in by his own statements about referenda. He remarked, with a certain bitterness: "Legality and legitimacy then become tactical instruments used by anyone who finds a momentary advantage in them. . . . Neither parliamentary legality nor plebiscitary

37. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

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legitimacy, nor any other conceivable system of legitimation can survive such a degradation (of the state) to a technical-functional instrument."[41] In the final analysis, Schmitt was not so much arguing for the state as for the restoration of politics, its prerogatives and limits.

Schmitt favored the establishment of referendum as an institution, but not as a purely plebiscitary system. Remember the model: order requires norms and decisions, which means a purely decisional system is as absurd as an exclusively normative system. In this sense Schmitt was never a doctrinal liberal, since for him the decision is as regulatory as the norm. He was simply not doctrinaire. Since any doctrine invites dogmatism, he paid attention to situations. Conversely, given the imperatives of politics, he supported regimes which guaranteed all possibilities for free expression. If he was in favor of referendum, it was not only because he believed it restored the right to choose and make decisions *vis-á-vis* the uniformity of rationalist legalism, but because it gave a place to freedom against the closed system of normativist legalism. The latter tends to sacrifice the flexibility of intuition to the rigidity of the norm. By its very nature, a situation is not normative; it calls for a decision likely to create other norms to master it. In Schmitt's opinion, referendum offers the possibility of unblocking a situation and, if the occasion arises, of preventing the dangers of the exceptional situation, which generally occurs when the will to decision is lacking. All his work reflects this preoccupation, although for a time he was unfaithful to his own ideas and thereby tarnished his reputation.

At issue here is his position in 1934, particularly as expressed in his article "The Fuhrer Protects the Law."[42] Schmitt's failing was all the more surprising because, during discussions about new elections in 1932, he warned his fellow citizens against the "premium of the majority," which ran the risk of allowing the Nazis to act in any way they wanted if they received more than 50% of the vote. In addition, the Catholic Party, led by the prelate Kaas, demanded that Chancellor Schleicher — Hitler's adversary — dismiss his counselor Schmitt in order to facilitate negotiations with the Nazi Party. The above-mentioned article appeared the day after the "night of the long knives" in June, 1934. At the time Schmitt had good relations with the military officers on the General Staff who were worried about the direction events might take. He thought that by eliminating the SA Hitler would put an end to the exceptional situation prevailing since he

41. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

42. Carl Schmitt, "Der Führer schützt das Recht" (1934), in *Positionen und Begriffe*, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-203.

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had come to power and would then restore normal state law against the trouble-makers in his party. This was an illusion on Schmitt's part and a sign of his failure as an analyst of internal German politics. When it came to Hitler, intentions were not enough.

International Relations

A violent article, full of threats against Schmitt, appeared in 1936 in *Schwarze Korps*, the weekly of the SS, which had won out against the party's old guard. From then on, Schmitt, the specialist in public law, turned to the second branch of his concerns — international law — because it had become too dangerous to deal with domestic politics. He was not on unknown ground here, since he had already published a few studies on the subject. But now he would devote himself to it, and did so until the end of his life. The major works of this period are: *Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff* (1938), *Land und Meer* (1942), *Der Nomos der Erde* (1950) and *Theorie des Partisanen* (1963). The two focal points in this research are the theory of *Raum* (space) and the concepts of war and peace in modern European history. One cannot speak of a break between the two periods, since the major ideas in *The Concept of the Political* found another application. For example, *Theorie des Partisanen* has as its subtitle "Incidental Comment on the Concept of the Political."[43]

Schmitt's new inquiry concerned the notion of *Grossraum* (large space). To understand it, one must relate it to another concept: *Ortung* (orientation); the term "localization" is perhaps most appropriate, as long as one insists on the idea of place as a determinate spatially-bound region. It is a question of what Schmitt called *Kleinräumigkeit* (limited space). Thus in the Roman Empire and the *respublica Christiana* politics was confined to a restricted territory. According to Schmitt, "law is land-locked and has reference to land,"[44] at least in terms of its origin. At that time, the sea was regarded as a space without unity, order, law or a precise location: "On the sea there is no law"[45]; it was a free space. Again, he writes: "The great primal acts of law remain territorial orientations: land appropriations, the founding of cities and colonies."[46] The triple etymological value of the

43. Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen* (1963), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975).

44. Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (1950), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), p. 13.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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term *nomos* (law, right) must be understood in this context: it means simultaneously *nehmen* (to appropriate, to occupy), *teilen* (to divide, to distribute) and *weiden* (to pasture, to produce).[47] From the beginning, political unity was territorial in nature; the sea was not a domain on which one could establish a politically-organized people.

The modern state, which arose in the 16th century, is the juridically rationalized form of this ordered space with the prerogatives of sovereignty and defined borders. Each state had the same rights, which made it possible to establish an international politics based on equilibrium. This was the foundation of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, the most typical examples of which were the Treaty of Westphalia and the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. War and peace were conditioned by this territorial recognition, which was legally protected. Wars of extermination were abandoned in favor of what Schmitt called *gehegter Krieg* — wars which are contained, limited and controlled. Every enemy was presumed to defend a just cause; the enemy was therefore considered a *justus hostis* — a legal subject with whom one could deal and negotiate once the test of strength constituting the limited war had decided the victor and the vanquished. Borrowing a phrase from Vattel and Proudhon, Schmitt called them "*wars in form.*" They ended in a peace treaty negotiated directly between the victor or victors and the vanquished, and all other states were obligated to respect such a treaty. This *jus publicum Europaeum* was extended across the globe as new territorial discoveries were made, like the *raya* or demarcation line drawn between the Spanish and the Portuguese in South America, or like the *amity line*. In short, and without going into detail about the few difficulties with this doctrine, the idea that every enemy should be considered just, defending a just cause, signaled a "rationalization and humanization, in other words, a bracketing of war"[48] for several centuries. As cruel as any war may be, there was success in mastering it in relative terms and in giving legal substance to the notion of peace.

By contrast, the sea remained an undefined space, lacking any legal organization — a free space resisting any orientation to the state. Discussion focused in particular on the problem of whether it was *res nullius* (space belonging to no one) or *res omnium* (space belonging to everyone). England did succeed in becoming the maritime power with relative control over the oceans, but this did not call into question the received opinion

47. Carl Schmitt, "Appropriation/Distribution/Production: Toward a Proper Formulaton of the Basic Questions of any Social and Economic Order (1953)," in *Telos* 95 (Spring 1993), pp. 52-64.

48. Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

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about the sea. Since there was no real maritime state law, on the sea the enemy assumed another form. Thus the pirate (unlike the privateer) was not considered a just enemy but rather a criminal, who could not claim legal protection because he acted outside the law. In a global context, the European law of nations had two concepts of space: land-locked and maritime space, each with a distinct system of laws and a different notion of the enemy. Here Schmitt: "Land war in particular was legalized, whereby it became war between states, i.e., armed confrontation between the armies of the belligerent states. Rationalization for land war — rationalization in the sense of the fragmentation and evasion of the totality of war — signalled the increasingly sharper division into wars between states, between state-organized armies, while sparing the civilian populations and private property. . . . By contrast, sea war in this order of international law is not a war of combattants; it is based on a concept of the total enemy."[49] Schmitt indirectly suggests that land combat was a regulated struggle.

Today there has been a significant change in the nature of international relations with the slow disintegration of international European law. "Today the former Eurocentric order of international law is declining. With it the old *Nomos* of the earth is foundering."[50] Another order is developing, but without any orientation. This is regrettable, because it leads to a separation between political and legal thought traditionally associated with order and orientation. Confusion results from the fact that no new conceptual means capable of grasping the situation have been developed. The idea of space assumes a different aspect, that of *Grossraum*, which Schmitt saw as able to clarify the new situation. This upheaval threatens to bring about the decline of the state, precisely because the latter is grounded in the idea of territorial orientation. In fact, today there is a widespread *Entortung* — a kind of "disorientation," which is disconcerting. So it is easier to understand Schmitt's theory of the state, which is by no means statist. Schmitt writes that the state is a "time-bound and historically determined, concrete and specific organizational form of political unity which . . . will probably come to an end along with the epoch of the state."[51] The possible end of the state does not signal the end

49. Carl Schmitt, "Staatliche Souveränität und freies Meer — Über den Gegensatz von Land und See im Völkerrecht der Neuzeit," in *Der Reich und Europa* (1941), reproduced in part as "Staat als ein konkreter, an eine geschichtliche Epoche gebundener Begriff" in Schmitt, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

50. Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde*, *op. cit.*, end of preface, p. 6.

51. Schmitt, "Staat als ein konkreter, an eine geschichtliche Epoche gebundener Begriff," *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

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of politics; only the end of the "epoch of the state"

The disintegration of international European law proceeds together with a "planetary revolution," which has not come about abruptly. The first harbingers are found in the French Revolution, which treated its adversaries as criminals, as enemies of the human race who should be exterminated, thus creating terror internally and waging devastating wars externally. At the beginning of this century, the disintegration of international European law suddenly accelerated — no longer on the battlefields, but in assemblies and juridico-political texts, with the benediction of the humanitarian pretext of intervening in international relations. Schmitt emphasizes three decisive moments. First, the Treaty of Versailles, which broke with the tradition of direct negotiations between the victors and the vanquished and which, unable to terminate hostilities, only licensed the suspension of military operations. Second, the League of Nations, founded on the idea that certain states have the right to decide which war will be just, resulting in the obliteration of the classical distinction between war and peace. Either one conforms to law and the actions taken no longer really constitute war, or one is outside the law and war becomes a crime. Finally, the Kellog-Briand Pact, which turned war into a mere police action, thereby criminalizing it — a kind of political exclusion of politics.

Other factors also intervened. On the one hand, space increasingly lost its fundamentally land-locked meaning once the possibilities offered by sea and air space became clear. These spaces do not have internal borders, thereby eluding orientation and legal skill. At the end of *Der Nomos der Erde*, Schmitt focuses on air space, which displaces the idea of horizon and of a theater of operations. On the other hand, for humanitarian reasons Europe became absorbed with universalism on the pretext of eliminating all legitimate differences in oriented spaces. Schmitt questions not the philosophically grounded idea of universality but the confused doctrine of universalism. The ongoing "complete disorientation" thwarts juridical perception because it corrupts the idea of *topos*. This is illustrated in the utopian fad for abstractions located in a void, as in the *nowhere* or *erewhon* of English writers. In such a case, it becomes impossible to make a positive decision, rooted in oriented space and time; negative valuations become the only alternative. Universalism evades determination and orientation. By invoking the vagueness for which it stands, it encourages only attitudes "against" what exists, to the extent that only what is positive can be delimited, characterized or at least made precise. It is possible to think under the category of the universal, but it is impossible to act under that of universal-

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ism because action is inevitably inscribed in a determinate time and space. The concept of *Grossraum* reintroduces the indispensable boundaries necessary for political action.

Characteristics of *Grossraum*

Grossraum has nothing to do with *Lebensraum* (living space), frequently discussed at the time, nor with classical imperialism, such as that of England. Schmitt saw *Grossraum* prefigured in the Monroe Doctrine, which had no universalist pretensions. It concerned only American space, which it wanted to secure against any outside intervention. However, it is Schmitt's reflection on the concept of *Reich* (as he thought Hitler conceived it) which provided him with the empirical rudiments of his theory. The problem is not one of knowing whether Hitler really had the ideas Schmitt borrowed from him. What matters is that they were the pretext for Schmitt's construction. At first he believed race could be the coalescing factor in his new concept of space, but he abandoned this idea quickly enough. *Grossraum* is close to the idea of *Reich* without, however, being identical with it. To use a phrase which became popular after Yalta, it constitutes a block, i.e., a political magnitude whose influence extends beyond the limits of a state, especially in surrounding areas. It thus denotes a political power which transcends the boundaries of all the states it controls directly or indirectly and thereby creates another concept of international relations. In Schmitt's words, it is a "hegemonic" power and, as such, considers its sphere of influence to be exclusive, protected from intervention by states outside this sphere and from any other potential *Grossraum*.

Internally, the dominant power organizes this sphere in a *Leistungsraum* — a space which determines the interest and behavior of the states living under its authority. *Grossraum* implies a specific cultural orientation, ideology, economic system, type of political and juridical organization as well as strategy neither regional nor universal, despite its theoretical pretention to universality. Schmitt defines it in this way: "*Grossraum* is a sphere of human planning, organization and activity deriving from a current and comprehensive developmental tendency."[52] In this text, he also suggests that this sphere can comprise people of different origins, authorized to maintain relations with each other, but with no right to challenge the hegemonic power. The organization of this new space

52. Carl Schmitt, "Raum und Grossraum im Völkerrecht," in *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, Vol. 24 (1940), p. 149.

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requires neither scientific validity nor technical or cultural competence because it results from a political will whose repercussions will modify the idea of international law. Once it is constituted, one must rely on the capacity of this immense space to "radiate." Thus Schmitt is not referring to the past but to a potential development in world affairs.

The advent of these new spatial powers will have several consequences. The first will be the decline of the state and of the European order grounded on the idea of nationalities. The limited space of particular states cannot constitute a counterweight to the hegemonic power of a *Grossraum*. The classical state is destined gradually to lose its substance, especially its sovereignty, which from a juridical standpoint has been its major characteristic. The law within satellite states and even their legislative capacity (thus also their legitimacy) will be dependent on a new legitimacy which transcends them. Consequently, it is easier to understand the preliminary definition of sovereignty Schmitt formulated as early as 1922. It should not be understood juridically, in line with the model of theoreticians of the state, but rather *politically*, as a decision of last resort. Obviously the *jus publicum Europaeum*, founded on the independence and sovereignty of states within a more or less limited space, can only become precarious and, in the long run, obsolete. It is destined to decline, forced to yield to a new kind of international relations which will inaugurate another international law more in line with new constellations, each envisaging *Grossraum* in different ways. In other words, like the state, international European law is an historical product. It is not eternal, as it was assumed only a few decades ago. Schmitt adds that this development is not due solely to military successes or defeats but also to economic and social factors (if the internal side of *Grossraum* is taken into account) as well as universalist and humanitarian factors (if ideology is taken into account) which modify prevailing way of thinking.

Total War and "Bellicose Peace"

The new *nomos* of the Earth now taking shape will also alter the classical forms of war and peace. Already in 1938 Schmitt described humanity as moving toward an "intermediary situation between war and peace,"[53] a kind of bellicose peace no longer really war or peace. This second great

53. Carl Schmitt, "Über das Verhältnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind" (1938), in Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247f.

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revolution of space — after the revolution of the 16th century, which followed the discovery of America and found its juridical expression in the *jus publicum Europaeum* — not only changes the general perception of the *cosmos* but also political structures and the prevailing way of thinking. "Total war" threatens to replace limited war. The idea of total war must be understood in connection with the idea of the "total state."[54] It will be total for two reasons: first, because it will no longer be limited to a battlefield, but will spread across the entire planet, including extra-terrestrial space; second, because it will not be just military, since all activities — scientific, technological, economic — and all of existence will be implicated directly in this gigantic conflict. Protected zones will no longer exist, since both military and non-military sectors will be engaged in the conflict. Politically speaking, there will no longer be a distinction between those who fight and those who do not.

For Schmitt, the problem is not one of being optimistic or pessimistic but of formulating conjectures and hypotheses as accurate as possible so as to prevent potential catastrophe. There are already many signs to this effect. Traditional structures, born with the state, are disintegrating. The system of international equilibrium between continental (European) states, assured by England's maritime power, has already been dismantled. Two kinds of *Grossraum* confront each other, both of which have the unstated aim of ruling over the whole world and thus of universalizing the order they have established in their respective spheres. These powers share mutual deterrence without, however, being able to establish a juridically-based equilibrium. They are barely able to coexist. In addition, they rely on an expanding technology whose developments are hard to foresee. The main result is that technology has given precedence to air space, so the classical distinction between land and sea — the foundation of international law so far — has lost its significance. Air evades the very "orientation" necessary for a juridical construction. But without a juridical guarantee, what can the idea of order mean? Schmitt does not see what help the new *nomos* would receive from the regulation of air space — a regulation analogous to or borrowed from the law of the land or the sea. The race is on for conquest of new spaces — a colossal race toward unlimited space, whose juridification remains problematic.

Schmitt devoted the end of his life to analyzing the phenomenon of

54. Carl Schmitt, "Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat" (1937), in Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe*, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-239.

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the partisan — a paradigmatic figure in the disintegration of the classical *nomos* and the beginning of bellicose peace. The figure is remarkable because it is still land-locked, which Schmitt calls its "telluric character." Nevertheless, the partisan is an irregular — not a soldier but an armed civilian who thus embodies the non-military element in current conflicts. He is not worried about law or international conventions; he "seeks his right in enmity,"[55] turning his convictions into weapons, spurning all regulations, making use of terrorism and undertaking actions formerly considered criminal (such as hostage-taking). How can one legally regularize something irregular by its very nature? Marxism — mainly in its Leninist version — went so far as to invest the partisan with a humanitarian character, since in principle his struggle is intended to alleviate alienation and liberate humanity at the cost of physically exterminating an entire class. In other words, in the name of humanity one proclaims the opposing camp is not human and turns it into a "total non-value" in the hope that, if victory is complete, there will no longer be anyone left to call the victors criminals and monsters.

Apart from a few exceptions, international European law succeeded in containing war and in relativizing the concept of the enemy. "In a world in which the partners mutually and accordingly sink into the abyss of total devaluation before they are physically annihilated, new types of absolute enmity must develop. The enmity will become so terrible that perhaps it will no longer be possible to speak of an enemy or enmity and even all forms of both will be outlawed before the work of extermination can begin. The annihilation will then be completely abstract and absolute. It will no longer be directed against an enemy but will serve only an allegedly objective achievement of the highest values for which, as everyone knows, no price is too high. Only the denial of true enmity clears the way for an absolute enmity."[56] European law recognized the enemy, but how can he be recognized when he is denied in advance? Is there a risk of imposing a *nomos of the earth* or just a *nomos*? Perhaps half of humanity will hold the other half hostage.

Strength of Mind

Criticisms of Schmitt have been voluminous, often violent, sometimes directed against his person, sometimes against his work. There are two

55. Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

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ways of approaching Schmitt's works: either taking into account the context in which they were written, the author's personal positions, his vacillations and sympathies, which themselves changed; or by focusing on the strong points in his thought without reference to particular circumstances. The first approach is all the more legitimate because Schmitt defended interpretations related to concrete situations. This procedure, however, is only possible within the framework of a long and exacting study, since it would have to be supported by extensive scholarship, and this is beyond the scope of a succinct study such as this. This is why many of Schmitt's works have not been mentioned — works which would have allowed his ideas to be considered at greater length. The second approach has been followed because it emphasizes the originality, strength and acuity of his mind and thus the ideas which can enrich knowledge, whereas situations and circumstances of personal life only serve to expand the field of the history of events. Plato's fame does not rest on his failure as a political counsellor to Denys of Syracuse, and Bodin's does not rest on his scheming during the religious wars.

Schmitt is reproached for remaining conceptually unclear in his concept of *Grossraum*, of not having elaborated systematically the political and juridical theory behind this idea and of contenting himself with approximations filled with uncertainties. It is primarily the definition of *Grossraum* in his study on *Raum* and *Grossraum*[57] that is called into question. These criticisms do not take into account the important phrase "developmental tendency," which is included in this definition and gives it its full significance. How is it possible to describe with precision what is in the process of appearing — what has not yet taken shape? Schmitt was a jurist; as such, he knew that law can normalize only what has happened: a factual state of affairs. A developmental tendency cannot be dealt with systematically; one can only have a political presentiment of it. It is not possible to construct a juridical framework for what is only a tendency with its supports and relations without becoming utopian. Moreover, no jurist's idea has ever become law. Schmitt had hardly any examples at hand, except the Monroe Doctrine, and what he surmised in the intentions of the Third Reich were never realized. Under such conditions, it is normal that his intuitions were exploratory and imprecise. There are no miracles in juridical matters.

If one now considers what took place after WWII, i.e., the formation

57. Schmitt, "Raum und Grossraum im Völkerrecht," *op. cit.*

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of blocs, within the confines of his intuitions Schmitt seems to have had the merit of having anticipated what was about to happen and of having foreseen the methods of the Soviet Union, including the application of the notion of "limited sovereignty" to satellite countries. As the popular phrase goes, all things considered this is not all that bad. With more flexibility than the Soviets, American politicians also think in terms of *Grossraum*, as do those who work on European unification. Even some of Schmitt's minor observations, concerning piracy for example, should be considered carefully, since pirates are tolerated in many countries to an astonishing degree. Schmitt even sensed the audacity of some countries bordering the new powers which, like Iran, have benefited from the situation by establishing tough regimes, and defying the blocs. Of course, in Schmitt's works these intuitions are combined with secondary considerations about the politics of the era. In any case, there is some virtue in having grasped the outlines of what was about to happen. Entire sections of the *jus publicum Europaeum* are in the process of crumbling, so there is nothing arbitrary in Schmitt's thesis on the decline of this law.

Schmitt's Influence

These reproaches raise a more general problem. The main criticism of Schmitt is focused on his opportunism, since he based his foreign policy views on the model he borrowed from the Third Reich — especially the servitude of bordering countries. At the risk of shocking people whose good intentions are always a function of the vagaries of chance, it may be necessary to recognize that Hitler's legacy is still present today. His ideas were not overthrown on the battlefield. They were even borrowed by his enemies. His heirs are not always those one would suspect; they can be found everywhere: on the Right, Left, and Center. Hitler was a diabolical genius whose malfeasance has far from faded, if one will grant that nefarious ideas have the ability to survive as long as good ideas. One day the catalogue of ideas for which Hitler was the precursor — not only in the political arena but in economics and other spheres — should be drawn up without ideological concession or polemical prejudice.

This being the case, it is an established practice in the republic of letters to put on trial authors who go against current ways of thinking. It is thus normal that Schmitt should be a defendant. His practical choices were inconsistent, even contradictory, sometimes reprehensible. He was

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also impulsive and unpredictable, so that relations with most of his best friends had dissonant phases, including transitory breaks. His life and thought are full of contrasts. But this is no reason to discredit his work. One must always reckon with human failings. Ultimately, one must be able to make important distinctions, to recognize the quality of his writing, even if one disagrees with his practical choices.[58]

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58. Jacob Taubes has recently devoted an article to Schmitt which makes a relevant distinction between a polemical and a judicious reading. ["Carl Schmitt: Ein Apokalyptiker der Gegenrevolution," in Taubes, *Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fügung* (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1987), p. 24]. He also mentions that Alexandre Kojève, having just completed a round of conferences at the Free University of Berlin, was asked by Taubes if he planned any stops before returning to Paris. Kojève replied: "I am going through Plettenberg to see Schmitt." Taubes continued: "I could not but be astonished, even though I was accustomed to surprises from Kojève." Kojève continued: "Where should one go in Germany? Anyway, Carl Schmitt is the only one worth engaging in conversation." Although I was shocked by this response, because I had refused to meet Schmitt, I envied Kojève's independence of mind. The episode is more meaningful than it appears, since I have acquired a more nuanced idea of this Hegelian writer and of the influence of Schmitt on his political writings. In fact, there are other French writers familiar with Schmitt's work, as Raymond Aron notes in his *Memoires*, among them Jacques Maritain, Réne Capitant and François Perroux. Schmitt's influence in France was no doubt limited; 'oriented' in any event. But I have every reason to believe that DeGaulle also read him. Perhaps one day it will not be necessary to excuse oneself in advance for having consulted his works. To do so does disservice to the aesthetician Walter Benjamin, who was finally discovered in France not long ago.

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Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism

Wolfgang Palaver

One of the main differences between liberalism and communitarianism is their attitude to sacrifice. The communitarian critique of liberalism resembles very much Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism during the first decades of this century. In fact, Schmitt may be regarded as an early "communitarian" critic of liberalism. Along with many contemporary communitarians, Schmitt convincingly demonstrated the importance of religion to social life. His positive reading of sacrifice and his critique of liberalism are deeply rooted in his Catholicism. But ultimately liberalism is also an offspring of Christianity. The liberal rejection of sacrifice has its foundation in Christian theology. How can Christianity be both the root of the liberal rejection of sacrifice and the theological foundation of a communitarian critique of this position? Christianity can be characterized by its rejection of the kind of sacrifices typical of all archaic religions. It does not, however, reject sacrifice in the sense of risking one's life in a tragic situation, but recommends such a behavior as long as people find themselves in predicaments that cannot be resolved without some kind of sacrifice. Such a theological reflection on sacrifice can help distinguish between those elements in liberal or communitarian political philosophies that imply valuable contributions to social life and those which ultimately lead to disintegration.

Liberalism: Rejection of Sacrifice

Liberalism can be characterized by its rejection of sacrifice. The protection of the individual's rights and liberties is at the heart of liberal political philosophy. The work of Thomas Hobbes — "the founder of liberalism" — already shows clear traces of this anti-sacrificial attitude. According to Hobbes' definition of the law of nature, it "is forbidden to do, that, which is

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destructive of his [a man's] life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same."[1] The onesidedness of the Sermon on the Mount, which calls for risking one's own life in tragic situations where there is no alternative between killing or being killed, is against Hobbes' understanding of natural law. The individual is not allowed to risk his own life, but has to look after his own self-preservation. Modern versions of liberalism emphasize this anti-sacrificial stance even more. John Rawls, the most prominent representative of contemporary liberalism, deals with the problem of sacrifice in his criticism of utilitarianism. Against utilitarian justifications of individual sacrifices for the sake of an increase of the overall utility, Rawls emphasizes the inviolability of the individual. "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many."[2] Like Hobbes, Rawls also excludes unilateralism in his political philosophy. According to Rawls, everyone who limits his own liberties rightfully demands that all the others behave in the same way. Nobody is obliged to risk unilaterally his rights or liberties. Jürgen Habermas, another representative of contemporary liberalism, points in the same direction. According to him, it is the task of political power to guarantee that the law obliges everyone in the same way, since only those laws generally obeyed must be observed. Thus, to Habermas, rational ethics and the rule of law mean the "abolition of sacrifice."[3] Nobody is obliged to unilateralism, although Habermas concedes that those who follow the Christian way of love in tragic situations deserve moral admiration.

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1. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited with an introduction by C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1984), ch. 14, p. 189. Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, "Politik und Religion bei Thomas Hobbes: Eine Kritik aus der Sicht der Theorie René Girards," in *Innsbrucker Theologische Studien 33* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1991), pp. 124-126. Leo Strauss, "Comments on Carl Schmitt's *Der Begriff des Politischen*," in Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans., introduction, and notes by G. Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 89, claimed that Hobbes is "the founder of liberalism," because in his work "the right to the securing of bare life" has "the character of an inalienable right of man, i.e., of a claim of the individual which precedes the state and determines the purpose and the limits of the state."

2. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. xx.

3. Jürgen Habermas, *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 136. Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, "Macht und Gewalt: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Hannah Arendt und Jürgen Habermas," in W. Lesch and A. Bondolfi, eds., *Theologische Ethik im Diskurs: Eine Einführung* (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 1995), pp. 208f.

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Despite its attempt to ban sacrifice, liberalism has not been able to fulfil its own promise. Liberalism has also entailed sacrificial consequences. According to Jean-Pierre Dupuy, liberalism "asserts that it has nothing to do with the unleashing of envy and with sacrifice, but it is haunted by them. The liberal order discloses that it *contains* disorder, in both senses of the word *contain* — it has it within itself, and it holds it back. The tangled hierarchy between order and disorder is built into the liberal order."[4] It is not difficult to see Dupuy's point of an inherent sacrificial dimension in liberal philosophy by examining Hobbes' work. Hobbes is one of the "dark" authors at the beginning of our modern age, who did not conceal the price that must be paid for his anti-sacrificial individualism.[5] He is not only a forerunner of liberalism but also an advocate of the absolute state. What starts as an antisacrificial individualism, ends as a sacrificial state. The individual is only the starting point in Hobbes' political philosophy. As soon as the Leviathan is built, the individual has to give up his rights and liberties to the state. This philosophy is a clear example of Dupuy's concept of "tangled hierarchies"; it is neither individualistic nor holistic.[6] In his book on dictatorship, Schmitt referred to the odd relation between individualism and the whole in Hobbes' philosophy: "According to Hobbes' scientific natural right, the individual human being is a center of energy and the state is a unity — emerging from a whirl of such atoms

4. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, "The Self-Deconstruction of the Liberal Order," in *Contagion* 2 (1995), p. xx. Cf. Roberto Calasso, *The Ruin of Kasch*, trans. by W. Weaver and S. Sartarelli (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 138, who claims that the modern rejection of sacrifice has resulted in a large scale sacrificial system: "The first consequence of the eclipse of sacrifice will be that the world will be used without restraint, without limit, without any part being devoted to something else. But here, too, the end overlaps with the origin, like a reflection and hence reversed: once sacrifice is dissolved, the whole world reverts, unaware, to a great sacrificial workshop." p. 156: "The specifically modern sacrifice is an immense industrial undertaking which rejects the name and memory of sacrifice. One speaks of entire classes as subjects for elimination, or of the inevitable 'dropouts' who are ejected from the machinery of society every day." Cf. pp. 136, 146, 170, 180f, 214f.

5. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, in Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: "Dialektik der Aufklärung" und Schriften 1940-1950*, ed. by G. Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), p. 113. According to Leo Strauss, "Comments," *op. cit.*, p. 89, "Hobbes differs from full grown liberalism only by what he regards as the obstacle against which the liberal ideal of civilization is to be established in a determined fight: the obstacle is not corrupt institutions or the will of a ruling stratum, but man's natural malice."

6. Cf. Louis Dumont, *Individualismus: Zur Ideologie der Moderne*, trans. by U. Pfau and A. Russer (Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag, 1991), pp. 95-97. Dupuy's concept of "tangled hierarchies" is closely related to Dumont's work.

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— that devours the particular."[7] Although one can find an anti-sacrificial attitude in Hobbes' focus on the self-preservation of the individual, there is also a dimension that demands the sacrifice of the individual to the state.[8]

Whereas Hobbes openly talks about the price of his liberalism, it is more difficult to expose the sacrificial dimension in the work of later "light" liberal authors. For them there seems to be no such price: the rejection of sacrifice seems to have no sacrificial consequences. A more thorough analysis, however, reveals that they too cannot escape the sacrificial logic. Thus Dupuy has convincingly shown that Rawls' rejection of sacrifice does not really free him from sacrificial thinking. Accordingly, Rawls' theory is undermined by self-deconstruction. "His theory does not apply to sacrificial situations. It is an 'ideal' theory that is only valid for a society already governed by the Rawlsian principles of justice! . . . In this perspective, the great merit of the *Theory of Justice* is to reveal that the ethos of 'democratic' societies rests on an exclusion: the exclusion of those sacrificial situations precisely which the *Theory* excludes from its field of application. To put this another way: what the *Theory* excludes from its fields of application is in fact constitutive of the *Theory* and is an integral part of it."[9] Habermas'

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7. Carl Schmitt, *Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf*, 6th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), p. 116. Whereas in this book Schmitt claimed that in Hobbes' philosophy the individual was reduced to nothing, later he emphasized that Hobbes was a forerunner of liberalism and the rule of law. According to Schmitt's later writings, the relation of "protection and obedience" is at the center of Hobbes' state. As long as the state can protect its subjects, it stays in power. If it fails to do so, it comes to an end and the subjects have no obligation to obedience. See *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52f; "Der Staat als Mechanismus bei Hobbes und Descartes," in *Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie* XXX (1936/37), pp. 622-632; *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols*, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938), pp. 111-114; "Die vollendete Reformation: Zu neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen," in *Der Staat* 4 (1965), pp. 51-69. On the influence of Strauss on Schmitt's view of Hobbes, see Heinrich Meier, *Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss und "Der Begriff des Politischen": Zu einem Dialog unter Abwesenden.* Mit Leo Strauss Aufsatz über den "Begriff des Politischen" und drei unveröffentlichten Briefen an Carl Schmitt aus den Jahren 1932/33 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1988), pp. 39-45.

8. This is what enables Hugo Assmann, a liberation theologian, to link Hobbes with the beginning of the modern ideology of sacrifice inherent in the modern economy. See Hugo Assmann and Franz J. Hinkelammert, *Götze Markt*, trans. by H. Goldstein (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1992), pp. 155, 172f.

9. Dupuy, "Self-Deconstruction," *op. cit.*, p. xx. Cf. also Dupuy, "John Rawls et la Question du Sacrifice," in A. Juilland, ed., *To Honor René Girard: Presented on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday by Colleagues, Students, and Friends* (Saratoga: Anma Libri, 1986), pp. 135-152; *Le Sacrifice et l'Envie: Le Libéralisme aux Prises avec la Justice Sociale* (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1992).

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attempt to abolish sacrifice by establishing the rule of law also overlooks that there is no easy way out of sacrifice. The rule of law is not really abolition of sacrifice since law itself is structured by a sacrificial logic.[10]

Communitarianism: The Inevitability of Sacrifice

For some years liberalism in the US has been challenged by communitarianism. Like liberalism, it refers to a coherent and homogenous group of political philosophies; there is a great variety of different approaches, some of them even rejecting the designation "communitarian," which can in fact be called communitarian. At any rate, contrary to liberalism, communitarianism emphasizes that society is prior to the individual. This shift to the community results in a very different approach to the question of sacrifice. Whereas liberalism can be characterized by its rejection of sacrifice, communitarianism does not conceal that every community thrives on acts of sacrifice and openly claims their constant necessity.[11] This difference between liberal and communitarian positions can be illustrated by their respective views on love, marriage and the family.[12] While evangelical

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10. Cf. Calasso, *Ruin*, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-170; Andrew J. McKenna, *Violence and Difference: Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), pp. 50, 63, 85, 165.

11. Cf. Ken Anderson et al, "Roundtable on Communitarianism," in *Telos* 76 (Summer 1988), pp. 13, 17; David Pan, "Enemies, Scapegoats and Sacrifice: A Note on Palaver and Ulmen," in *Telos* 93 (Fall 1992), p. 85: "To be part of a community means to give up part of one's freedom — to make sacrifices in one own's life for the sake of the community." Stanley Hauerwas remarks that in liberal society, which make freedom an end in itself, people "lose their ability to make sacrifices for worthy ends." Hauerwas also refers to the hidden sacrificial structure of liberalism. Accordingly, the power of coercion fuels liberal and illiberal states alike. Liberalism is only different because of its diffusion of the coercive nature of state and society. "The coercive aspects of our social order are hidden, since they take the appearance of being self-imposed. Yet the distrust of the other inherent in liberal society and political theory cannot help but create powers that claim our loyalties and destructively run our lives." See Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: Towards a Constructive Christian Social Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 75 and 84. On Hauerwas' relation to communitarianism, see Arne Rasmusson, *The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1994), pp. 271-274. Communitarianism has also influenced recent American politics. Thus President Clinton often deploys communitarian arguments. In his inaugural address he thanked those "millions of men and women whose . . . sacrifice triumphed over depression, fascism and communism" and asked for future sacrifices. So far, however, he has not fulfilled these expectations. See Christopher Lasch, "Politics and Culture: The Culture of Poverty and the Culture of 'Compassion'," in *Salmagundi*, No. 98-99 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 3f.

12. Cf. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 85-112.

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Christians advocating traditional ways of social life frequently mention sacrifice to express their understanding of Christian love and do not hesitate to speak of sacrifice and obligation in connection with love or marriage, those influenced by the modern therapeutic attitude representing liberal ideologies of expressive individualism are troubled by the need to "sacrifice" some of their interests to each other. Liberal difficulties to speak of sacrifice and obligation in connection with marriage and love indicate liberalism's general difficulty in overcoming the gulf between self and other. Communitarians today insist on the necessity to reconstitute those traditional virtues that enabled human beings to sacrifice their own interests to build strong families and communities. According to a communitarian viewpoint, families cannot really work if based solely on liberal principles. "Raising children or making a marriage work through a lifetime requires personal sacrifices that are irrational, if looked at from a cost-benefit calculus."[13]

Communitarians often refer to Alexis de Tocqueville to explain their approach.[14] Over 150 years ago Tocqueville already observed that the ancient virtue of self-sacrifice was becoming increasingly suspect in the age of equality and individualism.[15] In democratic times moralists are alarmed by the idea of self-sacrifice and no longer teach the necessity of this virtue. The rejection of any kind of self-sacrifice, however, entails great dangers. Pointing to the situation in France at that time, Tocqueville concludes that those who want to save everything often lose it all. "If the members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their selfishness may lead them; and no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves lest they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their fellow creatures."[16] Selfish individualism may result in an administrative despotism worse than ancient forms of despotism because it turns citizens into something like Nietzsche's "last man."[17] Administrative despotism

13. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 324.

14. Cf. Bellah et al, *Habits*, *op. cit.*; Fukuyama, *End*, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-324.

15. Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. by P. Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), Vol. II, pp. 98f, 121.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

17. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbänden*, ed. by. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vol. 4, *Also sprach Zarathustra* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), pp. 18-20. On parallels between Nietzsche and Tocqueville, see Fukuyama, *End.*, *op. cit.*, ch. 28.

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means keeping people "in perpetual childhood" — a status in which they "think of nothing but rejoicing." This "mild" type of despotism "does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd."[18] Although selfishness is a radical rejection of self-sacrifice, it nevertheless results easily in sacrificing all the individual's private rights to the power of government.[19] Despite these fatal consequences of individualism, Tocqueville did not recommend the reconstruction of an aristocratic society. He firmly believed that aristocracy was no longer possible. According to Tocqueville, America shows how a society can prosper in an individualistic age with its suspicion of all moralities claiming self-sacrifice. While American moralists did not express the ancient virtue of self-sacrifice, they took the view that sacrifices to the welfare of the state were ultimately the best thing one could do for his own self-interest. In Tocqueville's view, this "principle of self-interest rightly understood" helped the people in America to overcome the possible dangers of individualism. "The principle of self-interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self denial."[20] This philosophical theory enabled Americans to go in a different direction than the French. Instead of saving everything and therefore losing all, "each American knows when to sacrifice some of his own private interests to save the rest."[21]

Communitarians acknowledge that Tocqueville's prophecy about a "gentle" form of despotism resulting from selfish individualism has partly come true. The former practice of daily small acts of self-denial — recommended by the utilitarian doctrine of interest rightly understood — is endangered by an even more radical individualism that rejects any kind of self-sacrifice and creates exactly those forms of despotism Tocqueville predicted. Radical individualism ends up as bureaucratic individualism.[22] An individualism celebrating the absolute autonomy of the self ultimately

18. Tocqueville, *Democracy, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 318f.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 326f.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 33; Robert Bellah *et al.*, *Habits, op. cit.*, pp. 148-150; Christopher Lasch, "Liberalism and Civic Virtue," in *Telos* 88 (Summer 1991), pp. 64-68; Hauerwas, *Community, op. cit.*, pp. 74-83; Paul Piccone and G. L. Ulmen, "Schmitt's 'Testament' and the Future of Europe," in *Telos* 83 (Spring 1990), p. 28; Paul Piccone, "The Crisis of Liberalism and the Emergence of Federal Populism," in *Telos* 89 (Fall 1991), pp. 9-22.

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causes the sacrifice of the self to immense bureaucratic structures. In accordance with Tocqueville's prediction, the endeavor to save everything has resulted in losing nearly all. Communitarians illustrate this tendency by referring to the use of human rights language in the liberal state. In a society governed by an unrestrained individualism, human rights are increasingly used to augment one's own benefit. Whereas human rights are at the heart of the anti-sacrificial attitude of liberal philosophy, the selfish and particularistic instrumentalization of those rights leads to the creation and elaboration of bureaucracies that necessitate in the long run the sacrifice of those human rights. This odd interaction of abstract individualism and managerial bureaucracies has close affinities with Hobbes' "Leviathan," which is the creation of an absolutist state in order to guarantee the self-preservation of the individual. Ken Anderson indirectly refers to Hobbes in his description of the counterproductive outcome of the contemporary use of human rights in the US: "The leviathan of rights, as currently understood, is a statist philosophy. It is ironic that these rights and liberties feed into a logic of domination which ultimately commits fundamental freedoms into the hands of a bureaucratic elite. . . . There is no issue of any social importance for which the required response is not a lawsuit. Each individual has no choice but to take refuge in his rights, but in doing so the collective lock of the state bureaucracy is tightened."[23] The same phenomenon is also discussed as "legalitarianism."[24] The long-term outcome of the instrumentalization of the legal system by a society of atomized, abstract individuals is the increasing necessity to enforce laws through coercion. What starts as individual freedom may end up in something increasingly resembling a police state. Again, an anti-sacrificial attitude results in the creation of a sacrificial system.

Communitarians have shown how liberalism's anti-sacrificial attitude results in a veiled sacrificial system that may even be worse than traditional sacrificial societies. Communitarians generally agree in their analysis of

23. Anderson a.o., "Roundtable," *op. cit.*, p. 9. Cf. pp. 6, 9-13. Cf. R. Bellah et al, *The Good Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p. 130: "The individualistic language of rights at the heart of the American legal tradition is a way of talking about the common good that inadequately addresses the kind of interdependence that is crucial in modern society." Bellah and his colleagues refer, for instance, to the American abortion debate that contrary to many European societies has led into deadlock — due to the all-or-nothing-approach of rights language. See *Ibid.* pp. 129. On the inadequacy of rights language to solve current social problems, see also Hauerwas, *Community*, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 160; Lasch, "Politics," *op. cit.*, p. 4.

24. Cf. Paul Piccone and G. L. Ulmen, " 'Schmitt's 'Testament' and the Future of Europe': Four Exchanges," in *Telos* 85 (Fall 1990), pp. 94-99. Cf. Hauerwas, *Community*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

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the perils of liberalism. Their proposed solutions, however, are very different and often contradictory. Many are not convincing and some even seem to suggest the reestablishment of traditional forms of sacrificial philosophies justly criticized by liberalism. An example of such a problematic proposal is the effort to recycle patriotism with its sacrificial implications as an important social virtue.[25] Liberalism threatens patriotism as a virtue because "men would never die for a country based merely on the principle of rational self-preservation."[26] Also troubling are certain remarks about a limitation of human rights and the creation of a less tolerant society. According to Fukuyama, the decline of the strength of community life in America "has occurred not *despite* liberal principles, but *because* of them. This suggests that no fundamental strengthening of community life will be possible unless individuals give back their rights to communities, and accept the return of certain historical forms of intolerance."[27] Fukuyama refers to groups and communities in Asian countries as a counter-example to the weaknesses of liberal society. He openly acknowledges some of the sacrificial dimensions of these Asian communities. "Strong communities in Asia come at the expense of individual rights and tolerance: strong family life is supported by a degree of social ostracism of people who don't have children; social conformity in areas like dress, education, sexual preference, employment, and the like, is stressed rather than disclaimed."[28]

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25. Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), pp. 34, 76, 261, 30. Lasch criticizes liberalism for its ridiculing of patriotism and its display of a "humanitarian horror of violence." Cf. Charles Taylor, "Wieviel Gemeinschaft braucht die Demokratie?," in *Transit* 5 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 5-20; "Aneinander vorbei: Die Debatte zwischen Liberalismus und Kommunitarismus," *Kommunitarismus: Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaft*, Axel Honneth, ed.(Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1993), pp. 110f, 116, 121; Alasdair MacIntyre, "Ist Patriotismus eine Tugend?," in *ibid.*, pp. 84-102; Walter Reese-Schäfer, *Was ist Kommunitarismus?* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1994), pp. 39f; 69-74; Tilman Mayer, "Kommunitarismus, Patriotismus und das nationale Projekt," in *Das Prinzip Nation in modernen Gesellschaften*, ed. by B. Estel and T. Mayer (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), pp. 115-128. For a liberal critique of communitarian sacrificial patriotism, see Stephen Holmes, *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 129f, 263f.

26. Fukuyama, *End*, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 326. D'Antonio criticizes communitarian attempts to take away certain human rights: "While appealing for cohesion and caring, communitarians would take away certain freedoms and rights. They would sacrifice small liberties for the sake of security. And in their rush to do good, communitarians may well trample on the individual. Their movement could create the baby boom generation's version of repressive, 1950s-style conformism." see Michael D'Antonio, "Strong Medicine," in *San Francisco Examiner* (April 26, 1992), p. 20.

28. Fukuyama, *End*, *op. cit.*, pp. 325 and 388.

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Schmitt as an Early "Communitarian" Critic of Liberalism

These questionable communitarian proposals call for a more thorough analysis of the debate between liberalism and communitarianism regarding sacrifice. Current discussions are reminiscent of similar debates in Germany after WWI. Thomas Mann's 1924 novel *The Magic Mountain* is a perfect illustration. There Settembrini, a Freemason representing humanitarian liberalism, and his adversary Leo Naphta, a Jew who converted to Catholicism and became a Jesuit, discuss individualism.[29] According to Naphta, individualism needs a transcendent God and can easily be reconciled with the needs of the community because his mystic or religious individualism demands discipline, self-denial, sacrifice, even terror and therefore joins a most unified community. Naphta criticizes Settembrini's individualism because his denial of a dualism between God and nature does not allow him to propose an ethics not linked to the state. He claims that Settembrini's absolutism of the self ends up in subordination of the state. Settembrini rejects Naphta's claims and insists he is defending an individualistic critique of the absolutist state, liberty and human rights.

Here it is not necessary to resolve this dispute between Naphta and Settembrini. It does provide, however, an interesting introduction to the work of one of the most famous critics of liberalism in Germany between the two wars. Although it may not have been Mann's intention to draw this parallel, Naphta's thinking resembles Schmitt's.[30] Like Naphta, Schmitt rejects liberal individualism and demands the self-giving of the individual to the community. There are several good reasons to focus on Schmitt's work in a discussion of liberalism and communitarianism. Both communitarians and liberal critics of communitarianism have pointed to the work of Schmitt to underline their viewpoint. Thus Piccone and Ulmen claim that "in the present situation of political stalemate, the Left can only benefit by learning from Carl Schmitt."[31] Liberal critics of communitarianism, on the other hand, have referred to Schmitt to point to totalitarian dangers connected with communitarianism.[32]

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29. Cf. Thomas Mann, *Der Zauberberg* (Frankfurt/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), pp. 545-547, 552, 622, 629, 632, 636-638.

30. Cf. Hans Mayer, *Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf: Erinnerungen I* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 141; Günter Meuter, *Der Katechon: Zu Carl Schmitts fundamentalistischer Kritik der Zeit* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), pp. 172f.

31. Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, "Introduction to Carl Schmitt," in *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987), p. 14.

32. Cf. Holmes, *Anatomy, op. cit.*, pp. 37-60; Chantal Mouffe, "Pluralism and Modern Democracy: Around Carl Schmitt," in *New Formations* 14 (Summer 1991), p. 5; Sybille Tönnies, "Die konkrete Gemeinschaft," in *Merkur* 47 (1993), pp. 580f.

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Schmitt's critique of liberalism focuses on its anti-sacrificial attitude. In one of his very first articles he compared Don Quixote with the liberal bourgeois. Whereas Don Quixote devotes himself fully to an idea, the metaphysical maxim of the "I-madness" of the liberal individual is according to Schmitt: "Be self-sufficient and avoid dying at all costs."[33] Twenty years later, Schmitt still emphasized liberalism's anti-sacrificial attitude. In *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt approvingly refers to Hegel's definition of the bourgeois, who acts "under the justification of his possessive individualism as an individual against the totality. . . . He wants to be spared bravery and exempted from the danger of a violent death."[34] Like communitarian critics of liberalism, Schmitt recognizes that despite its own efforts the individualistic denial of sacrifice ultimately ends up in a sacrifice of the self. In *Die Buribunken*, a deadly serious parody of the intellectual world at the beginning of this century, he mocks the self-sufficient intellectual who lives according to the maxim "I think, therefore I am; I speak, therefore I am; I write, therefore I am; I publish, therefore I am."[35] But what starts as the celebration of a most extreme self-esteem — an emphasis on the self so extreme that it even rules out marriage — and of a pure will to power, ends up as a total subordination to an organization that controls every moment of one's life. Schmitt's satire strongly resembles Huxley's *Brave New World*.[36] A most extreme form of self-autonomy is reconciled with the dominance of a totalitarian heteronomy. The egoistic will to power becomes a "self-sacrificing will to power."[37] In this satire, written over 70 years ago, Schmitt described the law of "publish or perish" governing today's academic life and showed its final destination.[38]

Schmitt also points to the sacrificial consequences of liberal individualism in his critique of political romanticism. According to Schmitt, individualism is at the heart of romanticism. "In an individualistically

33. Carl Schmitt, "Don Quijote und das Publikum," in *Die Rheinlande* 22 (Januar-Februar 1912), p. 351; quoted in Meuter, *Katechon*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

34. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, pp. 62f. Cf. p. 51.

35. C. Schmitt, "Die Buribunken," in *Summa* (1918), p. 103.

36. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, "Die Verzeitlichung der Utopie," in *Utopieforschung: Interdisziplinäre Studien zur neuzeitlichen Utopie*, ed. by W. Voßkamp (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1985), Vol. 3, pp. 8-14; Meutner, *Katechon*, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

37. Schmitt, "Buribunken," *op. cit.*, p. 100.

38. Schmitt's negative prophecy has partly come true. For a contemporary critique of literary criticism, see René Girard, "Theory and its Terrors," in *The Limits of Theory*, edited, with an Introduction, by T. M. Kavanagh (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 225-254.

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disintegrated society. . . it is left to the private individual to be his own priest. . . . The ultimate roots of romanticism and the romantic phenomenon lie in the private priesthood."[39] Again, the ultimate outcome of this individualism is the sacrifice of the self. "Byron, Baudelaire, and Nietzsche" are, according to Schmitt, "the three high priests, and at the same time the three sacrificial victims, of this private priesthood."[40]

What communitarians call bureaucratic individualism — the interdependence of liberal individualism and the emergence of huge bureaucracies — is summarized in Schmitt's early writings by the term "enterprise/function" ("*Betrieb*").[41] Everything is transformed into a huge industrial plant. Schmitt uses this term in *Die Buribunken* to describe the organization to which the writing individual has to subordinate himself. In this totalitarian brave new world even the repugnance of the enterprise is organized as an enterprise.[42] Schmitt characterized his world at the beginning of this century as a huge enterprise or a large organization and called it a mechanistic age in which means dominate and ends have become irrelevant. He shows that this individualistic age of enterprise ultimately sacrifices the individual despite its direct rhetorical claims. Accordingly, the individualistic age is not individualistic at all. It is, rather, the age of enterprise that destroys the individual without his being aware of it.[43]

After WWII Schmitt directly turned to those phenomena currently discussed by communitarians, focusing especially on legal issues. Like contemporary communitarians, he observed that law, after it split into legality and legitimacy, was transformed into legality and became a weapon of

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39. C. Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, translated by G. Oakes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), p. 20.

40. *Ibid.*

41. It is very difficult to translate the German term "*Betrieb*" into English. Several translators of Schmitt's work have used different English words. See Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 18 ("function"); Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, tr. and Introduction by G. Schwab, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 65 ("huge industrial plant"); *The Idea of Representation: A Discussion*, translated by E. M. Codd, edited and introduced by S. Draghici (Washington: Plutarch Press, 1988), pp. 45 ("big business concern"), 46 ("industry"); "The Plight of European Jurisprudence," in *Telos* 83 (Spring 1990), pp. 65, 68 ("enterprise").

42. Schmitt, "Buribunken," *op. cit.*, p. 102. Cf. Günter Maschke, *Der Tod des Carl Schmitt: Apologie und Polemik* (Vienna: Karolinger, 1987), pp. 33f.

43. Cf. C. Schmitt, *Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1914), pp. 3-6; *Idem*, *Theodor Däublers "Nordlicht": Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualität des Werkes* (Munich: Müller, 1916; reprint, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), p. 59.

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civil war.[44] According to Schmitt, the present is "an age in which legality has become a poisonous dagger, with which one party stabs the other in the back."[45] Similar to communitarians, he also saw that the transformation of law into legality would result in the strengthening of bureaucracies. In his last published article, he defined legality as "the functional mode of a modern industrial or state bureaucracy."[46] Schmitt also described the modern phenomenon of "motorized legislation," which is the transformation of law into a means of planning and administration. "Decrees had pushed the law aside. Legislation became motorized by simplification and acceleration. Every motorization of the legislative process, however, means an increase of power of those offices in which the decrees are created."[47] What in his early writings he called "*Betrieb*" ("enterprise") is now identified with Max Weber's "bureaucracy."[48] Schmitt comes even closer to contemporary communitarian positions where he praises Tocqueville as one of the very first authors who saw the emergence of administrative despotism. According to Schmitt, Tocqueville is the prophet of centralization and the transformation of the world into a huge anthill. Human beings will become like termites.[49] Like Tocqueville and some communitarians today, Schmitt fears the coming of a "brave new world," in which citizens will resemble Nietzsche's "last man."[50] And he knows that this brave new

44. Carl Schmitt, "Das Problem der Legalität," in *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre*, 3rd edition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), p. 447.

45. Schmitt, "Plight," *op. cit.*, pp. 69f.

46. Carl Schmitt, "The Legal World Revolution," in *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987), p. 74. Cf. also "Das Problem der Legalität," *op. cit.*, p. 444.

47. Schmitt, "Das Problem der Legalität," *op. cit.*, p. 441. Cf. pp. 444 and 447. On the "motorized legislation," see *Idem*, "Plight," op. cit., pp. 50-53.

48. Carl Schmitt, *Donoso Cortés in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation: Vier Aufsätze* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950), p. 91.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-92, 102f; cf. also Carl Schmitt, *Ex Captivitate Salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950), pp. 28-31; "Plight," *op. cit.*, p. 64, 67f. The German term "Termitisierung" ("becoming a termite") is translated as "mass society" (p. 67), which is a weaker formulation than Schmitt's German expression. On the relationship between Schmitt and Tocqueville, see G. L. Ulmen, *Politischer Mehrwert: Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt* (Weinheim: VCH/Acta Humaniora, 1991), pp. 341-361.

50. Huxley's *Brave New World* is one of the most often quoted books in Schmitt's private notes after WWII. On Huxley's negative utopia, see Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951*, edited by E. v. Medem (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), pp. 47f, 55, 60f, 75, 79, 86, 112, 159, 200, 306. Cf. Martin Meyer, *Ende der Geschichte?* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1993), p. 168; Meuter, *Katechon*, *op. cit.*, p. 134. On Schmitt's attempt to prevent the emergence of Nietzsche's "last man," see Gunther Maschke, "La Rappresentazione Cattolica: Carl Schmitts Politische Theologie mit Blick auf italienische Beiträge," in *Der Staat* 28 (1989), p. 567.

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world will not be a world without sacrifices, but a world that will kill in a "peaceful" way.[51] Like Tocqueville and contemporary communitarianism, Schmitt's critique of individualistic liberalism ultimately seeks to prevent the development of a totally administered society that becomes a huge sacrificial enterprise despite its anti-sacrificial claims.

Contrary to liberalism and its implicit tendency to transform the world into a "completely pacified globe without politics — a world resembling Tocqueville's anthill and its sacrificial implications —Schmitt wants to emphasize the political, which means the existence of a pluriverse of organized political entities able to distinguish between friend and enemy.[52] Up to WWII Schmitt had supported the state as the decisive political entity able to prevent the emergence of a brave new world. During WWII he became aware of the fact that the age of the state had come to a close. From that time on he promoted the concept of a pluriverse of "*Grossräume*."[53] Despite this change, however, Schmitt's essential emphasis on the political remained the same. Accordingly, it is necessary to have a pluriverse of political entities that organize themselves according to the political distinction of friend and enemy.

Schmitt's emphasis on the political, however, has strong sacrificial implications. These can already be found in one of his first books, his 1914 Habilitationsschrift *Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen*. This book discusses relationships between right, the state and the individual. According to Schmitt, right or law precedes the state just as the state precedes the individual. The position of the state is in the middle. It is situated between a higher law — preceding the state — and the individual. Its function is the transformation of this higher law into reality. The sacrificial dimension in Schmitt's thinking can readily be seen in his thesis about the relation of the state and the individual. In Schmitt's view, the individual is totally unimportant and has no value at all as long as he is not connected to the state. "The physical concrete individual is (if his examination is not shifted beyond its material corporeality) a completely accidental unit, a motley crowd of atoms, whose shape, individuality and uniqueness

51. Schmitt, *Glossarium, op. cit.*, p. 200; "Die Tyrannei der Werte," in *Säkularisation und Utopie: Ebracher Studien: Ernst Forsthoff zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1967), p. 46; *Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), pp. 124-126. On Schmitt's insight into the sacrificial dimension of this centralized world with its tyranny of values, see Meuter, *Katechon, op. cit.*, pp. 170f.

52. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political, op. cit.*, pp. 35, 46, 53.

53. Cf. Piccone and Ulmen, "Schmitt's Testament," *op. cit.*, pp. 31f.

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are just like those of a pillar of dust formed by the whirlwind."[54] Not all human beings as such deserve respect, but only those who are good and worthy of respect. According to Schmitt, the value of an individual depends on a task and its performance. Only the connection to the state, which provides each individual with his task, can therefore give an individual value. In order to gain respect and be valuable, every individual has to submit himself to the state. According to Schmitt, self-sacrifice to the state is the only way for the individual to gain value. Throughout the third chapter of this book, which focuses especially on the individual, Schmitt emphasizes the necessity of the individual's total "devotion" to the state.[55] The sacrificial dimension of this devotion becomes even more explicit where he refers to the old thought "die and grow" to illustrate that every individual has to belong to something beyond the realm of the individual to overcome his material nothingness.[56] At first sight it seems that Schmitt is contradicting himself. Someone who dedicated nearly his whole scholarly work to the overcoming of the modern spirit of enterprise and its tendency to bureaucratic despotism, here seems to be recommending total devotion to the state. How can bureaucratic despotism be prevented by recommending that every individual become a kind of functionary of state bureaucracy?

Schmitt was aware of this problem. According to him, however, it would be a complete misunderstanding of his position to think he was in favor of a "bureaucratic schematization" or "a Chinese type of hostility to culture."[57] He insists his considerations are first of all purely limited to the philosophy of law and do not deal with practical political questions. Secondly, his notion of the state, to which the individual has to submit, must not be confused with the government of daily politics. Schmitt's notion of the state is the state subject to a higher law and not identical with the state as a complex of power. "The extermination of the individual . . . is not because of the law and the state that is fully taken up with the realization of the law, but comes from the state as a complex of power, from actuality, which has to be opposed by a struggle of power against

54. Schmitt, *Der Wert des Staates*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 90, 92f, 108.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 89. What Schmitt calls "Chinese" in 1914 refers to traditional Chinese forms of authoritarian rule. Schmitt's reference to China and his affirmative comment on Lao-Tse's deep insight into the meaning of the state (p. 92) point to the problematic nature of Fukuyama's communitarian recommendation of "strong communities in Asia" as an alternative to individualistic liberalism.

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power. The question how the empirical individual could be supported in this case is no longer a question of the philosophy of law," but refers to "partly psychological or characterological, partly educational and purely technical questions of politics."[58]

Here Schmitt apparently avoids an open contradiction. Since its argument is confined to purely philosophical questions, he would always have the theoretical possibility to counter criticisms accusing him of sacrificial thinking in a bad sense. In the long run, however, the germ of sacrificial thinking — clearly visible in this book despite Schmitt's direct claims — began to spread.[59] Some twenty years later, when he had begun tackling political questions, he no longer talked about the state as a purely philosophical concept completely subordinate to some higher law and distinct from power. The state is the decisive political entity with enormous power: "The possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men."[60] This concept of the state is openly sacrificial. The state has the *jus belli*, which implies "the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies."[61] In accordance with this sacrificial concept of the state and the political, Schmitt criticizes the political incompetence of liberalism. Since the ultimate aim of liberalism is the protection of the individual's rights and liberties, it cannot demand sacrifices. In Schmitt's opinion, however, this anti-sacrificial attitude prevents liberalism from becoming a positive theory of politics. "The question is whether a specific political idea can be derived from the pure and consequential concept of individualistic liberalism. This is to be denied. . . . There exists a liberal policy of trade, church, and education, but absolutely no liberal politics, only a liberal critique of politics. . . . In a very systematic fashion liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and moves instead in a typical always recurring polarity of two heterogeneous spheres, namely ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and property. The critical distrust of state and politics is easily explained by the principles of a system whereby the individual must remain *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem*. In case of need, the political entity must demand

58. *Ibid.*, p. 108. Cf. pp. 89, 99f.

59. According to Hasso Hofmann, *Legitimität gegen Legalität: Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), pp. 53 and 68, Schmitt's insistence on the precedence of the law to the state in *Der Wert des Staates* remains purely logical and lacking in content and therefore points already tohis later articulation of the state as a political power.

60. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

61. *Ibid.*

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the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. . . . For the individual as such there is no enemy with whom he must enter into a life-and-death struggle if he personally does not want to do so. To compel him to fight against his will is, from the viewpoint of the private individual, lack of freedom and repression. All liberal pathos turns against repression and lack of freedom. Every encroachment, every threat to individual freedom and private property and free competition is called repression and is *eo ipso* something evil."[62]

Schmitt's fear that the world will develop into something like Huxley's *Brave New World* is connected to his criticism of liberalism's inability to demand sacrifices. He articulated this fear in his rejection of a world-state. What would remain in such a state is "neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc." Strauss clearly recognizes that it is ultimately a "world of entertainment" that Schmitt really dislikes, since it would not be serious.[63] Schmitt's rejection corresponds to his rejection of a brave new world, in which human beings would become like Nietzsche's "last man."[64] In his critique, Schmitt indirectly points to his proposal of sacrificial politics to prevent the coming of such a state: "A completely pacified globe would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics. It is conceivable that such a world might contain many very interesting antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind, but there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings."[65]

Schmitt's proposal to prevent the coming of a sacrificial brave new world of total functionalization by demanding a sacrificial concept of the political remains contradictory. There is no possibility left, as in his book on the state and the individual, to avoid this contradiction. In order to defend the bureaucratic age of the liberal bourgeois, Schmitt became a supporter of the world of the soldier.[66] His contradictory attempt to prevent a world of sacrificial despotism with the help of sacrificial politics corre-

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62. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-71.
63. Strauss, "Comments," *op. cit.*, pp. 98f.
64. Cf. Meier, *Schmitt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-57; Friedrich Balke, "Zur politischen Anthropologie Carl Schmitts," in H.-G. Flickinger, ed., *Die Autonomie des Politischen: Carl Schmitts Kampf um einen unbeschadigten Begriff* (Weinheim: VCH/Acta Humaniora, 1990), pp. 45-48; Meuter, *Katechon*, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
65. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
66. Cf. C. Schmitt, *Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches: Der Sieg des Bürgers über den Soldaten* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934).

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sponds to his personal involvement in Nazi politics. Since his approval of Mussolini's fascism and his support of National Socialism in Germany are closely linked with his critique of liberalism, Schmitt may be taken as a general example for the dangerous consequences of anti-liberalism.[67] Like contemporary communitarian critics, Schmitt's critique of liberalism convincingly exposes possible dangers of individualistic liberalism. This critique has to be taken seriously. However, Schmitt's positive proposal and its dangerous consequences must be also be taken seriously. His work helps to understand the communitarian critique of liberalism in a more profound way, but it also exposes serious flaws in some communitarian proposals. Those communitarians proposing patriotism as an important social virtue, unhesitatedly seeking to limit human rights, may take Schmitt's example as a warning.

A Theological Reflection on Sacrifice

The theological dimension of the debate concerning liberalism, communitarianism and sacrifice has not been mentioned so far. Yet it is essential. Many communitarian proposals include religious elements. This is already true for Tocqueville. He believes that in a democratic age Christian faith is essential to prevent despotism. As he puts it, "Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot. Religion is much more necessary in the republic . . . than in the monarchy. . . , it is more needed in democratic republics than in any others."[68] Many communitarians follow Tocqueville on this. Thus Alisdair MacIntyre also expresses hope in religious virtues in addition to his appeal for Aristotelian ones.[69] The same is true of Bellah and his colleagues. Throughout *Habits of the Heart*, they claim that biblical and republican traditions must be kept alive in order to avoid the dangers of liberal individualism. Likewise, Fukuyama refers to the importance of religious values that helped to build strong communities in the past.[70] Piccone criticizes the Left for its inability to take religious

67. According to H. Meier, *Die Lehre Carl Schmitts: Vier Kapitel zur Unterscheidung Politischer Theologie und Politischer Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 1994), pp. 205-228, Schmitt's antiliberal position was essential for his support of Nazi politics. Meier also stresses the fact that Schmitt's fear of a world state contributed to his acceptance of nationalistic concepts typical of German National Socialism (p. 226).

68. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 318; Vol. II, pp. 22, 31f, 143-147, 149-151.

69. For a rather hypercritical view on the importance of religion in MacIntyre's book *After Virtue*, see Holmes, *Anatomy, op. cit.*, pp. 95-97.

70. Fukuyama, *End, op. cit.*, pp. 325-327.

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questions seriously.[71] According to him, "real human beings are always inescapably immersed in transcendence" and it is religion that "deals with the ultimate relations concerning the part and the whole, the finite and the infinite, the individual and the totality. . . . It has been the historical role of organized religions to provide pre-packaged solutions to these questions and, therefore, facilitate the achievement of an integrated organic consciousness to people who otherwise would have considerable difficulty in doing so."[72] Elsewhere Piccone emphasizes that the different religious traditions have to be distinguished according to their respective contributions to the current crisis of liberalism. He is especially critical of the liberal instrumentalization of human rights and points to Protestantism as the root of the human rights tradition. Thus he suggests a more critical view of Protestantism and shows some sympathy for Catholicism: "In spite of spectacular events that have decisively shapened collective consciousness, such as Galileo forced to recant, scores of innocent people broken at the wheels during the Counter Reformation, and the brutally repressive climate in Catholic countries . . . the popular contraposition of a liberating humanist-Protestant culture and Catholic traditionalism may be in need of revision."[73] Along similar lines, David Pan points to the importance of religion for communal life. "The existence of the sacred depends on the need for individual sacrifice to insure community survival."[74]

This communitarian emphasis on the importance of religion is also essential for Schmitt. Recent studies of his work have shown that his political theory is essentially influenced by his religious convictions. Schmitt is a political theologian.[75] Thus his aversion to the totalitarian brave new world is ultimately not based on political or philosophical reasons but is theologically motivated. In Schmitt's opinion, the human attempt to create a world of security is a satanic temptation, the Tower of Babel or the reign of the

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71. Paul Piccone, "The Actuality of Traditions," in *Telos* 94 (Winter 92/93), pp. 101f.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

73. Paul Piccone, "The Case Against Liberal Federalism and Protectionism: Reply to Johnstone," in *Telos* 93 (Fall 1992) p. 35. Cf. pp. 34f. On Piccone's criticism of Protestantism, see also *Idem*, "Actuality," *op. cit.*, p. 94: "Notions such as individual freedom, private property, constitutionally guaranteed rights, etc. are not unproblematic 'natural' entities shared by all cultures but social constructs grounded in particular deep-rooted traditions — primarily those of Protestantism."

74. Pan, "Enemies," *op. cit.*, p. 88.

75. Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, "A Girardian Reading of Schmitt's *Political Theology*," in *Telos* 93 (Fall 1992), p. 46; Meier, *Schmitt, op. cit.*; *Lehre, op. cit.*; Meuter, *Katechon, op. cit.*; Bernd Wacker, ed., *Die eigentliche katholische Verschärfung . . . Konfession, Theologie und Politik im Werk Carl Schmitts* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994).

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Antichrist.[76] He also distinguishes between those Christian traditions leading to liberalism and those avoiding such an outcome. Schmitt criticizes Protestantism — especially Calvinism and Puritanism — as the root of individualistic liberalism and the modern detachment of politics from bonds. He sides with Catholicism and its emphasis on a visible institution, instead of focussing on private individualism like liberalism, and he emphasizes Catholicism's close relation to the soil and its ability to prevent the splitting of law into legitimacy and legality.[77]

Is Schmitt's account of the theological roots of liberalism an appropriate answer to the political problems caused by the long-term influence of Christianity? Does his position provide a theological answer to the crisis of liberalism? Here a biblically oriented theology aided by Girard's mimetic theory can help clarify the theological dimension of the current debate on liberalism and communitarianism.[78] Girard's theory seems to be an especially proper tool to focus on the question of sacrifice in this debate. A first important insight gained with the help of mimetic theory is the fact that the most essential element of liberalism, individualism, is an offspring of biblical revelation. According to mimetic theory, the social life of archaic societies is ultimately based on a victimage mechanism that generates internal cohesion, peace and harmony by channeling all aggressions and rivalries outside: A relatively (compared with the group of the lynchers) innocent scapegoat is killed or expelled. The truth of the whole victimage mechanism is not understood by the lynchers. They attribute both the crisis preceding the expulsion or killing and the new harmony after the event to the expelled or killed victim. Thus the victim becomes a primitive god representing simultaneously good and evil. The original scapegoat mechanism is a social mechanism creating the sacred. Many myths provide evidence for this theory. These myths tell about an original crisis that was overcome

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76. Schmitt, "'Nordlicht'," *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62; *Theology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65; *Idea*, *op. cit*, p. 39; *Romanticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 16; "Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen," in *Idem*, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), p. 93; "Plight," *op. cit.*, p. 70; *Donoso Cortés*, *op. cit.*, p. 11; *Glossarium*, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 165; "Die Einheit der Welt," in *Merkur* 6 (1952), pp 1f; "Nomos-Nahme-Name," in Siegfried Behn, ed., *Der beständige Aufbruch*, Festschrift für E. Przywara (Nuremberg: Glock und Lutz, 1959), p. 104; *Politische Theologie II*, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 81. See also Meier, *Schmitt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-57.

77. Schmitt, *Diktatur*, *op. cit.*, p. 116; *Romanticism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8f, 24; *Idea*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 53, 56; *Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung* (Cologne-Lövenich: "Hohenheim" Verlag, 1981), pp. 41, 44, 52, 78f, 81-85; "Problem," *op. cit.*, pp. 447-449.

78. For a short introduction to Girard's mimetic theory, see Palaver, "Reading," *op. cit.*, pp. 47-51.

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through the killing of an evildoer who later became a god. Sacrifice is an offspring of this victimage mechanism. It is the conscious repetition of the original scapegoat mechanism to stabilize internal peace.

According to mimetic theory, the long-term influence of Judeo-Christian revelation has slowly destroyed all cultures based on the scapegoat mechanism. As in many myths, we also find in the Bible many narratives that tell about collective violence against a victim. Unlike other myths, however, the biblical perspective sides with the victim. The most outstanding examples are the songs of the suffering servant of Yahweh (*Isaiah* 42:1-9; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; 52:13-53:12) in the Old Testament and the passion narratives about Jesus Christ in the New Testament. In both cases, the Bible emphasizes the innocence of the victim persecuted by the multitude. In the long run, this solidarity with the victim created modern individualism. The radical shift in perspective was not immediately understood. It took centuries until the biblical texts changed our attitudes concerning sacrifice and victimization. However, the more the content of the biblical message came to the fore, the more people became aware of its new view on humanity. When Christian spirituality shifted its emphasis to the human sacrifice at the Cross and the suffering humanity of Christ at the end of the Middle Ages, modern individuality began to emerge.[79] The identification with Christ's violent fate helped human beings understand that the single suffering individual stands far above any social system demanding its sacrifice. The value of the single individual began to rise. The liberal rejection of sacrifice is closely connected to this new view of the individual.

Does that mean Christianity is the root of all the current problems resulting from individualistic liberalism? Is Christianity the ultimate source of the modern "cult of the victim" undermining social life?[80] Nietzsche and current representatives of the European New Right, such as Alain de Benoist in France, answer these questions in the affirmative.

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79. Cf. Cesáreo Bandera, *The Sacred Game: The Role of the Sacred in the Genesis of Modern Literary Fiction* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 245-255.

80. According to Lasch, "Liberalism," *op. cit.*, pp. 67f, the current "cult of the victim" is contributing largely to the creation of huge bureaucracies, which increase the victimization of many people: "Claimant groups aggressively displaying their wounds, begging for handouts, and blaming all their troubles on a system of organized oppression are the natural counterpart of the bureaucrats who selectively dispense governmental largesse." On the status of "victim" as the seal of moral rectitude in contemporary American society, see also Gil Bailie, *Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads* (New York: Crossroad, 1995), pp. 22-24.

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According to Nietzsche, Christianity has to be blamed for causing individual selfishness and the rejection of sacrifice: "The individual was taken so seriously, he was posited as such an absolute principle, that he could no longer be *sacrificed*: but the species only survives thanks to human sacrifices."[81] Today the New Right follows Nietzsche and demands the substitution of paganism for Christianity.[82]This, however, would be a dangerous attempt to return to sacrificial religion. It may not be possible at all and may result in an unleashing of violence typical of totalitarian movements. Here the fatal consequences of National Socialism should be a warning.

If it is not Christianity as such that caused the destructive instrumentalization of the new emphasis on the victim, what is the real reason for this negative development? The problem is not the biblical overcoming of archaic sacrificial structures but a perversion of the biblical impulse. Girard is aware of the fact that in modern culture the knowledge of the victim is used for a more subtle persecution, but he clearly rejects any direct connection of this development to biblical revelation. "The unique character of modern times is revealed in the fact that, in the competition for public opinion, the position of the victim is now the most desirable. It is no longer the ancient posture of a suppliant struggling to arouse pity, but a claim for legal and even extra-legal rights. This unique situation is a product of biblical influence. But we need not, like Nietzsche, become obsessed by mimetic *ressentiment*, so that we look on it as the legitimate heir to the Bible and even as its earliest inspiration. Resentment is merely an illegitimate heir, certainly not the father of Judeo-Christian Scripture."[83] Biblical revelation is not only the rejection of the ancient reliance on sacrifice, it shows at the same time that the biblical overcoming of sac-

81. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke*, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887-1889*, p. 470; quoted in R. Girard, "The Founding Murder in the Philosophy of Nietzsche," in P. Dumouchel, ed., *Violence and Truth: On the Work of René Girard* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 244.

82. Cf. Alain de Benoist, *Comment peut-on être paien?* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1981). For a theological critique of the New Right, see Józef Niewiadomski, "Die Götter der Vertreibung und der vertriebene Gott," in M. Langer, ed. *Wir alle sind Fremde: Texte gegen Haß und Gewalt* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1993), pp. 146-153; Wolfgang Palaver, "Die religiöse Dimension des Nationalismus," in *Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift* 142 (1994), pp. 232f.

83. René Girard, *Job: The Victim of His People*, trans. by Y. Freccero (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 108. In his most recent book, Girard discusses the same problem in his critique of political correctness, which he calls the religion of the victim detached from any transcendence. See, *Quand ces choses commenceront . . .*, Entretiens avec M. Treguer (Paris: Arléa, 1994), p. 65.

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rificial culture is itself based on a kind of "sacrifice" that, however, must not be confused with the archaic sacrifice rooted in the scapegoat mechanism. It is the nonviolent behavior of the suffering servant of Yahweh, for instance, that made it possible to see him later as an innocent scapegoat.[84] His people disdained him, spat on him, beat him and finally killed him. But since he voluntarily offered his back and cheek and thereby caused the misdeeds not to fall back on his persecutors, he enabled them to come to a better understanding later on. His self-giving helped them understand themselves as persecutors. The same applies to Jesus Christ. In a tragic situation in which he could only have escaped death by the use of force, his complete commitment to nonviolence lead him to the Cross. He risked his life for the sake of mankind. Both, the suffering servant of Yahweh and Jesus Christ, risked their lives in a tragic situation in which they had to choose between killing or being killed. The "sacrifice" of the suffering servant and Jesus differ radically from the sacrificial logic of the scapegoat mechanism. The suffering servant and Jesus neither used violence against others to save their own lives, nor are they examples of a masochistic attitude to sacrifice themselves; they rather gave their lives in order to save the life of others.[85] Girard refers to the biblical story of the Judgement of Solomon (1 *Kings* 3:16-28) to explain the difference between the archaic sacrifice rooted in the scapegoat mechanism and the "sacrifice" of Jesus Christ.[86] Two women are quarreling about who is the true mother of a living child. After Solomon had decided to divide the child in two, the bad mother accepted his judgement and demanded the death of the child. She represents the sacrificial spirit of the scapegoat mechanism. The good mother, on the other hand, sacrificed her rights to the child when she

84. Cf. Raymund Schwager, *Must There Be Scapegoats? Violence and Redemption in the Bible*, tr. by M. L. Assad (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 126-135.

85. Although Aviezer Tucker, "Sacrifice: From Isaac to Patocka," in *Telos* 91 (Spring 1992), pp. 117-124, does not understand the real meaning of the "sacrifice" of Jesus, since he relies too much on traditional theology that made God and not the people responsible for the death of Jesus, he comes close to the biblical perspective where he defines a "just sacrifice" as "a conscious self-sacrifice for truth and life aimed at its discovery." (p. 122) In an interesting application of this definition to political life in former Czechoslovakia, he distinguishes between the just sacrifice of the philosopher Jan Patocka, who wrote and signed *Charter 77* and died in 1977 in a Prague hospital, following a massive brain hemorrhage he suffered under police interrogation, and the questionable self-sacrifice of Jan Palach, a student who burned himself in Prague in 1968.

86. René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World*, research undertaken in collaboration with J.-M. Oughourlian and G. Lefort, trans. by S. Bann and M. Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 237-245. See also McKenna, *Violence*, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-211.

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asked the king to spare the life of the child and give it to the other woman. She even risked her own life since she could have been accused of being a liar after she had given up her right to the child. According to Girard, the good harlot is the perfect *figura Christi*. She "has absolutely no inclination to 'sacrifice herself' in the abstract. She wishes to go on living to take care of her child. But she is ready to renounce her child for ever, even to renounce her own life if necessary, *in order to save his life*."[87] Like the suffering servant of Yahweh and Jesus, the good harlot is a representative of the biblical logic of devotion not demanding self-sacrifice for its own sake but for the sake of the others. Jesus clearly expresses this biblical spirit of devotion: "This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends" (John 15:12f). Jesus' command to risk life for the sake of the others depends on its connection to God, to an all-embracing transcendence of love. Jesus' famous saying about the grain of wheat must be interpreted against this background: "Very truly, I tell you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it bears much fruit. Those who love their life lose it, and those who hate their life in this world will keep it for eternal life." (John 12:24f) This passage must not be understood in the sense of archaic sacrifice, but in the light of the acts of self-giving performed by the good harlot, the suffering servant, and Jesus Christ.

Despite his commitment to Catholicism, Schmitt did not really understand these dimensions of Christian theology; he is not really a representative of sacrificial thinking in the sense of archaic myths. Nietzsche and Schmitt clearly differ from each other. Schmitt, however, does not take the perspective of the Bible either. He always had problems to reconcile the biblical perspective with his way of thinking. Most famous is his attempt to overcome the tension between his definition of the political as the distinction between friends and enemies and the commandment of the Sermon on the Mount to love one's enemies (*Mt* 5:43-48) in his book *The Concept of the Political* by contending that the Bible only calls for the love of the private enemy.[88] Moreover, there is already some tension between Schmitt's theoretical standpoint and a biblical perspective in his *Der Wert des Staates*. There he especially criticizes all those attempts in which law is deduced from empirical reality or just from nature. According to him, his philosophy of law represents "natural

87. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

88. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, *op. cit.*, pp. 28f. Cf. Palaver, "Reading," *op. cit.*, pp. 65f.

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right without naturalism."[89] Schmitt thinks that right or law cannot result from the observation of nature, e.g., from the empirical social life of human beings. "Only by establishing a norm is it possible to justify the difference between right and wrong, nature cannot. The sun shines on the just and the unjust."[90] The last sentence of this quote resembles the behavior of the heavenly father as Jesus described Him in the Sermon on the Mount. According to Jesus, one should love one's enemies in order to become the Father's child. "For he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous." (*Mathew* 5:45) Schmitt's critique of naturalism, i.e. that nature is not able to distinguish between the just and the unjust, indirectly criticizes also the biblical God. In fact, it is not really possible to reconcile the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount with any kind of philosophy of law. Yet, all human attempts to create right is put into perspective by the biblical viewpoint. Schmitt disliked such an undermining of law. His critique of naturalism resulted in his denying of any value to the empirical individual as long as it is not subordinated to the state. Schmitt's exclusive linking of the value of the individual to the state cannot be justified from a biblical perspective. God, as creator, makes every human being and nature itself valuable. Schmitt felt his position on the individual conflicted with a theological perspective. In a footnote he remarked he was only talking about "the importance of the individual in the state, not about religious matters."[91] But this attempt to avoid a theological challenge remains futile. It is not possible to relegate the biblical perspective within the narrow boundaries of scholarly disciplines.

However, it is not only Schmitt's attempt to separate the religious realm from politics and law that causes his problematic relation to the biblical perspective. The main problem is that his own theology does not really comprehend the biblical impulse. It was the increasing emphasis on Christ's suffering at the end of the Middle Ages that was both a return of Christian theology and spirituality to its biblical roots and the emergence of modern individualism. Until the end of WWII, Schmitt had never focused on Jesus'suffering humanity. In his book on the political significance of Roman Catholicism he claims, for instance, that the Catholic Church is the real contrast to the age of enterprise and contends that She "makes up . . . the historic bond with Christ's Incarnation and the Sacrifice

89. Schmitt, *Wert, op. cit.*, p. 76. Cf. pp. 102f, 106, 109.
90. *Ibid.* p. 31.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

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of the Cross. She personally represents Christ Himself, the God who in historical reality became Man."[92] This reference to the Cross, however, does not mean Schmitt actually understands the real biblical significance of the Crucification. He does not refer to the suffering humanity of Christ, but to Christ as a victor and representative of power. "In the great history of the Catholic Church we find besides the ethos of justice that of its own power. It is even increased to that of prestige, glory and honor. She wishes to be Christ's royal Bride. She represents the ruling, reigning, and victorious Christ."[93] When he was accused of supporting National Socialism, after the war, and therefore felt victimized, he became aware of the suffering Christ on the Cross for the first time. Schmitt, however, was not able to translate this new experience into politics; he never really understood the political meaning of the Cross and thus both the biblical root and the political importance of liberalism.[94]

Schmitt is a representative of sacrificial Christianity, the historical type of Christianity that is in danger of diminishing the gulf between the mythic religions of archaic societies and the full scope of biblical revelation. He justly emphasizes the necessity of transcendence in the face of those types of liberalism that as a perverse offspring of Christianity have lost any relation with the divine transcendence and represent an instrumentalization of the knowledge of the victim for their own interests. But the transcendence on which Schmitt insists, at least as long as it is politically relevant, is exclusively linked to the state and is not the universal and divine transcendence of love. Schmitt's understanding of transcendence is closer to the immanent transcendence resulting from the scapegoat mechanism than to a real divine transcendence. His critique of naturalism in *Der*

92. Schmitt, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

93. *Ibid.* p. 56 [translation corrected].

94. Cf. Schmitt, *Ex captivitate*, *op. cit.*, p. 61: "The last refuge for a human being who is tormented by other human beings is always a prayer, a quick prayer to the crucified God." In his post-war diary many remarks point in the same direction. There he even formulates a theological alternative to Huxley's brave new world that differs significantly from his sacrificial concept of the political and demands martyrdom, a way much closer to the biblical perspective. See his *Glossarium*, *op. cit.*, p. 159: "The leap into the fantastic, the utopian, the brave new world of Huxley or the way of the cross of the embodied God. The answer has already been given; everything is already finished. . . . You are only giving answer. It needs a martyr, and not a Napoleon." Schmitt, however, never applied these insights to politics. On Schmitt's limitation of his identification with the suffering Jesus to the realm of private spirituality, see Klaus-M. Kodalle, *Politik als Macht und Mythos: Carl Schmitts "Politische Theologie"* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1973), pp. 84-86. Contrary to Schmitt, H. Büchele, *SehnSucht*, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-395, supports a biblically oriented alternative to Huxley's world.

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Wert des Staates can be taken as an example for his problematic view of transcendence. He dissociates himself from naturalism because of its rejection of any transcendence and its attempt to base everything on pure nature and maintains to the contrary that there is a transcendent realm that is the ultimate source of right. This higher law, however, cannot be reached directly but is mediated by the state. There is no direct link between the individual and transcendence; immediacy is not possible in our age.[95] Since we are living in an age of mediation, Schmitt concludes that there is no possibility of right outside the state. Transcendence is therefore linked exclusively to the state. A politically relevant relation between the individual and an all-embracing transcendence outside the state seems impossible. Christian theology, however, cannot support Schmitt's state-dominated view of transcendence.

This theological critique of Schmitt has to be taken seriously by contemporary communitarians. They criticize liberalism wherever it deprives human beings of transcendence and forces them into total isolation and atomization. The communitarian emphasis on the community, e.g. its positive view of patriotism, has to aim beyond the limited realm of any concrete local group, state, or *Grossraum* if it wants to avoid the shortcomings of the archaic transcendence of the scapegoat mechanism or those of Schmitt's state-centered transcendence. Such a fundamental opening to the universal transcendence of divine love does not automatically lead into a centralized world state that destroys every local community but should emphasize the necessity to connect the need of local communities with universalism. The Catholic Church's attempts to combine universalism with the principle of subsidiarity — the specific communitarianism of the protestant theologian Stanley Hauerwas, who makes the Church and not the national community primary — point in the right direction. Even Émile Durkheim, another early "communitarian" whose view on the relation between the state and the individual has much in common with Schmitt, correctly maintained that any patriotism had to be combined with a universalistic notion of humanity.[96]

The best example to illustrate the biblical standpoint, which rejects the archaic practice of sacrifice and at the same time supports the devotion to

95. Schmitt, *Wert, op. cit.*, pp. 108-110; "Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche: Eine scholastische Erwägung," in *Summa* (1917), pp. 53f; *Idea, op. cit.*, p. 57.

96. Émile Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, trans. by C. Brookfield, with a new preface by B. S. Turner, 2nd edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 65-75.

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universal love, cannot be found in political or social philosophy but in literature: Dostoyevsky's famous novel *The Brothers Karamazov.* The Bible's non-sacrificial attitude is powerfully expressed in this novel. In a dialogue, both the intellectual Ivan and his saintly brother Alyosha claim they could never accept a world or a state in which its final and universal harmony, however glorious, would depend on the torture of just one innocent child.[97] In this novel, the legend of the Grand Inquisitor points to the biblical critique of all sacrificial politics. In the same novel, however, Dostoyevsky also overcomes the perils of the liberal attitude toward sacrifice. He does not support the liberal rejection of any kind of sacrifice, but uses Jesus' saying about the grain of corn as an epigraph for this novel. This verse from John's Gospel reappears in several crucial episodes of the novel.[98] Dostoyevsky writes that the rejection of sacrifice and the devotion to universal divine love depend on each other. Only if human beings are ready to give up their lives for each other, only if theyaccept that they are responsible for the whole world and all the sins of human beings, is it possible to avoid scapegoating others. "There is only one means of salvation, then take yourself and make yourself responsible for all men's sins, that is the truth, you know, friends, for as soon as you sincerely make yourself responsible for everything and for all men, you will see at once that it is really so, and that you are to blame for everyone and for all

97. Fyodor M. Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. by C. Garnett (New York: Modern Library, 1977), p. xx (part 2, book 5, chap. 4): "Tell me yourself," Ivan asks his brother Alyosha, "I challenge your answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature — that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance — and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth." "No, I wouldn't consent," replied Alyosha. Cf. Glenn Tinder, *The Political Meaning of Christianity: The Prophetic Stance: An Interpretation* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), p. 30.

98. Cf. René Girard, *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure*, trans. by Y. Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 311f. Girard's emphasis on this verse of St. John as an epigraph for all novelistic conclusions, which overcome individual romanticism, indicates that Girard is ultimately not a representative of the liberal antisacrificial attitude. Similar to Schmitt, he criticizes romanticism, its detachment of vertical transcendence and its tendency to a deviated and immanent transcendence. When Girard, in his later book *Things*, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-237, avoided the term "sacrifice" to describe Jesus' self-giving of his life, he was not adopting individualistic liberalism, but tried to distinguish the biblical perspective from both the sacrificial logic of archaic religions and masochistic tendencies of self-sacralization. For critics accusing Girard's liberalism in regard to sacrifice, see Calasso, *Ruin*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-161; Bruce Chilton, *The Temple of Jesus: His Sacrificial Program Within a Cultural History of Sacrifice* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1992), pp. 15-25, 142f, 163-172.

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things. But throwing your own indolence and impotence on others you will end by sharing the pride of Satan and murmuring against God."[99]

Dostoyevsky should be the model for all communitarian critiques of liberalism. His closeness to the biblical perspective and its humanitarian universalism helped him avoid the perils of communitarianism. He overcame his own temptation to Russian nationalism and demanded a kind of patriotism neither exclusive of nor prone to war. At his best — in his great novels and his famous Pushkin-speech — he combined his emphasis on the importance of the Russian people with universalism. He maintained that in order to become a true Russian, one had to become a brother of all human beings.

It was Schmitt's personal failure that he was not able to see Dostoyevsky as an ally for his critique of liberalism. Instead, Schmitt identified with the Grand Inquisitor and accused Dostoyevsky of representing immediacy, the "unchristian" idea that Jesus could appear once again before his glorious Second Coming.[100] If Schmitt had taken up a more affirmative view of Dostoyevsky's great novels, he may have avoided his involvement in the sacrificial politics of National Socialism.

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99. Dostoyevsky, *Brothers Karamazov*, *op. cit.*, p. xx (part 2, book 6, chap. 3).

100. Schmitt, "Sichtbarkeit," *op. cit.*, pp. 75f; *Idea*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56f; *Glossarium*, *op. cit.*, p. 243. On Schmitt's identification with the Grand Inquisitor see Palaver, "Reading," *op. cit.*, pp. 64f, 68. Interestingly, Hannah Arendt indirectly shares Schmitt's critique of Dostoyevsky's idea that Jesus could appear once again. According to Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 82, it is because of the French Revolution that Melville and Dostoyevsky dared to make Jesus return to the world of men.

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*End of the Left-Right Dichotomy: The French Case**

Alain de Benoist

Consider the frequently cited quotation by the French philosopher Alain: "When I am asked if the division between parties of the Right and parties of the Left, between leftists and rightists still has any meaning, the first thing which occurs to me is that whoever is asking the question is certainly not on the Left."[1] Alain would be surprised to learn that today this question, which he thought could only have been posed by someone from the Right, is on everyone's lips — at least in France.

During the past few years, all the Sofres opinion polls have shown that for most of the French people the Left-Right split is becoming increasingly meaningless. In March 1981 only 33% considered notions of Right and Left to be outdated and no longer descriptive of political positions. In February 1986, this figure was 45%; in March 1988, 48%; in November 1989, 56%.[2] This last figure was confirmed by two subsequent Sofres polls published in December 1990 and July 1993.[3] It does not seem to have changed since. As for the inverse opinion, according to which the Left-Right split still has meaning, since 1991 it has not been

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* Translated by Raphael Benjamin

1. Pen Name for Emile-Auguste Chartier, *Eléments d'une Doctrine Radicale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1925)

2. Sofres opinion poll, in *Le Point* (November 27, 1989), pp. 62-65. The same poll revealed that most socialist sympathizers no longer saw a significant difference with the Right over issues such as human rights, culture or social welfare, while a majority of RPR-UDF voters said they no longer saw a difference with the Left over issues such as education, crime or information policies.

3. *Le Point* (December 3, 1990), pp. 56-57; *Le Nouvel Observateur* (July 1, 1993, p. 42.

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more than 33% of those polled, as against 43% in 1981.

This evolution is remarkable for three reasons. First, because it shows a growing tendency: from year to year the notions of Right and Left appear increasingly discredited. Second, it has only taken a dozen years for the credibility of the Left-Right split to decline by more than 20 points in public opinion polls. Third, because this development is a fact in all political circles and all sectors of opinion: in April 1988, a Sofres poll indicated that since 1981 this conviction had made the most progress within the Left.[4]

At the same time, however, most French people continue to identify themselves as either Left or Right — a paradoxical result confirming the extent of the gap separating political parties from their voters. But this kind of self-definition is also weakening. Whereas during the 1960s, 90% of the French people located themselves along the Left-Right axis,[5] by 1981 the number had dropped to no more than 73%, to only 64% in 1991.

All these figures show clearly that the Left-Right dichotomy which has structured the French political landscape for more than two centuries — what Emmanuel Berl described as "by far the most lively distinction for the mass of the French electorate," and Jean-François Sirinelli has more recently characterized as "in essence, the major French split,"[6] is losing much of its meaning. This is all the more surprising since it was in France that the concepts Left and Right first saw the light of day. The general opinion is that this dates from August 28 1789, when the Estates-General, in session since May and transformed into a constituent assembly, began to debate in Versailles whether the king should have veto rights. This debate sought to establish whether in the constitutional monarchy being installed the monarch had any prerogatives over and above that of national sovereignty, i.e., a prerogative exceeding that of the representatives of the people organized in a body politic. To indicate their choice, those in favor of a royal veto were placed to the right of the speaker, while their opponents sat on the left. So the distinction Left-Right originally came about as a topographical accident.[7] It was to expand gradually into

4. Cf. *Le Nouvel Observateur* (April 1, 1988), pp. 42-43.

5. Cf. Emeric Deutsch, Denis Lindon and Pierre Weill, *Les Familles Politiques Aujourd'hui en France* (Minuit, 1966), pp. 13-14.

6. Interview with *Le Magazine Littéraire* (April 1993).

7. The date most frequently cited is August 28, 1789. Some writers, however, cite August 11 and still others the month of September. In their *Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française* (published in 1834), Buchez and Rouzhold claim that the Right-Left polarity appeared before June 27. In any case, the August 27, 1791 *L'Ami des Patriotes* already talks of "Right" and "Left" in the body of the Constituent Assembly.

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all of Europe, then to the entire world, taking permanent roots in the Latin countries and, in a more circumstantial way, in Germanic and above all Anglo-Saxon countries. In France it took its contemporary meaning and became part of everyday language during the Third Republic.[8]

What are the reasons for the gradual erosion of the concepts of Left and Right? There are several ways to answer this question. One would be to ask about the exact meaning of the terms in order to establish whether they are attached to certain permanent themes or merely to attitudes (psychological traits, "sensibilities") where one would be able to locate their recurrence in certain well-determined political families, yet again to certain key concepts constituting the "hard core" whose heuristic value can facilitate analysis. For reasons too long to go into, such an approach would lead to an impasse, and that is why it is more fruitful to focus on the French situation. Today the three great debates which for two centuries in France have characterized the Right-Left dichotomy are essentially over.

The first of these debates concerns political institutions. Beginning with the Revolution and for over 100 years it was to pit against each other the supporters of the Republic, the partisans of the constitutional monarchy and those nostalgic for the monarchy by divine right. It was a debate bearing on the Revolution itself, which ended in the Restoration and the 1815 compromise which, in some way, marks the birth of modern France. Next, starting from the July Monarchy, it became a debate concerning the definition of the political regime — republic or monarchy— which culminated in 1875 with the establishment of universal suffrage and the definitive installation of a republic. From then on rightists became essentially republican, while monarchist movements were gradually cast to the fringes of the political spectrum.

The second major debate, beginning in the 1880's, dealt with the question of religion. Pitting supporters of a "clerical" concept of the social order against those advocating a purely secular vision of justice, the debate took the place of the one about institutions and generated a polemic whose violence has now been somewhat forgotten. For some time, it came to be identified exclusively with the Left-Right split and became the touch-stone for all political life. "By comparison," wrote René Rémond, "all other divergencies appeared secondary. Whoever followed the prescriptions of the Catholic Church was *ipso facto* catalogued

8. Cf. Marcel Gauchet, "La Droite et la Gauche" in Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, Vol. 3: *Les France. 1: Conflits et Partages* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), who shows that the popularization of the terms took place later than generally believed.

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on the Right, and the anti-clerical had no need to furnish any other proof of democratic sentiments and attachment to the Republic."[9] This was the atmosphere that eventually gave rise to the Dreyfus Affair (which lead to a shift of anti-Semitism from Left to Right and, for the first time, introduced the Left-Right cleavage in intellectual circles). This argument culminated in 1905 in the separation of Church and state. It left profound traces on French political life. It gradually lost its relevance due, on the one side, to the rallying of a party of the Catholic hierarchy to republican institutions and, on the other, to the appearance of a secularized theory of the traditional social order (from Auguste Comte to Taine) — a double movement which came to an end with a progressive dissociation of the Church from the counter-revolution. Subsequently, religious controversies continued to lose relevance and soon survived only in debates about state subventions for schools run by the Church.

The final debate is obviously the social one. It began in the 1830s when capitalism imposed itself on economic forms inherited from the past, paving the way for the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the development of industrial society, the birth of socialism and the founding of the labor movement. Interrupted during the "Sacred Union" of WWI, it resurfaced in 1917. From 1920 on, to be on the Left no longer meant simply to be a republican (since everybody was republican), or even secular (since by then there were Left Catholics), meant to be a socialist or a communist.

Before anything else, the social question raises the problem of the role of the state in regulating economic activity and the eventual redistribution of wealth. Divided between reformers and revolutionaries the Left identified itself with the rejection of the market economy — and even private property — and advocated a planned, centralized and state-controlled economy. Its objective was to assure collective emancipation through economic and social institutions in order to promote a kind of general contract via the collectivization of the means of production. In addition, the Left made purely quantitative and material demands: it denounced capitalism (the exploitation of labor and the inequalities in the distribution of wealth), without challenging its central objective (constant growth). It sought to ground itself in the working class and turn workers into a political force bearing a concrete program for emancipation. This statist and productivist project was to last decades before collapsing under the joint

9. *La Politique n'est plus ce qu'elle était* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1993), p. 26.

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impact of the implosion of "real socialism" and the exhaustion of the welfare state, while the working class itself became increasingly reformist and eventually evaporated with consumerism and popular shareholding. As Rémond put it: "In a short period of time, almost all the issues over which elections were fought, which did and undid majorities, which fed debate, which gave political life its colors have ceased to evoke passion, have lost their spark and have even disappeared from the scene."[10]

After WWII, the rapid rise in the standard of living was accompanied by a deep transformation of political practices as well as the behavior and value orientation of society. "In France, enriched by the 'Thirty Glorious Years,' the relaxation of economic constraints led to the relaxation of social controls."[11] On the other hand, the growth of the middle class began to erase confessional and sociological criteria for voting. In the 1960s, the more Catholic one was the more one was likely to vote for the Right. In the social context, the more one was a worker (or the more one felt to be one, for it is a subjective perception of social class which exercises the most decisive influence on political choice) the more one voted for the Left. Ten years later, this was no longer completely true. Various commentators have pointed out the specificity of the political behavior of the "salaried middle classes," whose numbers more than doubled between 1954 and 1975 (owing to the expansion of the service and public sectors), who vote mostly Left, and of those self-employed who vote mostly Right.

This trend has generally continued. The sense of belonging to a social class, as measured by opinion polls, fell from 68% in 1976 to 56% in 1987. Indeed, it is among workers that it has fallen the most, from 74% to 50%. As for the Catholic vote, it has become distributed across all sectors of opinion: between 1978 and 1988 the correlation between voting for the Right and religious practice fell by 20 points.

In 1981, the Left coming into power appeared to mark the victory of this new sociological model. In order to explain it, one used to point to urbanization, economic growth, etc. Shortly afterwards, the rapid diminishing of support for the Left among the very groups that had brought it to power, concurrent with the appearance of new parties and social movements, began to cast doubt on this schema and favored the appearance of competing models questioning the pertinence of the Right-Left split as much as its sociological foundations. This is when talk began about the

10. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

11. Jean-François Sirinelli, "La Morale Entre Droite et Gauche," in "Morale et Politique," special issue *Pouvoirs*, No. 63 (1993).

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"new voter," unconcerned with social or professional ties and of a very limited "rationality."[12] We were entering an era which has been described as "electoral self-service" or "commercial democracy."[13] As Jérôme Jaffré has written: "Voters choose either Right or Left, whichever seems to suit them. This phenomenon is evidence for the ideological destructuring of the French that corresponds to the weakening of major parties."[14]

This has resulted in a considerable increase in electoral volatility. In 1946 François Goguel calculated that at no point in France, between 1877 and 1936, did the balance of forces between the Right and the Left vary by more than 2%. Today 17% of voters for the far Left in the 1986 legislative elections voted for a right-wing party in the first round of the 1988 presidential elections and, inversely, 60% of Mitterand's voters in 1988 refused to vote socialist in 1993.

On the level of political leadership, this destructuring of the electorate corresponds to a substantial move toward the center.[15] Not only has the Left finally accepted the institutions of the Fifth Republic and the principle of nuclear deterrence (which it resisted ferociously in the past), not only has the Right in large part come to terms with the Left on such issues as contraception, the death penalty and new models for authority in the family and society, but as soon as they come to power Right and Left alike seem increasingly inclined to adopt the same policies. The more rapid their alternation the clearer this identity becomes. In this regard, since 1981 the French have hardly seen any difference between the economic policy followed by the Left and that adopted by the Right. Neither have they seen the slightest difference between the social policies of Edouard Balladur and of Pierre Bérégovoy, the foreign policy of Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterand, the "security" obsessions of Michel Charasse and Charles Pasqua, the budget priorities of departmental or regional authorities controlled by the majority and those controlled by the opposition. Of course, the Right wants a little more liberalism (in the French sense of the word:, i.e.,

12. In this regard, Nonna Meyer and Pascal Perrineau note that "even the concept of political 'rationalism' is relative. A voter faithful to the party which seems to best defend the interests of his social class or the values of his religion is no less rational than one who switches. Those who swing between parties belonging to the same political family are no more rational than those who cross the Left-Right boundary." (See *Les Comportements Politiques* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), p. 87.

13. Cf. Denis Jeambar and Jean-Marc Lech, *Le Self-service Électoral. Les Nouvelles Familles Politiques* (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), pp. 21-22 and 151-162.

14. *La Tribune de L'Expansion* (March 23, 1992).

15. Cf. François Furet, Jacques Julliard and Pierre Rosanvallon, *La République du Centre. La Fin de l'Exception Française* (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1988).

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more free-market economics) and fewer social programs, while the Left prefers a few more social programs and a little less liberalism. On the whole, however, the political class does not seem to be torn apart all that much in the shifts between "socio-liberalism" and "social liberalism."

This move toward the center has also affected intellectual circles, as witnessed by the collapse of critical thinking in an age when most of those who only yesterday would rush to refute the established order have been transformed into passionate defenders of liberal democracy, the New World Order, and the right to neo-colonialist interference on humanitarian pretexts. This move to the center, however, gives a strong impression of the end of something. Maybe only the end of modernity. This is Serge Latouche's thesis: "The political form of modernity is running out of steam because it has run its course. Right and Left have essentially realized their programs. Alternation has succeeded extraordinarily well. The enlightened Right and the Left lay claim to the legacy of the Enlightenment, but neither of the two claims it entirely. Each sees itself as having realized its part of the legacy. The Left, whose imagination is tied to a radical version of the Enlightenment, used to worship progress, science and technology. . . . The liberal and enlightened Right, from Montesquieu to Tocqueville, exalted individual liberty and economic competition. The Left advocated well-being for all, while the Right defended growth and the right to enjoy the fruits of enterprise. Through shocks and crises, the modern state has achieved all that."[16]

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16. "Le MAUSS est-il Apolitique?" in *La Revue du Mauss*, Nos. 3/4 (1991), pp. 70-71. In a similar spirit, Jacques Julliard could note that "it is from its own success that the Left has come out exhausted: it is passing away for having realized in two centuries the essence of its program." ("Une Quatrième Vie pour la Gauche," in *Le Nouvel Observateur* [February 25, 1993], p. 44). To be fair, it ought to be pointed out that it is also "passing away" for having seen a part of this program realized. . . . by its opponents. Gerard Grumberg and Etienne Schweisguth claim that while the Right defends primarily economic liberalism and the Left primarily cultural liberalism, philosophical liberalism seems to reconcile everyone. "The strong link between cultural liberalism and a Left stance on the one side, and between economic liberalism and a Right stance on the other might lead one to ask if these two liberalisms do not form the two opposing poles of one and the same dimension, which would be nothing other than the Right-Left dimension itself." ("Libéralisme Culturel et Libéralisme Économique," in Daniel Boy and Nonna Mayer, eds., *L'Électeur Français en Question*, CEVIPOF (Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1990). But they also observe that "the growth in the two levels of economic liberalism and cultural liberalism has rendered visible a very weak connection between them," which has a paradoxical result: "Economic liberalism and cultural liberalism have a strong statistical relation as opposites in the Right-Left dimension, but they are only very weak negatively opposed to each other." *Ibid.*

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As Régis Debray has pointed out: "When there will be no more differences between Left and Right than between the services of a nationalized or a private bank, or between the TV news on a public or commercial channel, then we will switch from one to the other without regrets and, who knows, without even realizing it."[17] We seem to have reached this point.

Some people may rejoice about this in the name of "consensus." They are wrong. First, because democracy is not the end of conflict but conflict mastered. For a political society to function normally, a consensus must be established over the framework and modalities of debate. But if the consensus results in the disappearance of debate, then democracy will also disappear. Even more than a plurality of parties, democracy implies a diversity of opinions and choices as well as the recognition of the legitimacy of a clash between them so that the adversary is not transformed into an enemy (for the opposition of yesterday can be the majority of tomorrow). But, if parties are no longer distinguished by anything other than insignificant differences in their programs, if current factions advocate basically the same policies, if they are no longer distinct regarding their objectives or even the means to attain them, in short, if citizens no longer see themselves confronted with real alternatives and choices, then debate ceases to have any *raison d'être* and the institutional framework for it becomes nothing more than an empty shell which most voters, not surprisingly, prefer to ignore.

Too much consensus is also anti-democratic in another sense. Contrary to the advocates of the "political market" (who postulate that voters seek above all to rationally maximize their best interests at polling time), in effect voting is primarily a means of representing and affirming the self.[18] In a context where the homogenization of all social space by the middle classes is already depriving the concepts of Left and Right of any sociological content, if in addition the electorate feels that the parties vying for power provide no alternatives, this electorate can only lose interest in a political game which no longer allows the expression of a sense of belonging or affiliation through the ballot. The end of the "democracy of identification" (Pierre Rosanvallon) translates into a growing abstention which leads to social anomie and the exclusion of those socially marginalized and

17. *Que Vive la République* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1989). Cf. also Max Gallo, *La Gauche est Morte, Vive la Gauche* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1990).

18. For a critique of the theory of the "political market," see especially Pierre Merle, "L'*Homo Politicus* est-il un *Homo Oeconomicus*? L'Analyse Économique du Choix Politique: Approche Critique," in *Revue Française de Science Politique* (February 1990), p. 75.

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no longer concerned with power games. In both cases there is a great risk of ending up not with a society pacified by "consensus," but with a dangerous and potentially belligerent one characterized by other modes of affirming identity (religious, ethnic, national, etc.). These may not result in any desire for "dangerous purity" (Bernard-Henri Lévy) but will be the logical consequence of the fact that it is no longer possible to function as citizens.

This is the direction in which things are headed today. Everything confirms it: the multiplying corruption scandals, which discredit both Left and Right politicians; the dominant individualism encouraging civic irresponsibility and turning in on oneself; the contrast between stated ambitions and the insignificance of results; the transformation of the political game into a media spectacle where "making things known" always counts more than "knowing how to do things"; the intellectuals' conceptual impotence and social anomie. As a final result, the political class seems to be increasingly made up of professionals alien to society and of parties which have become mere machines to sell electoral goods for the sole profit of their present leaders. In other words, in market terms, political life is characterized by a decreasing supply in the face of ever more indifferent, because disoriented, demand.

As for the move to the center, although it constitutes one of the causes of the current clouding of the Right-Left split, it is itself the consequence of a whole series of broader events. It has resulted from the accumulation of discomfort and disillusion brought about by the collapse of predominant lately-hegemonic ideologies and socio-historical models. Typified by the implosion of the Soviet system, this collapse has ruined many hopes and has resulted in a false belief in the "end of ideology," i.e., the disappearance of one of the most powerful resources of political thought and imagination. The blurring has increased confusion and fudged differences. But it has also created conditions for a greater acceptability of the idea that many phenomena are "ineluctable," for example, the "laws" regulating the market economy and the uncontrolled growth of technology. All these phenomena are deemed inevitable because we have lost the habit of questioning the meaning of outcomes, resulting in the assumption that it is no longer possible to validate decisions. This denies the very essence of politics and reduces it to a simple technique of administrative management. The rise of technocracy and the rule of experts already set the stage. This legitimates the belief that political choices are simply a matter of technical rationality, allowing only one possible solution. This is a denial of the very essence of politics. But it is also a denial of democracy, since for the

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experts, "pluralism always results either in misunderstandings or in a lack of rationality: on one side there are competent experts and on the other incompetents. For the latter to be rational and informed it is sufficient to accept the opinion of the former."[19]

From this viewpoint, one of the today's most salient features is the nation-state's growing inability not only to steer a society characterized by the dilution of social relations, but also to react to the internationalization of national spaces and markets, the development of a global economy and the planetary deployment of information. Today the nation-state can no longer deal with problems such as unemployment, drugs, economic instability and social ostracism. Divested of its means, the state is increasingly reduced to the daily management of phenomena which transcend it, i.e., to find short-term solutions while continuing to perfect techniques of social control and repression. As Sami Naïr has put it: "The crisis of the welfare state is first of all the crisis of the nation-state's inability to deal with the internationalization of capital. Today the structure of the capital market and thus the forms of the resulting competition are determined by transnational oligopolies against which the traditional nation-state has hardly any response. . . . The state is confronted with a tragic dilemma it cannot resolve: either drastic protectionism with very uncertain economic and social consequences, or capitulation before the major poles of the international economy."[20]

The problem is that, in this regard, both the Right and the Left have already accepted capitulation. Once again, this is one of the reasons for the move to the center, as well as the blurring of the distinction between Left and Right. This is not really surprising for the Right, which has long since allied itself with money and the wealthy classes. According to Bernard Charbonneau: "While justifying the state's protection of economic interests, patriotism has become its own caricature: chauvinism. The role of the best people in justifying the whims of the richest makes it impossible to distinguish between a genuine aristocracy and a so-called 'elite' defined exclusively by money."[21] In so doing, however, the Right has betrayed itself. "Those values which the Right espouses are exactly those by which it is judged. The criticisms the Left makes of the Right are nothing

19. Pierre Rosanvallon, "Repenser la Gauche," interview with *L'Express* (March 25, 1993), p. 116.

20. "Le Socialisme n'est plus ce qu'il Était," in *L'Evénement Européen*, No. 1 (1988), pp. 101-102.

21. *L'Etat* (Economica, 1987), p. 153.

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compared to those the Right should be able to make of itself. Capitalism claims the virtues of property, and it supports the dispossession of millions of people by capitalism in order to safeguard private property, bringing about the largest undertaking of expropriation in modern times. It exalts the motherland and for the glory of one nationalism it feeds a will to power which tends to destroy all other motherlands. It upholds authority and character, while on the whim of one, be it monarch or owner, it transforms all others into serfs. While defending liberty, the Right everywhere gradually slides into monopoly. . . . Against Marxist materialism, it sets itself up as a champion of the power of the spirit, but serves a social class whose sole reason for being is economic activity. . . ."[22]

The classical Right has always been in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, it has to respond to the exigencies of profitability, competitiveness and modernization, which are vital to its interests; while on the other, to continue enjoying the support of its voters, it has to appear to embody traditional values (authority, family, patriotism, etc.), which are exactly those which oppose the logic of the commodity and what Jürgen Habermas calls the "colonization of the lifeworld" by "economic and administrative sub-systems." As long as capitalism remained tied to the nation-state, this dilemma could still be managed. Economic modernization could be presented as part of national greatness, sometimes even as triumphant nationalism. In a world economy which seeks to suppress all local particularities that act as an obstacle to its movement or threaten to slow its expansion, this is no longer the case. Liberal capitalism no longer has a "national strategy": globalization of the economy has led it to make the state's primary task to support this process of globalization with appropriate legislation — an assortment of new forms of internal control to disarm all kinds of social resistance.[23] This can be seen in France with the conversion of most of the Gaullist program to the very economic liberalism excoriated by General de Gaulle — with the consequent appearance on the political margins of social protest movements which tend to widen the gap between politicians and voters.

The monied Right has no principled convictions, only principled interests. "This is why, among other reasons, it shows itself so magisterial in its mastery of what one might call the relativism of ideologies. All representations can serve it on the condition that they do not challenge its

22. *Ibid.*

23. Cf. André Gorz, "Droite/Gauche. Essai de Redéfinition," in *La Revue du MAUSS*, Vo. 4, No. 4 (1991), pp. 16-17.

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system of interests."[24]

The Left has followed the same path. Fifteen years ago it was still an old republican bedrock, coated with socialist and communist or even anarchist sediments. This heterogenous mixture was generally unified by the same political culture, common sociological references and, as it was claimed at the time, a certain ethics. Since then its political culture has fallen apart. The working class has seen its contours eroded. As for "ethics," it is best not to mention it! Discredited by the defeat of "really existing socialism," the communist wing has not survived the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The anarchist trend is no more than an erratic underground stream. As for the socialist and social democratic wings, which were the main components of the Left, they have been dealt a major blow by the crisis of the welfare state.

Socialism espoused an emancipatory ideology meant to allow man, beyond all forms of domination and social exploitation, to recover his self, i.e., to be restored to himself in all his authenticity. Achieving this aim presupposed a radical transformation of society as organized by triumphant capitalism. The whole history of the labor movement revolves around the debate regarding the nature of this transformation and the best means to carry it out. Some claimed it had to take place through a violent rupture, others by gradual evolution. The former only succeeded in installing unprecedented forms of dictatorship, while the latter have been reduced to perpetually postponing the project, having failed to find an alternative to the capitalist system or to propose a viable project of social reconstruction.

It was already paradoxical to identify the state as the agency of emancipation since the main characteristic of the paternalist-state model is to strip individuals of their autonomy in exchange for security. Today, under the weight of bureaucratic burdens and fiscal impositions, all models of intervention from above have collapsed. Along with this, the discrediting of the idea of progress has ruined optimistic visions of a future seen to coincide automatically with an ideal of emancipation. The Left, heir of Descartes, wished to change the world and subdue nature. Now it realizes that the results are not too brilliant, that the achievement of modernity is passing it by and that the subdued nature is in a pitiful state. As for a socialism which presented itself as the "civilization of labor," it must henceforth confront the problem of free time.

During the past few years, all Left ideological constructs as well as

24. Naïr, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

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those of the managerial New Class have become either considerably weaker or have collapsed altogether. Naïr writes: "For more than a decade, the crisis over representing the future, the evaporation of the grand organizing narratives of the future (socialism, communism) has intensified. This process entails considerable cultural, political and sociological displacement; essential ingredients of socialism as a vision have collapsed. We are now witnessing a progressive disappearance of the main values of the Left. The concept of exploitation is gone from the polemical vocabulary, while that of equality, at best, is only stuttered with some compunction in political confrontations. Already derailed in its bureaucratic form in the East, socialism is equally in trouble in its democratic version."[25] Peter Glotz adds: "The Left has been philosophically disoriented since its concept of progress has been destroyed and the humanism of the Age of Enlightenment has become a universal concept. Its economic theory is breached because the crisis in Marxism has, like it or not, stripped it of its own economic vision; and it is further threatened by the loss of an old advantage: the solid organization of unions and workers' parties. The Left finds itself disoriented in the post-modern age."[26]

In 1981 in France, the Left triumphed politically against the background of ideological confusion. It might have been able to seize this occasion to restructure its identity. What happened, however, was the opposite. Not only did Mitterrand's rise to power accelerate the confusion, but the Left assimilated the "managerial culture" so well that, redoubling its efforts, it suddenly adopted and perfected everything it had previously denounced. Beginning in 1982-3, the adoption of a new economic policy brutally confirmed the move toward the center. The critique of capitalism was abandoned, and with it the idea that the state, even if not the motor of the economy, might at least have the right to oversee the private sector. Add to this the rehabilitation of the notion of profit, the apology for the market and "entrepreneurial culture," greater growth in capital revenues as compared to labor and the picture is complete. By abandoning the Jaurésian idea that the state is first of all a balance of forces between the social classes, the Left has chosen to put the freedom of capital before the freedom of citizens, and has laid its statist identity to rest without, however, trying to recenter itself in society. In short, acting as if the final stage in social organization had been reached and as if it would be impossible for

25. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
26. "Le Malaise de la Gauche," in *L'Evénement Européen* No. 1 (1988).

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people to act collectively, it has implicitly enshrined the mercantile West as the unsurpassable ideal. The result will be an unbridled Stock Exchange, corruption at the highest level and the promotion of crooks-turned-politicians such as Bernard Tapie as paradigmatic "winners."

In 1979, at the Metz congress of the Socialist Party, Mitterrand and his friends argued that "economic rigor, as understood by those in power, is a formidable lie." In 1992 the socialist project, titled "A New Horizon," stated: "Yes, we believe that the market economy is the most efficient means of production and exchange. No, we no longer believe in a break with capitalism." This is what enabled Michel Rocard to redefine socialism as a "kind of tempered capitalism" (sic).

Today Left and Right worship the same god: the cult of performance, efficiency and profit. This can be seen in the answers to questions regularly posed to the French by Sofres seeking to find what terms evoke positive or negative responses. In November 1989 one of these polls allowed one to state that the word "liberalism" garnered positive responses from 59% of the socialist sympathizers, whereas a majority of UDF voters looked favorably upon the term "social-democracy."[27] Between April 1981 and October 1990, when Mitterrand was head-of-state, the terms which received the most positive responses in public opinion were "profit," "capitalism" and "participation"; while those which had lost the most were "socialism," "unions" and "nationalization." In 1992 Roland Cayrol concluded: "The tendency toward convergence over liberalism, competition, participation and profit is the law of the decade."[28]

The Right had already been corrupted by its possession of wealth; the Left was corrupted by acquiring this wealth. The Right allied with wealth contributed more than the Left to the destruction of the values which it pretended to advocate. The Left, as it came to be allied with wealth, contributed more than the Right to prevent the advent of the new society it wished to bring about. In short, the Left has lost its principles before a Right which never cared too much about having any, thereby confirming Bernard Charbonneau's claim: "To describe the evolution of the Left and of the Right is to trace the curve of their respective self-betrayals. How living moral values became instantly paralyzed in the idea, how the fury of the struggle progressively deformed the idea into a self-serving lie, and how, animated by the same will to power and using the same means,

27. *Le Point* (November 27, 1989), pp.62-65.

28. "La Droite, la Gauche et les Références Idéologiques," in Sofres, ed., *L'État de l'Opinion 1992* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 67.

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different ideologies have ended up dissolving themselves in the same chaos. This is their history."[29]

The Right has lost its main enemy: communism. The Left has chosen to collaborate with its own: capitalism. As a result, the Right can no longer mobilize its voters by denouncing the "red menace," while the Left can no longer rally its own by proposing "to change society." This, however, does not prevent them from periodically attempting to revive extinct arguments. But the symmetrical myths of anti-communism and anti-fascism, polemical evocations of a bygone era, cannot forever serve to economize on profound thinking nor to hide the emptiness of ideas.[30] Some day it will be necessary to reconstruct values and reformulate identities.

For now, that remains far into the future. While the populist Right is looking for identity, thanks to the immigrants, the Left exhausts itself in various "renewals" and "regroundings," or seeks to regroup on the margins of political life by advocating aid to oppressed minorities, solidarity with the most impoverished, and the struggle against social ostracism. However sympathetic they might be, and assuming they are responding to an authentic commitment to altruism and not to a straightforward need for a clear conscience and moral comfort, such aims are unfortunately also an admission of defeat. To replace ideological with purely moralizing criteria, to reduce militant activity to first aid for the war-wounds of change and justice to a profane version of that *caritas* theologians in the Middle Ages defined as a kind of non-erotic love is only an attempt to correct the faults or excesses of a society we cannot change, i.e., to reinforce it. By seeking remedies merely for a few consequences of the degradation of social relations, by changing into a charitable lady in the best of traditions of that paternalism it previously denounced, the Left is implicitly demonstrating it no longer thinks itself capable of acting on the causes of the problems. However, to act in politics is to build, not just to repair. Today, in opinion polls, solidarity wins clearly as a positive value to the Left, over and above justice, class struggle or equality. What remains undone is to combine this theme of solidarity with an aspiration for "autonomy," which should not

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29. *Op. cit.*, p. 152.

30. On anti-fascism, see Karl Dietrich Bracher: "Anti-fascism is not a scientific idea. It is an ideological and political concept whose utility has been to mount an alliance against the Nazi horror, but which has also served to define democracy too restrictively." Cf. also Annie Kriegel, "Sur l'Antifascisme," in *Commentaire* (Summer 1990), pp. 299-302, who qualifies anti-fascism as a "Stalinist myth *par excellence*," and attributes it to the triple character of being, "an obscure concept, a concept of variable dimensions and a constantly changing concept."

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become the alibi for a new form of individualism and thus of indifference to others. Social action cannot be confined to the administering of alms. The ideal of solidarity implies the creation of new public spaces where active forms of citizenship can be articulated.

For two centuries there has been a Right and a Left, but their contents have constantly changed. There is neither a metaphysical Right nor an absolute Left, only relative positions and systems of variable relations, constantly forming and reforming. They cannot be abstracted from their context. "In every era, certain oppositions disappear or lose their importance, while others, seemingly secondary, suddenly assume a pole position."[31]

The current crisis of Right and Left does not mean that either will no longer exist, only that this dichotomy as it has been understood until recently has lost its rationale. It has had its day. Current events provide ample confirmation. Whether it is a question of the Gulf War, the war in the former Yugoslavia, GATT, German reunification and its ramifications, the Maastricht Treaty and the single European currency, Islam in France, cultural identities or biotechnologies — all the debates of the last few years have produced conflicts impossible to account for in terms of the traditional dichotomy. The fault lines cut across everything, penetrating to the very heart of both Right and Left. Although they have not yet led to real reclassifications, according to all accounts this is the beginning of a long process of regrouping.

There will be new splits in the future. In an age when the imperative of solidarity is imposing itself irresistibly, when ancient forms of exploitation of some by others tend to give way to new forms of alienation bearing down on everyone, when work is no longer the major source of social cohesion, these new cleavages will lead to unexpected regroupings and will draw fluid boundaries, be it around modernity and postmodernity, work and unemployment, production or the environment.

Modern societies have passed from extensive to intensive capital accumulation, i.e., from the systematic search for spaces for realizing profits to the general transformation of all forms of human activity in commodities. To set a limit to this process, not in order to suppress the marketplace but in order to prevent it from substituting itself for all kinds of social relations and to refute the idea that market values are socially paradigmatic as well as to prevent their destabalizing effects; to recreate organic forms of solidarity and to develop the economy for the benefit of

31. Etienne Schweisguth, *Droite-Gauche: un Clivage Dépassé?* (Documentation française, 1994), p. 3.

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all in the name of the common good and against Right and Left management, to initiate a European anti-oligopolist strategy challenging the internationalization of capital and the phenomenon of transnational and extraterritorial markets which determine economic realities, to find at last, before the steamroller of a homogenous world, the means to safeguard the diversity of peoples and cultures without cultivating xenophobia or hatred — these are the objectives around which men and women who today still belong to different camps will rally around tomorrow.

Then it will become clear that concepts once regarded as contradictory are in fact complimentary. José Ortega y Gasset's saying is well-known: "To be on the Left or to be on the Right is to choose one of the many ways available to people to be an idiot; both are forms of moral paralysis."[32] Charbonneau has written: "Discussion of principles between Left and Right is absurd, because their values complement each other. . . . Liberty in itself or order in itself can only be the lie which dissimulates tyranny and chaos. Truth belongs to neither Right nor Left, neither is it in equal distance from the two. Rather, it is contained in the tension of their extreme exigencies. If one day they have to meet each other, it will not be in denying what they are but in going right to the end of themselves."[33] He concluded: "The time has finally come for us to reject Left and Right together, in order to reconcile within ourselves the tension of their fundamental aspirations."[34]

It is not a matter of "neither Left nor Right" but of salvaging their best features. It is a matter of developing new political configurations transcending both.

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32. *La Révolte des Masses* (Livre-Club du Labyrinthe, 1986), p. 32. Ortega returned to this often, notably in a 1930 article ("Organizacion de la Decenia Nacional") and in a 1931 collection ("Rectificacion de la Repùblica") where he qualifies the terms Right and Left as "sterile words" and as "the vocabulary of the past."
33. *Op. cit.*, pp. 150-151.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

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Journal of European Psychoanalysis

Humanities, Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapies

No.1, Spring-Summer 1995

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Demagogic Populism in Eastern Europe?

Béla Greskovits

In the first years of post-communist transition in Hungary, populism emerged as a hot topic academically and a veritable curse politically. No party has claimed to be populist, and none has avoided charges of populism levelled by one or another competitor. A demagogic populism seems to be always on the agenda, yet never actually present. In the East European context, however, populism has a peculiar meaning — similar to what it means in Latin America, but very different from what it means in the US. Far from referring to, e.g., Christopher Lasch's small proprietorship or an ethic of individual responsibility,[1] it refers to a political strategy that seeks easy popularity by making unrealizable promises to the lower classes and frustrated domestic business interests. Of course, it also entails restrictions on global capitalism. Thus demagogic populism refers to policies and movements that reject market logic, endanger economic stabilization and threaten liberal democracy.

Much has been written about "the populist threat" in Eastern Europe.[2] Clearly, economic hardships that breed populist fervor are present in the region. Many groups *have* made irresponsible appeals and put forth demands that threaten liberal democracy and economic stabilization alike. Yet what is interesting is that so far populism has *not* succeeded in conquering the

1. Christopher Lasch, "Communitarianism or Populism?", in *The Revolt of the Elites* (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 106. See also the special issue, "Populism vs. the New Class," in *Telos* 88 (Summer 1991), with contributions by Lawrence Goodwyn, Christopher Lasch, Tim Luke, Robert D'Amico, Andrew Fraser, Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen.

2. See, for example, Ellen Commisso, Steve Dubb and Judy McTigue, "The Illusion of Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe," in György Szoboszlai, ed., *Flying Blind. Emerging Democracies in East-Central Europe*, Yearbook 1992 (Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992).

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headquarters of economic policy-making, either in Hungary or the rest of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, no matter which parties have won, economic policy has remained more or less in the neo-liberal mainstream.

Why? How has it happened that the East's recent economic history has been characterized by the *absence* of any notable populist experiment? Why is it that no populist tendency has managed to take control of macroeconomic policy levers? It may have to do with the following: 1. The structural antagonisms that have been conducive to populist economic experiments in Latin America, such as dramatic income inequalities and a sharp sectoral division between traditional exporters and producers of non-traded goods, have never been characteristic of East European societies. 2. Since the transition began, neither political nor economic conditions were favorable for a populist economic experiment. At times, economic populism was feasible from a strictly macroeconomic viewpoint, but the political conditions were missing. Conversely, there were moments when political factors seemed to favor a populist turn in economic policy-making, but macroeconomic factors were prohibitive. Yet what happened in the past will not necessarily continue in the future. While there has as yet been no constellation of political and economic factors favorable to populism, this may arise in the future. Recent structural, political, and macroeconomic developments increase the likelihood that the East will move toward economic populism in the coming years.

What is Economic Populism?

In Latin America,[3] populism has meant an economic policy-mix designed to mobilize political support from organized labor, the lower-middle-class, and domestically-oriented business. This entails the political isolation of the rural oligarchy, foreign enterprises, and large-scale domestic industrial elites. Among the typical items in this package[4] are budget deficits to stimulate domestic demand, nominal wage increases with price controls to effect income redistribution, and exchange rate control or appreciation to cut

3. Following Robert Kaufman's and Barbara Stallings' "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism," in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), the populist episodes include those associated with Salvador Allende (Chile, 1970-73), Juan Perón (Argentina, 1973-76), Alan García (Peru, 1985-90), José Sarney (Brazil, 1985-90), Luis Echevarría and López Portillo (Mexico, 1970-76 and 1976-82).

4. See Kaufman and Stallings, "The Political Economy of Latin American Populism," *op. cit.* Populist policies often included specific institutional and structural policies such as privatization and land reform.

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inflation and to raise wages and profits in the non-traded goods sectors.

Analysts agree that populist economic policy makers, while concentrating on income redistribution by macro-policy means, have tended to disregard macroeconomic constraints. More specifically, the populist approach to economics "emphasizes growth and income redistribution and de-emphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-market policies."[5] The literature stresses that populism as a government policy is not just a synonym for disorder but rather the fairly systematic enforcement of specific socioeconomic interests to the detriment of others, and the exploitation of political benefits of this process. The rejection of both efficiency criteria and a concern for macroeconomic balance have been principles rather than accidental by-products of populist episodes.[6] Experiments with economic populism have been much more coherent than just incorporating a few political priorities into the process of economic policy making.[7]

The failures of populist economic experiments are associated with both improper assumptions and the neglect of structural constraints. Neglect of the inflationary impact of the budget deficit led to rapid inflation or hyperinflation. Neglect of international constraints led to a rapid drying up of international reserves and to a quick deterioration in the trade and current account balance. Neglect of the macroeconomic constraints of large-scale income redistribution led to dramatically adverse distributive consequences. Organized labor and lower-middle-income groups, targeted as the main beneficiaries of populist redistribution, were actually much worse off *after* populist episodes than before.

Why Populism?

Why then are populist economic experiments tried at all? The answer is that populist policy can lead to short-term economic and political benefits. Economic populism is tempting precisely because it does *not* backfire imme-

5. Rudiger Dorbusch and Sebastian Edwards, "The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America," in *World Bank Policy, Planning and Research Working Papers* No. 316, 1989, p. 1.

6. Populist programs cannot be treated as mere "aberrations." As Drake stresses, such programs "normally respond to the problems of underdevelopment by expanding state activism to incorporate the workers in a process of accelerated industrialization through ameliorative redistributive measures." See P. Drake, "Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?" in M. L. Conniff, ed., *Latin American Populism in a Comparative Perspective* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), p. 218.

7. Carlos Bazdresch and Santiago Levy, "Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970-1982," in Dornbusch & Edwards, "Macroeconomics of Populism," *op. cit.*

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diately. That occurs only later, when budget and current account balances deteriorate and international reserves dry up. Under specific conditions, important macroeconomic indicators like growth, inflation and real wages may actually improve dramatically in the short run. In other words, populist policies pay politically. Allende's *Unidad Popular* in Chile saw its share of the vote climb from the 36% it won in the presidential election of 1970 to about 50% in the 1971 municipal elections . Even in 1973, six months before the coup, the UP share stood at 44%. Alán García, whose APRA Party took 46% of the vote in the 1985 elections in Peru, won considerable support even from the capitalist class for the success of his recovery strategy a year after his program started. In Brazil, trust in Sarney's government increased from 40% in September 1985 to 72% one year later, along with an impressive growth of Sarney's personal popularity. This may have been due to the initial results of the expansionary policies followed since early 1985, which were further enhanced by the Cruzado-program of February 1986.[8]

There are several structural explanations for the recurrence of populist episodes in Latin America. These focus on the sharp class and sectoral divisions in the region. Structural analysis points to two particular characteristics. One is the *extreme income and asset inequality* characteristic of many Latin American countries. Income polarization intensifies redistributive pressures. Normally, governments might deal with this through taxation, but the upper classes do not like to pay taxes, and in Latin America they are usually able to avoid doing so. This leaves the government virtually no other way to deal with redistributive pressures than through populist expansionary economic policies.

The second structural problem is the *distributional struggle* pitting employers and workers in industry and services against the primary products export sector dominated by the traditional oligarchy. For a variety of reasons, such as controlled and overvalued exchange rates, trade protection, price controls and real wage increases, the former sector is favored to the detriment of the latter. Populist policies that penalize the rural export sector have been political winners because export proceeds benefit only a small fraction of the population, while those targeted for populist redistribution constitute a large vocal group of voters.[9]

8. Robert Kaufman, "Stabilization and Adjustment in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico," in Joan M. Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).

9. See Jeffrey Sachs, "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America," in *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, No. 2897, 1989; and Kaufman and Stallings, *op. cit.*

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Class and structural divisions of Latin American societies cannot provide a satisfactory explanation, however, for populist episodes have also occurred in countries characterized by more balanced income patterns, as well as by less sharp divisions between the export sectors and the rest of the economy. Also important are features of both the political institutions and of the regime that translate socioeconomic structures into political behavior and policy choice. Two types of party structures facilitate populist experiments: the *exclusionary* and the *unstable* multiparty patterns. Perónists in Argentina and Apristas in Peru represented popular sectors that were periodically excluded from the political process. "[B]road distributive appeals to workers and industrialists have been a way to mobilize the support necessary to regain entry into electoral politics, and to consolidate power." In highly fragmented multiparty systems such as Brazil, for instance, "the divided 'political class' typically faces a strong temptation to strengthen its electoral position by appealing to the distributive interests of politically available working-class groups."[10] Multiparty systems *without* exclusionary elements and fragmentation limit the chances for populist turnabouts.[11]

With regard to regime-type, both authoritarian systems and consolidated democracies are unlikely to experiment with economic populism. However, transitional democracies which have only recently moved from authoritarian to democratic rule will be extremely susceptible. All democracies in post-communist Eastern Europe are in transition. None, however, has experimented with populist macroeconomic policy episodes so far. The reason is because of the profound structural differences between Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Structural Differences of the East

None of the structural characteristics conducive to economic populism in Latin America can be found in post-communist Eastern Europe. Take income and asset distribution. Despite rapidly increasing income polarization since 1989, post-communist income distribution has remained far more balanced than in Latin America (which is unprecedented even by Third World standards). There is a sense that populism is not necessary in Eastern Europe, since communism left these countries with a legacy of relatively egalitarian

10. Kaufman and Stallings, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

11. Clientelism and a stable, two-party democracy limited the chance for economic populism in Colombia. See Miguel Urrutia, "On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia." in Dornbusch & Edwards eds., *op.cit.*

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social welfare benefits. Much of the former social, education and health care systems remains in place, putting extreme pressures on the budget.[12]

Another important difference is that export sectors in Eastern Europe are less sharply divided from the rest of the economy than in Latin America. Populist pressures to restrict the export sector are consequently weaker in Eastern Europe, since more groups benefit from the proceeds. Thus in Hungary the export sector has not been divided clearly from other branches by specific sectoral features, like in the traditional export enclaves of Latin America. Rather, it may be identified as a complex web of developmental, productive and marketing activities focused on competitive markets and unevenly spread in the active structure of firms.[13] Distributional struggles between sectors oriented to export and those concerned with domestic markets have therefore had less chance to enforce the kind of economic policy turnabouts typical of Latin America. Of course, just as sharp structural divisions alone cannot explain the intensity of redistributional pressures placed on governments, their absence is no guarantee that there will be no such pressures. Even if there were those pressures and East European policy-makers felt tempted by them, the latter would still remain heavily constrained against populist policies during the early transition period.

A conclusion of recent discussions is that one cannot simply "go populist" at will. The Latin American experience demonstrates that even populist adventures which ostensibly disregard macroeconomic constraints are still dependent on specific macroeconomic conditions. The first important point is that *populist episodes rarely begin during deep economic crises*. Rather, they usually begin immediately afterwards, when there is a little "breathing space." None of the Latin America populist episodes started in a deep recession. Out of six populist periods in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, only the 1985-90 Peruvian experiment was initiated during a slight recession. All others were preceded by economic *growth* — even if policymakers thought actual growth was below potential. Other macroeconomic indicators were also holding their own before populist experiments in Chile (1970), Argentina (1973), Mexico (1970 and 1977), Peru (1985), and Brazil (1985). No short-term macroeconomic catastrophe was forecast on the basis

12. Janos Kornai, "A posztszocialista átmenet és az állam. Gondolatok a fiskális problémáról," in *Közgazdasági Szemle* No. 6, 1992, forthcoming in *American Economic Review* as "Post-Socialist Transition and the State. Thoughts on the Fiscal Problem."

13. For more on the Hungarian export sector under communism, see Bela Greskovits, "The Hungarian Credit Programme to Stimulate Exports," in Andreas Rába and Karl-Ernst Schenk, eds., *Investment System and Foreign Trade Implications in Hungary* (Stuttgart: Fischer Verlag, 1987).

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of the macroeconomic indicators alone. These facts are of utmost importance: populist economic policies need adequate financing.

In the pre-populist era, inflation was high, though not excessive by Latin American standards. In most cases there was no hyperinflation. Budget deficits, ranging from 2.7% of GNP in Chile (1970) to 6-7% in Mexico and Peru (1977 and 1985, respectively) were acceptable. In most cases the trade balance was positive and\or the current account deficit was low and there were substantial international reserves available.[14] The "acceptable" economic situation, though far from satisfactory, was certainly not independent of the standard stabilization and adjustment programs introduced prior to the populist episodes. In fact, orthodox stabilization and adjustment programs can be said to have "bred" economic populism in two ways: first, by "improving the budget and the external balance sufficiently to provide the room for, though perhaps not the wisdom of, a highly expansionary program"; second, by feeding the dissatisfaction of politicians and the population with the poor growth results and the serious distributive consequences of the mainstream adjustment approach.[15]

If moments of relative and temporary balance have provided the macroeconomic conditions for populism in Latin America, it is the *absence* of such conditions that is most striking in the early years of East European post-communism. From 1990 on, macroeconomic indicators have pointed to a substantially *more* devastated landscape in Eastern Europe than in Latin America prior to populist episodes, rendering any populist approach virtually prohibitive. The unprecedented recession in post-communist Eastern Europe has in fact been *deeper* than the recession that *followed the collapse* of populist experiments in Latin America. The breakdown of populism implied a 2.9% drop of the GNP in 1976 in Argentina. Respective data are 5.6% for Chile (1973), 10.4% for Peru (1989), 0.6% for Mexico (1982), while Mexico and Brazil actually continued to grow after 1976 and 1987.

The breakdown of communism, however, was accompanied by a contraction of 12% in Poland, 10% in Hungary, 16% in Czecho-Slovakia, 17% in Bulgaria, and 14% in Romania.[16] Hungarian economists[17] have

14. Populist regimes often financed their development strategies by nationalizing differential rents from the country's main export products. See Boeckh, *op. cit.*

15. Dornbusch and Edwards, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

16. Figures for Poland are from 1990; the others are 1991.

17. See Pál Juhász, "Hasonló a helyzet a világválságéhoz," in *Magyar Hírlap*, No. 12 (January 1993); and János Kornai, "Recession, Stagnation and Growth: The Case of Hungary," lecture presented at the Political Science Department of the Central European University, Budapest (January 1993).

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estimated that the recent recession, at least in the Hungarian context, appears to have been *deeper* than that of the Great Depression. Not only the depth but also the length of the crisis was unprecedented. 1992 was the fourth consecutive year of recession for most of Eastern Europe; only Poland experienced a modest recovery.[18]

Besides the recession, other macroeconomic indicators have blocked populist adventures in Eastern Europe. Budget deficits have reached or exceeded levels of the peak growth years of populist episodes in Latin America. This is all the more striking since Latin American budget deficits were fueled by fiscal expansion and an overheated economy, while in Eastern Europe they occurred without any new investment programs. The overall rate of inflation has remained high or higher in Eastern Europe than in pre-populist Latin America. With regard to international reserves as well as trade and payments balances, most of Eastern Europe performs the same or even worse than Latin America prior to populism. Ever since 1990, macroeconomic conditions have *never* been ripe for populist experiments in any East European country. On the contrary, from a macroeconomic viewpoint, Eastern Europe has looked as if it were in a *post-populist* era.

While communist central planning went far beyond any populist government in Latin America, communism had strong populist-like features: 1) An appeal to organized labor and urban white collar groups by sanctioning full employment, comfortable wages and social benefits such as minimum wages, free nurseries and kindergardens, and free health, education and child-care benefits. 2) Import-substitution policies aimed at regional autarchy and forced industrialization, in the ambitious hope of "taking off" (in Rostow's sense) and "catching up" with the rest of the world. 3) A pro-urban and anti-rural policy such as the redistribution of income from rural to urban populations and from agriculture to industry. 4) Strong preference for the public over the private sector. 5) Considerable restrictions on foreign firms — especially multinational corporations active in the Third World. 6) Policies such as budget deficits to stimulate aggregate demand, nominal wage increases with price controls to effect income redistribution and exchange rate control or appreciation to cut inflation and to raise

18. Even during the Great Depression, output in Hungary began to recover after three years. One can hardly find anything comparable even in Latin America in the 1980's, a decade characterized as "lost" from the viewpoint of growth. In countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Chile recession lasted for, at most, only two consecutive years. See Joan M. Nelson, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Appendix, Table 1.

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wages and profits in the non-traded goods sectors. 7) An emphasis on growth and income redistribution, and deemphasis of the risks of deficit finance and of external constraints.[19]

Retrospectively, the similarity of the two systems seems to be confirmed by the "medicine" regularly prescribed. The internationally-sponsored stabilization, adjustment, and transition programs recommended for post-communist Eastern Europe are remarkably similar to those forced on post-populist Latin America. As a group of influential economists and policy-makers noted not long ago: "When Argentina and Peru embark on their next stabilization programs, they will get roughly similar recommendations from their economic advisers on how to proceed. But how much of what we have learned is relevant for Eastern Europe? . . . Are not the initial conditions so different as to require a drastically different approach? We do not think so. Most of the logic behind the standard stabilization package applies to Eastern Europe as well."[20] As key macroeconomic data show, East European economies are still far from cured. They are even far from any "breathing space." Eastern Europe *could not afford* economic populism after 1990. Macroeconomic conditions did not provide room for it.

International Constraints

Are macroeconomic constraints the only things preventing a populist turn? The question is more relevant with respect to the Balkans. Recent evidence from the region shows that under specific conditions the actual state of the economy does not matter. What matters is the maintenance of certain "rules of the game." In the East European context these rules have been mainly of an international nature. These include a collaborative relation with the IMF, World Bank, and international banking community and a desire to become as close as possible to the European Community. All countries in the region have tried to maintain the image of committed reformers, reliable debtors and potential EC-members.[21] In other words, macroeconomic constraints *along with* a specific international context have limited

19. For a more detailed comparison of communism and populism, see Béla Greskovits, "Is the East Becoming the South?" Budapest: Central European University, Political Science Department (January 1993), mimeo; and András Bozóki and Miklós Sükösd, "Civil Society and Populism in the Eastern European Democratic Transitions," in *Praxis International*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (October 1993).

20. Olivier Blanchard et al., *Reform in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 1.

21. Strong ties with the international financial community, particularly with the EC, also shaped politics and economic policies in Spain and Portugal after the democratic transition. International influence had less of an impact on policies in Greece and Turkey.

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policy options in general, including one for economic populism.

The Latin American experience seems to show that rules of international financial and economic cooperation can temporarily be broken for the sake of politically motivated policies, *provided* macroeconomic performance permits at least short-term internal financing. Thus Sarney in Brazil, García in Peru, and Betancur in Colombia all broke with the IMF, and both Brazil and Peru announced a moratorium on debt payments when initiating populist policies. For their part, the IMF and the banking community broke with several countries when they tried to move toward economic populism.[22] The latter has very poor chances if it requires challenging international financial sources at times of catastrophic macroeconomic conditions. Under post-communist conditions, economic populism was simply a non-starter, regardless of political conditions.

The subordination of politics to emergency economic conditions does not always happen. During the post-communist period there have been three distinct periods of interaction between political institutions and macroeconomic conditions: the "breakthrough" years of 1989 and 1990; the period of "subordinated politics" from 1990 to 1994; and a period of nascent recovery beginning soon after and continuing today. During the first period there was a possibility of a populist turn, in that the macroeconomic situation did not prevent it; the second, with deep recession and a domestic politics subordinated to international financial constraints, offered no populist possibilities; while the coming third period may still see a populist turn.

From a purely macroeconomic viewpoint, the breakthrough years of 1989 and 1990 may have provided the last occasion to introduce populist economic programs in Eastern Europe. This was the "honeymoon" period of new democratic governments — a time when macroeconomic conditions did not yet rule out populist experiments. Of course, at that time not all countries enjoyed "permissive" conditions. Thus in Poland, with a 1989 inflation rate of 250%, a large budget and current account deficit, and dried-up international reserves, populist policies were never economically feasible. Nor was there any political support for such policies. Virtually all important political forces at the time, from Solidarity to the former communists, supported some form of neo-liberalism. At the time even public opinion was willing to accept hardships as the condition for a better future.[23]

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22. Kaufman and Stallings, *op.cit.*

23. Simon Johnson and Marzena Kowalska, "The Transformation of Poland, 1989-91," prepared for the World Bank Project on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in New Democracies, organized by Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, 1992, mimeo.

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Economic populism was not "feasible" in Yugoslavia either, because of the catastrophic economic condition: a 7.2% decline in GNP in both 1989 and 1990, with hyperinflation in 1989 and over 100% inflation in 1990, and a severe budget and current account deficit. On the contrary, economic chaos only pushed the country into civil and ethnic war, with further devastating economic consequences in the following years. In any case, it was not macroeconomic income distribution but nationalist and ethnic appeals that were used for political mobilization in the former Yugoslavia.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however, economic populism was in principle viable. In 1989, GNP dropped by only about 1% in Hungary, and actually grew by 1.3% in Czechoslovakia. Inflation was increasing, but still relatively low. Budget and current account deficit were far below prohibitive levels. Yet economic populism was shunned. In Hungary there was still a memory of the awful experience with a quasi-populist revitalizing experiment in 1985-87.[24] Key macroeconomic indicators at the time resemble those obtaining during failed Latin American populist efforts. It discredited the communists' reputation as reformers and aroused considerable suspicion against hasty attempts to revitalize the economy through fiscal expansion and income redistribution. Caution came to characterize the Hungarian approach to economic policy.[25] Thus in Hungary, as in Poland, both the outgoing and the incoming political forces legitimated themselves by "mainstream" economic approaches, even if the macroeconomic situation could have allowed something different. Even before the fall of the old regime, Károly Grósz, Kádár's successor, cultivated an image of a liberal and a reformer. In 1988, he passed the premiership on to Miklós Németh, a soft-liner and young technocrat acceptable to the emerging opposition. As Prime Minister, Németh followed a line of "non-partisan professionalism" which, in 1989-90, was identified with price and trade liberalization, subsidy and budget cuts, restrictive monetary policies — the exact the opposite of economic populism. Like their successors, outgoing Hungarian reform-communists did not initiate anything "populist" in 1989-90.[26]

Wherever macroeconomic conditions in Eastern Europe permitted

24. For a detailed analysis, see Ágnes Ungvárszki, "Gazdaság-Politikai ciklusok Magyarországon, 1948-1988," in *Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó* (Budapest, 1989).

25. For a recent summary of arguments against artificial revitalizing attempts, see János Kornai, "Visszaesés, veszteglés vagy fellendülés," in *Magyar Hírlap*, No. 24 (December 1992).

26. András Körösényi, "Demobilization and Gradualism: The Hungarian Transition, 1987-92," presented to the Overseas Development Council Research Project on Democratization and Market-Oriented Economic Reforms: Short- and Medium-Run Interactions, mimeo, 1992.

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politicians to have a say on the desired path of economic transition, they unanimously chose anti-populist policies.

Dominant Economy, Subordinate Politics

During the breakthrough years anti-communist and pro-capitalist public sentiments were overwhelming — the last time politics still had a say about economic policy. Large, anti-communist electorates (Solidarity and its political affiliates in Poland; Civic Forum in coordination with Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia; a more developed but segmented anti-communist party system in Hungary; and the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria) voted for comprehensive anti-populist economic changes, even though only a minority of the electorate had any idea of their bitter, short-term economic implications. This stable arrangement, however, could not last. In 1990-92, it was threatened by an increasing fragmentation of the new political system and major populist challenges.

Fragmentation in Hungary occurred mainly within the established political parties in parliament. Within the governing coalition, both the main coalition force (the Hungarian Democratic Forum) and the junior coalition party (the Smallholders Party) became polarized because of different approaches to systemic change. Until late 1992, *right-wing populism*, advocating both nationalist and redistributive appeals, had an impact within the coalition, while some major labor unions and other organizations became receptive to the redistributive slogans of *left-wing populism*.[27] Right-wing populist leaders, such as József Torgyán and István Csurka, argued that the international financial mafia and its internal agents were enforcing restrictive macroeconomic policies resulting in a substantial decline in living standards. The Hungarian situation would improve, said Csurka, only when "economists" and narrow-minded "financial experts" were replaced by "national strategy thinkers."[28] Csurka was soon forced out of the Democratic Forum and in 1993 founded his own "Party of Hungarian Life and Truth," a name that reeks of prewar extremist terminology.

While fragmentation in Hungary was an intra-party matter, in Poland it occurred during the process of party-formation and, because of substantial differences in electoral and legislative rules, the resulting fragmentation was far more extensive. During and after the 1991 and 1992 elections,

27. On Right and Left populism in Hungary, see János Kis, "Gondolatok a közeljövõrõl," in *Magyar Hírlap* No. 24 (December, 1992).

28. István Csurka, "Keserû Hátország," in *Magyar Fórum*, No. 31 (December 1992).

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both the political arena and parliament were invaded by a multitude of small parties, the largest only slightly stronger than the smallest Hungarian parties. In this context, populists were able to make a much more direct and effective challenge than in Hungary. It came in the person of Stan Tyminski, who defeated liberal reformer Mazowiecki only to lose to Walesa in the final round of presidential elections. "Rather than presenting an economic and political program, Tyminski accused the government of corruption and of betraying the ideals of August 1980. He made vague promises about all the benefits he could achieve for Poland . . . . [D]isillusioned people voted for the myth of the West rather than for Tyminski himself."[29]

Political fragmentation in Czechoslovakia followed the Polish pattern. A multitude of competing parties emerged as "spin-offs" from the major anti-communist blocs originally mobilized by Civic Forum and Public Against Violence.[30] After initial political goals were met, fragmentation was quick and brutal. In Czechoslovakia, however, the major fragmentation has occurred along ethnic and national lines. By 1992 populism there reflected national and ethnic frustrations amplified by the hardship of economic transition. Slovak Prime Minister Meciar's populism addressed the fears and angers of many Slovaks, hit much harder than Czechs by recession, price hikes, and unemployment.[31] Yet, despite political fragmentation and polarization, and despite the populist predilections of many politicians, there was no populist economic turn anywhere in Eastern Europe.[32]

The anti-reform and pro-populist rhetoric during the presidential election campaign in Poland did not prevent Walesa from keeping Balcerowicz as his number one economic policy maker. Even after Balcerowicz resigned, following the 1991 parliamentary elections, the general economic policy approach has hardly changed. On the contrary, the rapidly changing Polish coalition governments timidly continued what Balcerow-

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29. Johnson and Kowalska, *op.cit.*, p 70.

30. "Up to 15 parties and groups of opinion joined inside both coalitions, ranging from the most conservative right-wing formations to the most radical left-wing groups, including the defenders of ethnic minorities and the proponents of socialist renewal." See Carlos Flores Juberías, "The Breakdown of the Czecho-Slovak Party System," in György Szoboszlai, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

31. As Juberías writes, "The tremendous impact of Meciar's party and the growing success of his populist and utterly nationalist message forced the other political groups to relocate themselves ideologically and to redefine their strategies. Most of them did so by clearly favoring nationalist positions." *Ibid.*, p. 162.

32. Ironically, because of the poor economic situation of Slovakia, Meciar the "populist" had even less opportunity to introduce populist economic policies than his counterpart Klaus, the "liberal," in the Czech Republic.

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icz started — even when the former communists regained power in 1993.

In Hungary, the coalition government continued spouting the populist rhetoric, but its Spring 1993 financial adjustment plan was almost pure liberalism. Like their Polish colleagues, the Antall government had to subordinate political ambitions to macroeconomic crisis management. The limitations of economic policy choice was dramatically illustrated by the striking uniformity of the economic programs of the various parties in the 1994 election campaign. Nowhere have populist challenges been powerful enough to alter the overall neo-liberal policy approach. After the breakthrough years, prohibitive macroeconomic conditions rather than vague pro-capitalist feelings led to consistent anti-populist policy choices throughout the region. This does not mean there was no change.[33] Populist pressures combined with increasing political fragmentation to retard the implementation of some reform measures and to postpone the development of others.

Economic populism constitutes a different and much broader policy-mix. This has not yet occurred in the East European transition. Instead, fiscal restraint, trade and price liberalization, budget cuts, subsidy removals and privatization have remained government policy everywhere, regardless of the depth of political fragmentation or the intensity of populist challenges. Political action has clearly remained limited by poor macroeconomic and strict international conditions. Politicians in Eastern Europe will have to wait for a recovery before they can influence economic policy choices once again. Until then, macroeconomic policies will not reflect the ideological preferences of the governing coalitions, whether leftist, rightist, or populist.

Recession cannot last forever. There are already signs of recovery in some countries. Modest recovery will not mean that all structural problems of post-communist economies will have been solved. It is likely to

33. Examples of this are the slowing of privatization in Hungary and Poland, and perhaps in Slovakia, in 1993; and the postponing of comprehensive reforms of the health, education and pension systems practically all over the region. The distribution of "pork" and of "sweeteners" in election times was probably also prompted by populist appeals. The first examples are issues of pace or sequencing, while the latter concern political business cycles rather than economic populism. Alesina suggests that populist cycles in Latin America "can be viewed as an extreme magnification of 'partisan cycles' in OECD democracies." See Alberto Alesina, "Political Models of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms," paper prepared for the World Bank Project on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in New Democracies, mimeo. While this seems both interesting and relevant, the specific interpretation of economic populism in this paper differs from the political-cycle analogy. For an Ecuadorian example of populism's relevance to political business cycles, see Merilee S. Grindle and Francisco E. Thoumi, "Muddling Towards Adjustment: The Political Economy of Economic Policy Change in Ecuador," paper prepared for the Ford-sponsored Project on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment, 1991, mimeo.

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mean little more than a "breathing space" on the road toward a Western-type market economy. Nevertheless, it will be a crucial time since politicians are likely to regain their influence over economic policies. The political system, along with the state's viability and the bureaucratic structure, will again have a decisive say about the future policies of individual East European economies. The Third World experience suggests that economic recovery tends to "reduce public tolerance for sacrifice and release pent-up demands for improved incomes and services. To sustain disciplined macroeconomic management and forge ahead on incomplete structural reforms, governments need to change their political tactics."[34]

While improved macroeconomic performance may release pent-up demands, structural reform, an essential task for all post-communist economies, involves a political and bureaucratic pattern of governance very different from that required by macroeconomic stabilization. In fact, a *second phase of transition* is likely to begin in Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s, even while the basic aims of the first phase, from the viewpoint of stability, are still far from achieved.[35]

Governments can be elastic enough to change their political tactics only if they preside over a framework that can support both stability and structural reform. Reviving distributional pressures, triggered by the first results of recovery and combined with requirements for new, cooperative political and bureaucratic tactics, may restructure significantly the political and policy making arena, and lead once again to politics controlling economic decisions. Thus politics is likely to be less subordinated to macroeconomic necessities than it has been ever since 1990. This provides new opportunities for economic populism. When the macroeconomic situation no longer rules out populist choices, the political system will regain its relevance. In that new situation, the paths of Eastern Europe may change.

By the mid- and late-1990s, the specific features of the political institutions of each country will determine the path each will follow. The exclusivity or fragmentation of specific national party systems, as compared to stable electoral blocs of others; the behavior of employers' and employees' associations, including their connection to the political par-

34. Joan M. Nelson, "The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe?" (1992), mimeo, p. 11.

35. To quote Nelson: "Key monetary and exchange rate adjustments can be put in place by Central Bank and Ministry of Finance officials, as can certain fiscal measures such as subsidy cuts. In contrast, most structural reforms are more complex to launch and implement. They may require legislative action, and they almost certainly entail the cooperation of operating ministries." *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

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ties; the political leaders personalities, both inside and outside the formal political systems; the relations between state and society. All these features will shape the character and intensity of political influence over economic policy in each country.

The renewed influence of politics over economic policy will not necessarily lead to economic populism in any post-communist country. There are other alternatives to neo-liberalism than demagogic populism, such as corporative-type arrangements of negotiated structural reforms or export-oriented, selective growth policies. Demagogic economic populism, however, will be *one* of the possible alternatives. Politicians seeking sustainable growth and structural change and shunning risky populist swings are likely to be challenged more in the *coming* period than in the early transition period. The age of demagogic economic populism in Eastern Europe may still be on the horizon.

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*Paul K. Feyerabend (1924-1994) — Search for Abundance**

Sergio Benvenuto

Since the publication of *Against Method*,[1] Paul K. Feyerabend has not had a particularly good reputation among scientists. Fortunately, some scientists think otherwise. For example, Stephen J. Gould has claimed that *Against Method* inspired him in his formulation of the theory of punctuated equilibria. Yet Feyerabend essentially developed Ludwig Wittgenstein's, Karl Popper's, Thomas Kuhn's and Imre Lakatos' ideas, and those of philosophers usually appreciated by scientists. Unlike them, however, he bore the brunt of criticism because he dared to challenge, with "dadaist" humor, the scientific method, stating that "the only principle which does not inhibit scientific progress is: *anything goes*."[2] For the cultured scientist, the core of his nobility lies in the method.

By contrast, Feyerabend's thought has had considerable success among philosophers, mainly in Continental Europe, where it fits in well with the prevalent hermeneutic trend. His posthumously published autobiography, *Killing Time*, shows how his provocative conclusions evolved from his life-long involvement within scientific rationality.[3] Many eminent philosophers — from Benedetto Croce to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger — have developed criticisms of science without ever threatening epistemologists and scientists. The latter felt safe from the criticism of philosophers, who knew little about physics. Feyerabend's "internal" criticisms — not of science but of scientific rationalism — had an entirely different impact. Even in philosophy, what is important is not only *what* one says but *who* says it.

The title *Killing Time* plays on the original meaning of his name in German, *Feierabend*, which means "after work, work-free time." Feyerabend had to kill time because his life was always veiled by a cloud of pain, both physical and spiritual. As a 20-year-old Austrian fighting for the Third Reich, he was seriously wounded, which left him crippled and impotent for the rest of his life (this, however, did not prevent him from having no fewer than four wives). Chronic pain stemming from this injury, painskillers to alleviate it and a "faithful depression" were constants in his life. His physical handicap was mirrored by an affective handicap: a sullen

* English translation by Claudia Vaughn.

1. *Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: NLB, 1975)
2. *Ibid.*, ch. 1, p. 20.
3. *Killing Time. The Autobiography of Paul K. Feyerabend* (Chigaco: University of Chicago Press, 1995). ,Bari-Rome: Laterza, 1994).

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refusal to love deeply. He describes himself as a hardened recluse, always ironically "elsewhere." Only later in life would his fourth wife, Grazia Borrini, an expert in international cooperation and development, thaw his "winter heart."

Feyerabend came of age in a pre- and post-WWII Vienna imbued with the spirit of the Vienna Circle. The logical-positivist epistemologists who scoffed at his thought would envy his curriculum. His teachers were the physicists Hans Thirring, Karl Przibram and Felix Ehrenhaft. He later studied with and befriended people such as Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger, Rudolph Carnap, Alfred Tarski and Popper. His works on quantum theory (on John von Neumann and David Bohm)[4] brought him notoriety in the scientific and philosophical worlds. He was among the organizers of the gatherings of leading European scientists and epistemologists in Alpbach, an Austrian alpine center. He then followed "the great migration" of analytic philosophy from Vienna to England, and then on to the US (Berkeley, California).[5]

In short, Feyerabend absorbed all he could from positivism and rationalism. Was it his disenchantment with them that eventually led him to denounce the pretenses of reason? As a youth, he thought "there was no other knowledge beyond scientific knowledge, and that all the rest was nonsense."[6] Then, as he put it, "I read Wittgenstein." As with Kant's reading of Hume, Feyerabend's reading of Wittgenstein awakened him from a sort of dogmatic or Carnapian slumber. His work is less the result of *disenchantment* than of a maturation or intellectual *growth* out of rationalism. Something happened to Feyerabend not altogether different from what had happened to another "time killer," Wittgenstein, who, along with Kierkegaard, Mill and Austin, was his real philosophical mentor.[7] In the end, even Wittgenstein (from the ironclad logical foundation of the *Tractatus*) eventually came to that disquieting deconstructive game known as "the private language argument."[8] From the later Wittgentein, Feyerabend also adopted the idea of the irreducible plurality of *forms of life*: even when doing science, human beings do

4. See "On the Quantum Theory of Measurement" and "Professor Bohm's Philosophy of Nature," in Paul K. Feyerabend, *Realism, Rationalism & Scientific Method. Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Vol. 1, pp. 207-18 and pp. 219-34.

5. With Popper's and Scröedinger's support, in 1955 he began his academic career in Bristol, where he taught philosophy of science. In 1958 he moved to the University of California at Berkeley, where he remained until 1989. The San Francisco earthquake that year led him to move to the University of Zurich, where in 1993 he was diagnosed as having brain cancer. He died in Geneva on February 11, 1994.

6. See the chapter "Al Termine di una Passeggiata non Filosofica tra i Boschi," in Paul K. Feyerabend, *Dialoghi sulla Conoscenza* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1991), p. 64.

7. Feyerabend's first scholarly work was a systematic commentary on "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*," in *Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Vol. 2, pp. 99-130.

8. On the interpretation of the private language argument as a kind of "skeptical argument," a provocation to rational common sense or even as a "sophism," see Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

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not do only one thing; they play various "games" and express various forms of life.

Feyerabend's "radical propaganda" sought a double emancipation: of scientists from epistemologists, and of citizens from scientists. He attacked two distinct *tutelages*: one imaginary; the other real. The imaginary tutelage is that which philosophers of science claim to have of scientists' work, when they prescribe truly *scientific, rational* methods. Feyerabend has written some witty pages showing how science advances by continuously changing methods, often proceeding in total disregard of the epistemological principles of a particular period. Thus he criticized the ideal image scientists often deploy to describe what they do: "Scientists have always acted in a loose and rather opportunistic way when *doing* research, though they often spoke quite differently when *pontificating* about it."[9] The emperor has no clothes: everyone knows that science marches on without worrying about the emperor-epistemology, which perhaps reigns, but does not govern.

Every scientific epoch has its "reason." Newton thought that not everything in the universe could be explained by mechanical causes. Yet his theoretical system required interference from God, e.g., in explaining attraction at a distance, and in so doing turning space into God's sensorium. This interference seemed irrational to Laplace, whose famous answer to Napoleon regarding divine intervention was: "I do not need this hypothesis." Laplace, in turn, would have been scandalized by quantum mechanics — a theory which allows that certain phenomena do not have a cause.[10] The moral here is that every scientific epoch elaborates its specific criterion of "scientificity" (as Feyerabend put it) in an "opportunistic" way. Thus in order to interpret the results of an experiment with the slit interferometer, scientists were so unscrupulous that they decided to revise common logic. From the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, the results of that experiment violate a fundamental law of (not only classical but also intuitionist) logic: nothing less than the principle of distributivity of the conjunction with respect to the disjunction. They chose to alter certain fundamental rules of reasoning by elaborating the so-called "quantum logic"[11] rather than give up their own theory! What could be more opportunistic?

The second, "real" tutelage is the damaging power that "experts," technicians and scientists have on hyperindustrial society, conditioning political choices and the future. These experts dismiss as irrational and superstitious all

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9. *Killing Time*, Chapter 12, "Against Method."

10. According to Feyerabend: "The Church, being the foremost guardian and interpreter of the Bible, also made it a boundary condition of reality. Newton, who opposed Catholicism, still took this boundary condition very seriously. Research, according to Newton, must use two sources: the Works of God, the magnificent Universe, and the Word of God, the Bible." See Paul K. Feyerabend, *Farewell to Reason* (London-New York: Verso, 1987), p. 253.

11. On "Quantum Logic," see George W. Mackey, *Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (New York: Benjamin, 1963); Hilary Putnam, "Is Logic Empirical?" in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), Vol. 5; John M. Jauch, "Foundations of Quantum Mechanics," in *Rendiconti della Scuola Internazionale di Fisica "E. Fermi." Fondamenti di Meccanica Quantistica* (New York, Milan: Academic Press, Periodici Scientifici, 1971).

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traditions and knowledge not recognized by scientific rationalism. For Feyerabend, science's strictures against both popular and élitist practices (such as acupuncture, Elsässer and Polanyi's vitalism, homopathic medicine, astrology, psychoanalysis, yoga, Marxism. dianetics, Jungism, Bateson's systemic theory, ufology, structuralist semiotics, Reichian orgonomy, the mathematical theory of catastrophes, parapsychology, etc.) constitutes a sort of modern Inquisition. The two denunciations and the two possible emancipations should be seen as two faces of the same coin: in order for both science and society to become *free*, they must accept a radical pluralism. All possible cultural traditions should be preserved, not by placing them in a kind of anthropological reservation but by allowing them to operate within the modern city.

Feyerabend is regarded as the most radical exponent of the so-called *new philosophy of science* — that approach which weaves its way from the French conventionalism of Duhem and Le Roy through Quine, Kuhn, Hanson, Fine, Hacking, Latour, Cartwright, etc. This thread gradually shifts philosophy of science from empiricist and rationalist presuppositions toward more Hegelian models. In both positivist empiricism and Popperian falsificationism, what was really at stake was the confrontation between *proposition* and *fact*: in order for scientific propositions to be such, they must be verified, falsified or corroborated by facts (in inductive theories the facts lead to propositions; in falsificationist philosophies the facts select propositions). To Carnap or Popper, science seemed a ruthless confrontation between language and world. During the last decades, science has gradually come to be seen as a competitive confrontation *between theories*, therefore between flesh-and-blood scientists with their prejudices and passions. To paraphrase Quine, Feyerabend broke Popper's rasor on Marx' beard.

Philosophy of science self-Hegelianized in the sense that it saw scientific theories less and less as "mirrors of nature" (to use Rorty's expression[12]) and more and more as resembling the development and survival of living species (a biological metaphor not usually used by the new philosophers of science). Thus a bear is not seen as *mirroring* its polar environment. Rather, it is seen as *well-adapted* to it, which does not prevent other species, such as seals or whales, from living there as well. Similarly, theories exist in the world of "facts": they do not mirror it but live in it. Consequently, there are a myriad of other possible "true theories."

At the root of this shift is the observation that there are numerous facts which do not agree with even the best established theories. Yet these recalcitrant facts, in and of themselves, are not enough to falsify the theory. Facts can falsify only if a rival theory can account for them. They falsify only in a competitive game between theories seeking to survive and prosper. Furthermore, theories survive and grow not only because they adapt to their environment but also because they can reproduce. In animal species, it is not only the strongest that perpetuates itself but also the male who "seduces" more females and the female who "seduces" more males. In terms of

12. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy as a Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).

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this metaphor, positivism and Popperianism highlighted only the relation between individuals and environment. What remains occluded is Feyerabend's radical stance focusing on the theory-theory relation, i.e., the individuals' ability to compete in seducing and reproducing. When Feyerabend described Galileo's "propaganda,"[13] i.e., his rhetorical ability to convince his contemporaries of the superiority of the Copernican theory over the Aristotelian on the basis of uncertain and partly refuted data, he emphasized the crucial role of seduction in the scientific enterprise.

Within such a context, facts become like cards in a poker game: although they are randomly dealt, some good players usually win, while others generally lose. The luck of getting good cards (read: facts confirm the given hypotheses) is certainly important, but in the end what prevails is one's "art" in poker (as well as in science), the way one "plays" the empirical cards in order to win (over rival theories). Thus Galileo and Einstein are no longer pure, objective and disembodied gazes on the world, but players who take on the risks of a new paradigm.

In terms of the earlier Darwinian metaphor, some species, such as elephants, having nothing to fear from predators (except man), have a long and infrequent gestation. Others, such as rabbits, with no defenses, compensate by short and frequent gestations. For a Popperian epistemology, all theories are like elephants who have survived all hostile encounters (i.e., all attempts at falsification). But the new philosophy of science has shown that if all theories were like elephants, they would be extinct. They must also be like rabbits: they must know how to convince and seduce scientists. The single rabbit can be easily devoured by falsifications, but his race will survive. In other words, the predominant image of Mother Nature is the result of a lot of (not all) responses nature has provided: relativism shows that the predominant image of her is determined by the questions asked, and if the questions were different so would be the image of nature.

In this "research program," which shifted the key of scientific work from a facts-propositions confrontation to one of theory-theory, Feyerabend occupies a position too radical for many to swallow. He does not merely say that every theory is falsified by a myriad of facts: he observes that a fact is such in relation to a theory. "New theories," he says, "never accept *all* the facts of the old theories, but only those which the new theories or the metaphysics associated with them consider legitimate."[14] Every new theory (what Kuhn[15] would call *paradigm*, or Lakatos[16] *research program*) decides which facts are scientifically relevant, hurling back a whole other series of facts as futile anecdotes.

Feyerabend's principle of *incommensurability* lies in this relativism of facts.

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13. See *Against Method*, *op. cit.*, Chapters 6-11.
14. *Scienza come Arte* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1984), p. XXXII.
15. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1962); *The Essential Tension* (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago, 1977).
16. Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1978).

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This principle states that two different paradigms are incommensurable (but not uncommunicative or untranslatable) because they cannot appeal to a neutral, outside referee, as would "the facts." Different paradigms not only interpret facts differently, they also regard as "facts" completely different events. This conclusion seems skeptical and irrational. Such a relativization of facts frustrates every appeal to them to decide rationally among conflicting theories. But this perspective does not necessarily lead to Humian-type skepticism. Feyerabend was not a skeptic for the simple reason that he never denied the successes of science. What he denied was that philosophers could identify precisely the reasons for these successes. He acknowledged that science was a rational enterprise, but denied that this rationality could be described rationally. He did not believe it possible to define the *essence* of scientific work any more than one can define the essence of art or ethics.

An artist himself, Feyerabend often drew examples from art to stress incommensurability between artistic epochs and styles. Today no one prefers Ingres' portraits to Picasso's simply because the former's figures are more recognizable. It is now generally accepted that both provided painting with different aims and rules. In short, artistic languages are mutually incommensurable. The difference is that in aesthetics incommensurability and relativism are generally accepted, while in science they are considered scandalous. Along with Wittgenstein, it could be said that there are "family resemblances" among scientific epochs and paradigms, and among artistic epochs and paradigms. Just as it is impossible to reduce family resemblances to one trait common to all, it is equally impossible to find a common method applicable to all scientific activities, from Babylonian astronomy to the physics of quarks. Feyerabend ultimately challenges the *unifying passion* of rationalism that seeks the common essence in disparate, contiguous, similar and related phenomena. As he put it: "I never 'denigrated reason,' whatever that is, only some petrified and tyrannical versions of it."[17]

Feyerabend's principle "*anything goes*" does not necessarily mean that any theory is fine. On the contrary, he was rather selective with his scientific preferences. It was the conclusion of a proof *ad absurdum*: it is "the terrified exclamation of a rationalist who takes a closer look at the history of sciences."[18] Theories do "go," but not for the reasons rationalists believe. History's selection of truth responds to far more complex exigencies. "Science is not therefore 'irrational'." According to Feyerabend, "every single step can be accounted for. . . . However, the steps, taken together, only rarely form an overarching pattern that agrees with universal principles, and the cases that do support such principles are not more fundamental than the rest."[19] His work is a hymn to the creative work in science, freed from epistemological shackles. For a long while he had wanted nothing to

17. *Killing Time,* "London, Berlin & New Zealand", Ch. 11.

18. Preface to the 3rd edition of *Against Method* (London: NLB, 1979). See also Paul K. Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (London: NLB, 1978), Ch. 6, p. 78.

19. *Killing Time*, Ch. 8, "London and after"; Ital. transl., *op. cit.*, p. 105

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do with epistemology, aiming less at designing a *Bild* of actual scientific doings than a new *Bildung* (edification, education) of scientists and citizens in the era of scientific domination. As he once said: "I wish there were not specialists in philosophy on one side and specialists in sciences on the other. I wish scientists would know more about philosophy. More scientists-philosophers and less philosophy of science."

Hermeneutic thought derives from Nietzsche's saying that "there are no facts, only interpretations."[20] Hermeneutics limited this Nietzschean judgment to literary texts and *Geisteswissenschaften*. Feyerabend's reconstruction was welcomed because it allowed this primacy of interpretation over facts to be extended to scientific texts. This Nietzschean sentence can be interpreted as skeptical subjectivism (such as "men are irreparably divided by their interpretations") or else in a quasi-Kantian sense ("because interpretation is always interpretation of something, *das Ding,* to interpret is beyond facts"). Precisely because the so-called "experimental facts" are not independent of the theory for which they are "facts," every scientific theory confronts itself with things-in-themselves, to which it refers in constructing the facts. In hermeneutics, rather than disappear things tend to recede into a sort of noematic background that relativizes the phenomenal world of facts and objects.

Where does Feyerabend fit in all this? He was always passionately interested in Greek culture, particularly the passage from archaic to classic culture: Homeric forms of life were dominated by quantity, to the detriment of structure and quality. Homer's and Hesiod's world was one of lists, catalogs, inventories, additions, combinations, superimpositions: everything was added to everything else, without ever dominating.[21] Greek rationalism simplified and unified this plethora of things and events, which the Western world exalted as the cradle of its own rationality and science. Feyerabend seems to prefer archaic Greek life: that plural world populated by sundry gods and myths was more liveable than today's rational world.

As for the concept of progress, for Feyerabend the only *absolute* progress is *quantitative*. For him, scientific progress is relative because, although each scientific paradigm may explain many phenomena the preceding paradigm did not, it also ignores and "forgets" many others the previous paradigm explained. In the qualitative world of sciences, progress is relative. In his own way, Feyerabend believed in progress: he only conceived it as quantitative.[22] A world rich in differences is better than a unified one.

The Feyerabendian thing-in-itself is the plurality of life. Abundance is the unthinkable *magma* against which thought continually measures itself to reduce its

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20. "Against positivism, which stops at phenomena saying 'there are only facts', I would say: no, facts do not exist, only interpretations do." Friedrick Nietzsche, *Wille zur Macht*, aphorism #481.

21. Especially in *Against Method*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 17; see also "Reason, Xenophanes and the Homeric Gods," in *Farewell to Reason*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2.

22. *Scienza come Arte*, "Il Progresso nell' Arte, nella Filosofia e nella Scienza." *op. cit.*

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importance.[23] In a sense, Feyerabend always remained a good Viennese empiricist. He inherited the irony of Johannes Nestroy and Karl Kraus. He always vindicated a certain empiricism against rationalism, hence his admiration for Ernst Mach, long cast as the "dinosaur" of empiriocriticism (he had the misfortune to criticize Einstein's theory of relativity and atomic theory). Feyerabend re-evaluated the thought of this distinguished loser (but today's losers can become tomorrow's winners) because, in some way, Feyerabend always vindicated the exigencies of empiricism against rationalism. His empiricism was no longer "logical" or "positivist" but *existential*, even aesthetic: more attention to real life, and multiplicity of colors, smells and flavors, rather than to the ideal, grey, monochrome unification of rationalism. In this, he remained faithful to one of his original philosophical masters, Kierkegaard, whom he read as a student in a "damp basement, surrounded by spiders, cockroaches and rusty heaters."[24] With the Danish philosopher he shared an intense concern for the individual, whose drama he opposed to the abstract logic of grandiose, speculative architectonics. Broadly speaking, Feyerabend is an existentialist: he vindicates the irreducibility of various individuals against mastodontic reason.

Feyerabend compared the solemn Popperian Procustan Bed to Byzantine art,[25] when mosaics showed humans only frontally, giving them a solemn air they did not have in real life. Even in the history of science, Feyerabend wished to introduce the richness of the glimpse, the non-frontal perspective, the sweeping views and the polysemy of humor. In short, he decried the *impoverishment* brought about by rationalism. Classic reason sought to eliminate the world's empirical wealth. He wished the joy and versatility of theater and song to wind their way into the austere corners of philosophy. Even his choice to live in the US was consistent with his thought: he liked its effervescent melting-pot of diverse races and cultures. California satisfied his philosophical taste for miscegenation.

For Feyerabend, the most important wealth was knowing how to laugh — even at himself on his death-bed. During his last days in a Geneva hospital, a nurse asked why such a critic of science came to a hospital with state-of-the-art science, to which he replied, "To learn French!" Being "dadaist" meant provoking "serious thought," and laughing even at the most sacred icons of science, reason and death. At the end of *Killing Time*, he was even admonishing his admirers against an overabundance of admiration for his work. As he wrote shortly before his death, "My concern is that, after my departure something remains of me, *not* papers, *not* final philosophical declarations, but love."[26] Even now that he is dead, we still love him.

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23. His other yet unpublished book is actually titled *Conquest of Abundance*; it demonstrates how both experts and common folk produce abstractions in order to reduce the enormous abundance that surrounds and distracts them.
24. *Dialoghi sulla Conoscenza*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
25. *Killing Time*, Ch. 8, "London and After."
26. *Ibid.*, Ch. 15, "Fading away."

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*Three Interviews with Paul K. Feyerabend**

Renato Parascandalo and Vittorio Hösle

I

Question: Could you begin with saying something about your intellectual development?

Feyerabend: Well, it certainly was not like that of David Hume, who planned his intellectual development far in advance. Mine was a series of accidents. I got interested in the arts, in acting especially, in singing, because I heard some excellent people perform and I had a very good teacher. I got interested in physics because we had an excellent physics teacher at high school. I got interested in philosophy because some philosophy books got mixed up with a package of second-hand theater books I bought. So I started reading them to cut my losses. I became a lecturer in philosophy because I was in Vienna without a cent and a friend of mine, Elizabeth Anscombe, said, "There is a job available in Oxford; why don't you apply, in philosophy?" I did. I also applied in Bristol and Australia. I got the Bristol job. I had no preparation whatsoever, because I had never studied philosophy or philosophy of science. So I had to learn by giving lectures on the subject. I gradually slid into the subject matter and emphasized it a little more, just because I had to give lectures about it. In the course of giving lectures and also being invited to conferences, I came to know many outstanding philosophers and philosophers of science. Eventually I thought that what they were saying was not so good, and so I argued against it. This is how some of my papers came into existence; not because I thought I have to sit down and put things right, but because at a conference I got up and argued against a certain talk somebody had given. Afterwards, all the talks were being published, so I had to write up what I had said, so eventually some publications arose. Thus my intellectual development was simply a series of accidents.

Question: When did you first begin to doubt traditional theory of science and that the absolutism of science is a blessing for mankind?

Feyerabend: I am now writing my autobiography, and part of it is trying to find out how that happened. I really cannot identify any specific event or course of events. Very early, when I was a student, I was invited to the summer university in Alpbach, which had just started, and I had excellent visitors and

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* These interviews were recorded May 15, 1992 in Rome, Italy, as part of the project "Enciclopedia Multimediale delle Scienze Filosofiche," sponsored by RAI.

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lecturers. There I had still an absolutist, scientistic attitude. When somebody was talking about God or beauty or truth, I usually got up and told him he did not know anything about science, that all he said was nonsense. I also admired the positivism of the Vienna Circle. In the discussions afterwards, people said we want to make clear what scientists have said, and to them that meant translating it into some pigeon logic. I also thought this was a waste of time. I really do not know when I started doubting the enterprise of science itself. There was a point when I thought that if you want to find how things really are, you have to turn to the sciences. And there was a point when I thought the sciences say very interesting things; they still interest me much more than other things, but they have not the absolute grasp of truth. I really do not remember. It must have been a gradual process. Part of it was that Imre Lakatos often came to my lectures. He was in favor of science, you know, a science freak, as one might say. And just to excite him a little, I sometimes made snide remarks about science. Having done so, Lakatos one fine day said "Why don't you write up all your remarks, and I will argue against them, and we will have a wonderful discussion about it in a book." He also added: "Make your remarks as extreme as possible." So I did, and that was *Against Method*. When it was published, Lakatos was already dead, so he could not write the second part.

***Question*:** Were there some physicists, some scientists, not only theorists of science, who also encouraged you in your criticism of our idolatry of science?

***Feyerabend*:** First of all, one of my teachers in Vienna, who was a physicist and an excellent lecturer, actually he was the physics teacher of Karl Popper and Herbert Feigl, who later ran the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science: Hans Thirring. Thirring was pensioned off when Austria became part of Germany because of his pacifism and because of his friendship with Einstein and Freud. When he came back, he continued his physics lectures, but he had also written a big book about the psychological and social presuppositions of world peace. He told all of us in the physics lectures that peace was much more important; therefore we should all come to his peace lectures in the auditorium. I came and I talked with him at length. He also frequented my lectures when he came to California, when he was already established there. This man really impressed me because he was against all sorts of cruel events. He was not one of these teeth-gnashing liberals who want to enforce a certain form of freedom, a certain form of liberalism and peace; nor did he believe all the events that had gone by — only the Nazi period — were the result of evil incarnate. It was just human folly. He was a sceptic, but a committed one. That is the only way I can describe him. This impressed me — not at the time, but over the years — and it put the sciences in a certain perspective. If you have a schooling in science, you can deal with these other things in a more rational and clear way than other people, such as metaphysicians.

Felix Ehrenhaft was also a professor of physics in Vienna. He had to leave

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when Austria became part of Germany. He said all sorts of things which contradicted other physicists; for example, when Milliken said there is a lowest electric charge, the electron. He said no, no, he has found lower charges; when people said inertial motion is on a straight line with constant speed, he said, no, inertial motion is on a spiral. When people said we have electrolysis, but magnets cannot do the same thing, he said he had found that magnets also dissolved water. When people said there are no single magnetic poles, he demonstrated single magnetic poles by experiments. And so, many physicists considered him a charlatan. When he came back to Vienna, all physics students said, "We'll expose this guy because we are all in favor of theory," and he exposed us instead. He made the experiments in front of us and said, "Now you big mouth, what are you going to say now? What can you say? You have to sit there, you can't open your mouth, you don't know anything." And this was very inspiring. He also did the same thing at the summer university at Alpbach. There was a little house where he set up his experiments. There were important physicists like Rosenfeld, who was Niels Bohr's PR-man, and Price, one of the most esteemed physicists in the profession. There was also Thirring. They came out as if they'd seen something obscene. Then the next day Ehrenhaft gave his lecture, and he said, "What can you do, you theoreticians, you don't know anything, you have to shut up, you have to remain seated." We believed in empiricism. We believed in theoretical physics. But as far as we were concerned, the experiments of Ehrenhaft did not show anything; they were just *Dreckeffekt*, the dirt effect. This was the second guy who had a great influence in this respect , who came up only much later. At the time I was slightly puzzled, but slowly this started percolating, rose and made a contribution to all sorts of doubts.

The third guy I met was Philipp Frank. He succeeded Einstein in Prague after Einstein went to Berlin. He was a founder of the Vienna Circle — the first Vienna Circle. He became professor at Harvard. I came to know him and I listened to a lecture he gave in Alpbach, where he said, "Look my dear friends, everybody talks about the Copernican Revolution, and everybody talks about how bad Aristotle was, and everybody at the same time says that scientists are empiricists, but if you look at it, Aristotle was the real empiricist, so the Aristotelian arguments were really good arguments. So if Copernicus won, he did not win because of empiricism but because of something else." This was another element which lingered and started festering only later on. My first aggressiveness went against philosophers, who started talking about the sciences without really knowing much about them. At that time many philosophers did not. They just said we have to reconstruct what the scientists say and so on, but they did not do it very well. *Against Method* is mostly against philosophy of science as a way of making meaningful the complicated things scientists say. What I say there is that there is no such method, which is also nothing new because many scientists had already said that. Einstein often said: "Compare a scientist with an epistemologist; a scientist faces a complicated situation. So in order to get some value in this situation

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he cannot use a simple rule, he has to be an opportunist." That is the word Einstein uses. When I say in *Against Method* that there is no method, this is something many scientists had already said before. It was nothing new, although apparently it was new to the philosophical community, and most historians of science. By now, people have discovered that the word "science" covers many things. Look, there is macroeconomics, there is Konrad Lorenz with his geese, there is physics, there is topology, which is also a science, there is also theology. Theology was one of the early sciences, you know. Are they all the same thing? Far from it. All this made me doubtful of philosophy. Only philosophers claim that one finds a concentration of truth in science. It was Immanuel Kant's idea, then of philosophers after him, and then it got hold of some scientists, not all of them, who took over this dogmatism from the philosophers. When quantum theory came out for the first time, people said, "Well, we know how to work with it, we know how to interpret some experiments, but what it means overall, we have no idea."

Lakatos advised me to write a book; "Do not make another shade of gray. I want to be able to attack something." It was only a series of accidents and stylistic considerations. For example, if I can argue something or tell a story, I do so. If I can say something softly or a little more wickedly, I prefer to do so, and this worked together to create this book.

Question: Would you like to explain the content of *Against Method* and the issue of relativism?

Feyerabend: Well, I was in London in 1952. I got a stipend, a scholarship, from the British Council, and I was supposed to study with Wittgenstein, because as a student I had met him in Vienna. He was always regarded as a very difficult person. Nevertheless, one of his pupils, Elizabeth Anscombe, who translated his work into English and came to Vienna to learn German to do the translation, came to a students' circle we had formed. I studied physics, and there were about 20 students: physicists, engineering students, chemistry students, some biologists, and also some people who studied philosophy, interested in general questions connecting science and society. We found that the professional philosophers were just great bores. As a matter of fact, we always spoke up in the lectures and were thrown out. So we founded a club of our own, started reading books and discussing problems. When we heard that Wittgenstein was in Vienna, we talked to Anscombe, who became a friend of mine when she was in Vienna. She told us we should invite Wittgenstein. Lo and behold the guy came to our students' circle. Now to these students Wittgenstein was not the great man he was regarded by lots of philosophers. To them he was just another bloody philosopher who most likely was just going to talk lots of nonsense and they showed their disrespect. This, I think, Wittgenstein really liked. This was a challenge. He was very sick at that time; he died I think about half a year later. At any rate, he would have taken me on as a student in Cambridge when I got the stipend. But I did get the scholarship. My second choice was Popper, whom I

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had met in Alpbach, so I came and studied with him in London. Now, when Popper came into his first lecture, he started out, as he did apparently in every lecture on scientific method: "I am a professor of scientific method. Well, somehow this is a paradox, because I don't believe there is such a thing." These were his first sentences. And all of us in the lecture hall thought this an interesting beginning and wanted to know what was going to happen.

This very relaxed attitude of Popper was carried over into Popperianism. The Popperians were much more dogmatic in this respect. Popper regarded his criterion of falsifiability, at least in his lecture, as a kind of rule of thumb, as quite useful. After he had said there is no scientific method, he said, "Well, there are a few rules of thumb which can be useful when you are doing research." Then he discussed some rules of thumb, namely, start with facts and then go on to general statements. He said, "This rule of thumb really doesn't work. I'll introduce another, namely, start with general statements and try to refute them. That works, so we shall introduce this into our box of rules of thumb." Later this box became a much more uniform and more mono-rule. Popperians started condemning viewpoints because they were not falsifiable. They started demanding that any scientist who puts forward a theory, if he is honest, must say in advance when he would give it up; specify the facts under which he will be prepared to give it up. This demand is very different from Popper's relaxed attitude in his lectures. Why can't a scientist specify? Because he does not know what his theory will lead to. Perhaps a new form of mathematics. That happened with Newton's theory. He introduced it; he worked with geometrical ways of deriving consequences. Then people like the Bernoullis and Laplace introduced algebra, analysis, different mathematics. So with one kind of mathematics you can or cannot make some deductions. Maybe you can with another kind of mathematics. The demand, "Tell me in advance when you will give up!" overlooks this possibility of development. Despite that, he was very relaxed about this method business. The whole thing became much more dogmatic later on. And in this dogmatic atmosphere, Lakatos tried to relax it a little. He said, "We have to have a different kind of methodology: first put forth not a theory, not a particular statement, but a research program, namely, a reservoir from which you can produce theories and adapt and change them, the research program remaining the same. Sometimes you have to give the research program. It is good when one of the theories makes an unsuspected prediction and it turns out to be true. Then this is a point in favor of the research program." So Lakatos loosened up this idea of the theory-refuting instance.

When *Against Method* was published, the general attitude among the educated public, among many philosophers of science, was that science is the only business run according to strict rules. That is why science can be regarded as a source of truth, a source of valuable knowledge. That is why the book created such a scandal. Scientists themselves, despite the fact that in their research they

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were rather opportunistic, believed that what they were doing was according to rules. Kuhn went around to find out about the history of quantum mechanics. He wanted to find this out before all the main contributors died. Bohr, Wheeler, Heisenberg and Schroedinger were still alive. He interviewed them, and Kuhn knew that the shape of a scientific paper does not reflect the thought processes which have led to this scientific paper. He also knew that what the scientists remember, if you ask them, is their scientific paper and not their research. So he came well-prepared, and asked them what happened. They recited the story of the scientific paper, then he brought up letters, "Look, you wrote this at this time. The letter says just the opposite." and they said, "Ah yes, of course, it was very different." In many scientists' minds there was the idea of law and order in science, although there is not because you have this split personality like many people; it is something quite normal. Thus the book created a minor uproar. It is just a minor thing. Not many people read it. Many more know who Arnold Schwarzenegger is. It is just a little boiling in the teapot — nothing really dramatic. By now, historians take it for granted that there are lots of different approaches. A book has just come out called *The Disunity of Science.*[1] The author claims science is not unitary, nor is the world. The world is, at it were, a collage of all sorts of things.

***Question*:** It is usually philosophy of science which claims science to be the only legitimate and acceptable way to recognize truth. One of the theses of your book, for example, is that it is not possible to compare science and myth on an epistemological level. You cannot say that science has a monopoly on truth, you cannot even say that science contains more truth than myth. Could you elaborate on this?

***Feyerabend*:** My difficulty is with the notion of truth. I do understand, and everybody also understands, what it means to say the truth before a judge: the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. That's very clear; we are not supposed to lie. We are supposed to try to remember, and not leave anything out which may be relevant. As for the truth of science, any scientific discipline contains approaches which are in conflict with each other. For a long time quantum theory and relativity were in conflict. Now people try to iron out this conflict with new kinds of theoretical approaches. Both belong to science. But if these two things are in conflict, we cannot say that within physics we find the truth. We find all sorts of interesting stories to tell within certain restricted domains. But the truth, what can you say? An important part of the scientific approach for many people, by no means all, is that science must be mathematical — the book of nature is written in mathematical symbols and so on. Is this a scientific theory? Is it true? It is very difficult to find out, because when some scientists go over to more qualitative considerations, mathematicians catch up with them and provide a theory of these qualitative considerations. In

1. Alex Rosenberg, *Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science* (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1994).

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the case of celestial mechanics, it was topology; for a long time the problem of the stability of the planetary system was not solved in a satisfactory way. The series was to converge and give you a certain number for certain parameters. This ran into difficulties, so some people said "Let us consider the whole thing qualitatively, not exactly on what trajectory the planets are running around the sun, but on the whole, qualitatively, how the planetary system breathes, as it were, and if in breathing it suddenly will explode." That was Poincaré's approach. But this qualitative approach can also be mathematized. It may be a guiding idea which advises mathematicians on what areas to concentrate: those areas where the existing forms of mathematics do not work.

It is not easy to speak about truth within the sciences. In 19th century physics, in any period in a specific science, you have different approaches with conflicting methodologies and conflicting results. In biology there seemed to be a conflict for a long time, but with molecular biology the situation is a little different. In economics, the situation is entirely different; in research like Lorenz with his animals, which seems to me like old naturalism: crawling around in the grass, you let geese follow you and quack at them and see what they are doing. An entirely different approach. So there is not this one thing "science" which has the "truth." This is a completely superficial description of the whole situation.

***Question*:** Obviously a method for providing a good interpretation of a poem by Goethe is not the same as one used to describe the movements of the planets.

***Feyerabend*:** Not only the method, but also the results. In quantum theory the results are that an absolutely well-defined position is not possible; in relativity that is assumed. It is not only methods but results and basic assumptions which are different in different areas of the sciences. A coherent entity, "'science," which has the truth or is supposed to have the truth, does not exist. And if it existed, one wouldn't know what it meant. Does it mean that when we study, we become happier, we are more efficient? Even the most truthful parts of science are not very efficient. Things collapse all the time, even in areas where people say: "It is an engineering problem, and engineering problems are very difficult." So what does this talk about truth mean? What does this talk about science as a unity mean? To me, these are all chimeras. I understand the PR aspect of truth, if somebody says the truth lies here, then the result is that money will go there. But apart from that, and apart from the concrete uses of the word "truth," does science have the truth? Does myth have the truth? It makes no sense to me.

***Question*:** Is it better to dedicate more time to science, to myth or to both?

***Feyerabend*:** A myth can be just as oppressive as a scientific theory, and as a matter of fact they have been oppressive: they have put people into very strange states of mind and made them behave in very strange ways. The Nazi myth is one example. I do not think it makes much sense to discuss those general questions, although these are the kind of questions philosophers mostly discuss. In the Vienna Circle science was a system of statements. For many members of the

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Vienna Circle (Carnap, Popper, Hempel), discussing science meant discussing special systems of statements; bringing order into science meant bringing order into these systems of statements. This assumes that whatever goes on in science is always above board, that people don't act for reasons which are not clear to themselves. It also assumes that making experiments is a simple matter. But if you look at large experiments today, which are like industrial plants, like in CERN, people have to agree with each other about certain things and make compromises. There is a lot of guess work. There is not enough money, so suddenly one has to change the approach in midstream. Besides, every experimenter who deals with an instrument has lots of what Polanyi calls "tested knowledge," like a race car driver. A race car driver could not tell you in detail all the things he knows; he can show it to you by driving in certain extreme situations. The same happens with scientists. Some historians of science say the experimental level is a whole culture by itself, and the connection of the experimental level with theory is very hard to figure out. This whole unity of "science" falls apart into different sciences, then among the different sciences we have the theoretical level, and the theoretical level is subdivided into, let us say, elementary particle physics, high theory, phenomenology: these are the guys who do the curve fitting, they still don't do any experiments. Then the guys who do the experiment are fed some information by the curve-fitters and by the high theoreticians. Sometimes a certain scientific result is like negotiating a political treaty between different parties where one of them gives a little here, one of them gives a little there, and finally, "At last we can publish." The discovery of two particles, a w-particle and a z-particle, was announced in a short note in "Physical Review Letters," which had about 17 signatures; it was a treaty between all these people. Ask yourself, is there some truth in the theater? Which theater? Absurd theater, naturalistic theater? Handke, Brecht, Tom Stoppard, and so on?

Question: Power struggles have become more and more important in the theory of science. But a traditional way to object to your remarks would be to say that the context of discovery and the context of justification are different, and all you have said is very, very important on the level of the context of a discovery, but does not really touch the justification problem. You say that this distinction does not really make sense. What would you say about this classical attempt to try to save the rationality of the justification of science by granting all you have said but limiting it to the context of discovery?

Feyerabend: You justify by making experiments. I've just described how complex experiments are and how many adaptations between different opinions occur on this level. There is never a clean justification in the sense that everybody agrees these steps have been carried through, therefore the theory is justified. Such a thing doesn't exist. So if you want to make the distinction between two very chaotic areas of behavior, you can make it, but it is a distinction without a difference.

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***Question*:** Certain experiments motivate certain ideas, but you can also say that experiments belong to the context of justification in so far as they falsify certain theories and necessitate looking for others.

***Feyerabend*:** One of the difficulties which made Newton assume that God interfered in the course of the planets was the so-called great inequality of Jupiter and Saturn. It seemed that Jupiter and Saturn, in the course of time, moved farther and farther away from each other. Newton knew from ancient Babylonian observations, which he got via Ptolemy, that in antiquity the planetary system was more or less the same as it is today. On the other hand, there was this tendency of disintegrating. So he decided that God periodically put the planetary system in order. Now there were some other people who said: "We shall use Newton's theory and eventually find that this can be explained by physics rather than divine interference." It took more than 200 years before this difficulty could be solved. Difficulties can exist for centuries. Nevertheless, for some metaphysical reason people believe a theory is correct. Another example is the early history of wave mechanics. Schrödinger believed for some time that there were waves. . . that elementary particles were of a wave-like nature, and he worked out the hydrogen spectrum on that basis. He got completely wrong values. Did he retreat? Did he say, "I'm wrong?" No. He said, "I shall not work according to Einstein, I shall work according to pre-Einstein." He made his theory worse, according to what everybody believed at that time. But the worst theory worked better than the better theory, which was explained much, much later. What you have to do is decide from case to case, and you have to know the case in detail. Now it's quite useful in this connection to have, as it were, a tool box of methodological rules. I mean, it's just like rules of thumb: shall I use this rule now, shall I use that rule? Popper introduced into the tool box the rule of falsification. His fault was to assume this is the only useful instrument, the only useful tool to apply to theories, instead of saying, "Well, we have increased our tool box." Never throw away the tool box, never declare the tool box itself to be the one right thing or one tool in it, but use it, extend it, disregard it sometimes, according to the case with which you are dealing, because you never know what you will run into.

Question: Is it possible to say one theory, a scientific theory, is better than another? Do you have any way of acknowledging that some theory has a certain normative predicate better, more rational, than another?

Feyerabend: Some people will say: "That is such a clumsy theory, the other one is much more elegant." Then some people will object. But look, this clumsy theory fits the facts better, and then the reply will be, "Of course it fits the facts better because it's so clumsy." But this does not mean there is a canon which establishes from one to five, let us say, all the judgments that can be made must be applied under all circumstances. Dirac, when he talked about the Schrödinger case, said "Schrödinger was quite right to stick to his theory because it was

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beautiful." For him, the beauty of the mathematical expressions of a theory was an important criterion. And some people really say, "I don't like the theory; it is ugly, it does not hang together very well. It may fit the facts, but I want something better." Sooner or later you come back to your own preference. The differences between some medical doctors and molecular biologists is that the latter want to have a universal account of certain phenomena, whereas the former want to know what works in specific cases. The knowledge of the doctor will be much more, how should I say, scattered, than the knowledge of the molecular biologist. On the other hand, the knowledge of the molecular biologist is too simplistic for the doctor. The doctor is better than the molecular biologist in some respects; the molecular biologist better than the doctor in others. Whatever comes, you are forced to judge.

Question: I would say: the best theory should satisfy both the criteria of coherence and correspondence. Do you agree with that?

Feyerabend: Some scientists do not stick to either criterion but have something entirely different in mind. If you think human beings are situated in such a way that the truth is evident to them, meaning that there was a benign creator (God) who did not turn the universe into a universal puzzle but built it up in such a way that people could do something with it, then you will be more inclined toward an empiricist outlook. But if you believe, as if you were almost agnostic, that God is far away and that the universe that surrounds us is a mockery of the ideas of the abstract and distant God, then you will think the human senses are not very good at finding the truth. So it depends on some vast metaphysical background. But in many cases, neither the one nor the other turns up. You may have some particular puzzle in the sense of Kuhn, something not very great, but something which bothers you and you want to solve, and you try things out. You do not ask for overall coherence because your problem is very limited, and finally you come up with a successful solution. This big alternative makes sense as an alternative to two positions. Have we been put here by a benign god who brings us close to what goes on or by a bastard who keeps everything away from us so we have to distrust our senses? There it makes sense on this metaphysical level; in scientific practice, some people may be influenced by it, others not. Some people may not be influenced by either and still be successful in the sense of those who support a certain kind of metaphysics. I would not make too much of this big alternative, except on a very general metaphysical level — not for the sciences.

Question: In *Against Method* you criticized Galileo. Since Galileo is highly respected as a martyr of science in our century, an attack against him is, in a certain sense, an attack against a taboo. In fact, you insist very much on external — not scientific — factors, which contributed to his fame and the triumph of his theory: the fact that he wrote not in Latin but in Italian, that he was a brilliant stylist, that he was able to render his adversaries ridiculous. In general,

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you tend to say that it was not more rational at the time of Galileo to say that the Copernican opposition was better than the Ptolemaic; that it was more an ideological question. Galileo succeeded in convincing his more intelligent contemporaries because he appealed to instincts rather than to strict and rigorous arguments. Wouldn't you say that at least after the development of Newton's theory, Galilean and Copernican theory were better than Ptolemaic theory, and second, that it is not merely an accident that Galileo was willing to bet on a theory which became then a motor of scientific progress, that it had to do with this instinct of a great scientist?

Feyerabend: I wonder how many great scientists — "great" because of their other achievements — used their instinct and went off into nothing. Many people would say the late Einstein was such an example. He tried to find a unified field theory after having made great achievements in all sorts of areas, but he never succeeded. And the young Turks of quantum mechanics said, "This guy is getting old, I mean, he cannot get away from his ideas, he cannot grasp new ideas." Some instincts of a great scientist go nowhere. Newton was one of the greatest scientists ever, considering all the research he did in alchemy, theology, physics, cosmology and in practically every area of human understanding. He was a great scientist, and yet his idea was that the planets are put in order by the finger of God. Later on people said, "Well, what a ridiculous idea." He had empirical evidence, at the time, and secondly, theological arguments. For him, God was not a principle; God was a person, a father who takes personal care of his creatures. This means the universe is not something constructed and thrown away in his spare time, as Leibniz assumes, but something God constantly works on with love, as a father, says Newton. Our relation to him is one of subordination, not recognition of a principle.

There were lots of great scientists who made the wrong guesses. Galileo is a great scientist who made the right guesses in some respects. This does not prove that, in general, great scientists make the right guesses He was just lucky. I just read a book about the different types of argumentation that existed at the time of Galileo. This also comes from Aristotle: there is dialectic, there is demonstration, there is rhetoric. Now, demonstration is where you can show something absolutely. Dialectic is where you argue with the opponent on some assumptions until you reach a conclusion, and rhetoric is where you work on the psychological weaknesses of your opponent and try to bring him around. Jean Dietz Moss[2] has enumerated the relative percentage of arguments during the Copernican Revolution and found that in the time of Galileo the percentage of rhetorical arguments increased considerably not only in Galileo but in his opponents, which is an indication that a case could not be handled according to the strict methods of argumentation. It was a difficult case, a case of belief or

2. Jean Dietz Moss, *Novelties in the Heavens: Rhetoric and Science in the Copernican Controversy* (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1993).

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disbelief, put in your bets and so on. And here Galileo got the right bet, namely, something which later could be used by Newton because, let us realize it, what Newton said about the universe was very different from Copernicus. You see, Copernicus was abandoned the moment he became accepted. Once the Copernican view had arguments in its favor, it was already abandoned. New discoveries had been made. But at the time of Galileo, the Copernican view was under considerable pressure. In this circumstance it is quite reasonable for a scientist to say, "Forget the difficulties, that's the right bet and we shall work on it and eventually it will work out." That is what Galileo did. In this circumstance, of course, you do not have scientific arguments. Rather, you have rhetorical ones to keep people in line and to get followers. In more recent times, when they are in difficulties, many scientists do this kind of stuff also, just to keep things going because they need the movement, detailed research, to show that the view is good after all.

Question: I would say it was rational after it had become clear, after many centuries, that the Ptolemaic system could not explain certain phenomena, to try another way, even if at the beginning the difficulties with this other way were even stronger than those of the Ptolemaic paradigm. Is it really only an accident that Galileo was proven right? Is it rational to bet on one research program rather than another?

***Feyerabend*:** It can be. Incidentally, you have forgotten Tycho Brahe. He solved almost all the problems of the Ptolemaians, and Galileo never talks about him. This is a rhetorical move. He does not argue against him. Tycho Brahe does not exist. The Church defended Brahe, while Galileo never talks about him except in a very mocking way, by just throwing it away, but that was a purely rhetorical move. In this connection let me tell you something entirely different. What interests me is that the Church made a decision concerning what view to accept. Galileo made another decision. He said, "The decision I make should be kept free from theology because it belongs to the sciences alone." This means he rejected any extra-scientific authority in deciding what kind of world-view should be accepted. That, in some respects, I do not like. If you have a research program, let's say, like Galileo's, you have also larger research programs; for example, the attempt to make a good society. If some smaller research program is part of a larger research program (you can also talk about the theology of the time as a research program), then the smaller must adapt to the larger and not the other way around. What is your opinion on that?

***Question*:** I believe a lot of the struggles between science and the Church are much more complex than is described in Enlightenment-inspired history of science. Obviously, even if the Church did not have many scientists of Galileo's caliber, in the committee which indicted Galileo there were also some highly qualified astronomers. The Church felt that the changes in the scientific world-view would have major social consequences. If a scientific theory has terrible

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consequences for society, it might be moral to sacrifice truth. To say that such a position is absurd and against the dignity of mankind is part of the blindness of the Enlightenment. The question became even more important in the case of Darwinism. Darwinism is one of the greatest natural theories, but it had very dangerous social consequences. The earth is not in the center of the universe but it does not follow that man does not have a specific responsibility. The fact that man descends from animals does not imply that man does not have moral dignity. It is better to accept the theoretical insight while warning against its possible practical, political and social consequences.

***Feyerabend*:** Incidentally, you call me a philosopher. I am not a philosopher. I was a professor of philosophy. Philosophers are a very special group, and their group mentality I do not particularly like. Would you say then, that a particular comprehensive viewpoint is true and scientific theories are not true because they have to be subordinated to it?

***Question*:** Obviously, science cannot answer moral questions. Thus science cannot answer all questions regarding nature. There is something in nature not accessible to the methods of modern natural science. So I would say that science has only a practical approach to reality and truth.

***Feyerabend*:** But if it has a partial approach, and if truth is universal, then science is not true.

***Question*:** You said that you do not regard yourself as a philosopher because you are critical of this group. One of the most refreshing aspects of your work is your criticism of pseudo-seriousness in academic life; particularly in Germany, where professors are taken absolutely too seriously. One of the most interesting theses in your book is that modern science had to separate itself from the Church in order to guarantee the freedom and autonomy of its citizens. Now you argue for a separation of state and science. Can you explain how you see this separation?

***Feyerabend*:** The separation of state and Church means that in public schools, which are financed by the state, religion is not taught. The same thing should also happen with the sciences. There should be more public control of the use of money for the sciences. In today's *Herald Tribune* I read an article about pork-barrel financing, where certain programs receive a certain amount of money, and then the guy who runs the program has the right to earmark a certain amount of money for scientific projects which bring money to his state. The free scientist is unrealistic; he simply does not exist. I would like to see public interference more systematized, done with an eye to the benefit of the populations in a state, not only financially, but also in terms of the products the scientists produce. It is taken for granted that science is taught and what science says is O.K., that's how it's taught in the school, and religion is taught somewhere else under different circumstances, more peripheral. The best kind of education would be that children as they grow up are told a variety of stories. They like stories anyway, so tell them many kinds of stories, scientific

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cosmologies, mythical cosmologies, religious viewpoints, etc. Then, as they grow up, you tell them, "Look, the most popular stories nowadays are these, so if you want to earn lots of money, you go in this direction." When they grow up, they make a choice on the basis of knowledge and not on the basis of the habits of their surroundings. They would be better scientists and see the limits of the sciences because they would also see alternatives. They might inspire these alternatives, and they would also be better citizens.

Question: Do you agree with Protestant fundamentalists who say that schools should not teach only Darwinism but also the Bible's creationist account?

Feyerabend: Why not? Look, lots of nonsense is being taught in schools. So much garbage is being put in the brains, so it does not really matter if you use a little of the other garbage. Why be so selective and say, "We cannot possibly. . .", when, on the other hand, you teach so much other garbage?

Question: Is the American model, where many universities are private and compete with each other, where professors have to be evaluated by students, who have to pay to study, better than European universities, which are financed even if they do not satisfy the students' needs?

Feyerabend: They bore everyone to death, but that should be quite OK (a mixture of both of them). Of course, so many things are being taught in high schools and elementary schools one could do without, and so many things one needs for a later life are not being taught. For example, one thing which should be taught is how to take care of one's body, how to take care of one's health. You can do what mothers long, long ago did, namely, heal lots of illnesses. You do not have to go to a doctor who will use the most expensive equipment to get the most money out of you. That should be taught. What should also be taught are opportunities. To some extent that is already being taught because universities put out a lot of propaganda, and try to steer students in their direction. These are the possibilities when you grow up. There are state universities. There you hear some people with some very weird ideas. They are bad lecturers, but somebody can get something out of it, because good people were bad lecturers. Helmholtz was one. In the first lecture, the classroom was full because of the "great Helmholtz," but after three lectures nobody was there. In high school or elementary school, already people should be informed about choice. What is a different and more rational kind of education, starting at the elementary school level? Let 100 flowers bloom. But tell people that there are these 100 flowers, tell them where to find them and what other people think about them.

Question: We have come to one of the most popular of your views: the famous statement "anything goes." You are interested in the proliferation of theories. You want to transcend the limits of stupid dogmatism. But if anything goes, there is no reason to search for better alternatives, so the result may be a mere mediocrity, accepted by all.

Feyerabend: No. Let me now start from a completely different end. All over

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the world people are dying, they are being gunned down, they are starving, do not have enough medicine, there is not even enough clean water and so on. There may still be some people who say, "We cannot interfere because this is a culture of its own and we must not touch any culture which has gone according to different history and so on." I say to this, "No!" Where there is misery, there must be interference, and sometimes almost war-like interference. My limit is where people start suffering. One of the kinds of relativism I do not want to have is, "We have different cultures, each culture is an authentic entity in itself. You may approach it with reverence, but you should never approach it with violence." I say that is a very dangerous principle. The statement "anything goes" was meant for the sciences, but not for everything. Consider a scientist who takes certain problems very seriously and wants really to solve them. You cannot say in advance what approach will work. Will it work when he makes a very rigorous experiment or will it work when he makes a vague conjecture and works from there? One cannot say that in advance.

Let me start from the other end, not from science. For a considerable time anthropologists, especially those who thought they did objective research, held that cultures are more or less self-contained entities which have a value in themselves. People who were against the earlier intrusion of Western civilization into all areas, which very often made things much worse, said we have to respect cultures, we cannot interfere with them. I would say there is a limit to this kind of principle, and the limit is human suffering. Here I say interference should start very soon. The military organizations in Europe and in the US should have started much earlier to think about how to interfere in Yugoslavia. The interference in Somalia should have been done better than it actually was because there was lots of bungling. In such cases, interference is just. I don't like to say it is a moral duty, because that sounds a little *schmaltzy*, but it is what a good person should do. If you see somebody next to you being mistreated, you just jump in there and hit the guy over the head. In that respect, it is not the case that "anything goes." Incidentally, relativism does not mean doing what you like. A philosopher sees a person who is in an unhappy state, who feels restricted, unfree, his life not worth anything. The philosopher gives this person medicine in the form of words, and afterwards the person says, "Well, suddenly I have such a feeling of freedom, things look much better." The person is the judge of his well-being, not the philosopher. But the well-being has been brought about by the philosopher. This extreme relativist makes the person the judge of well-being, not the philosopher. The person who brings about the change is guided by the person being changed. But in science you really cannot put down any rules. A colleague of mine, Noretta Koertge, wrote me, "Well, at least one thing you should put down is: if you are a scientist, do not follow any rules, but do your damnedest." Even that does not work, because some people work best only when they are relaxed, not when they are trying to do their damndest Their brain does not func-

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tion well. Against those who say, "It is restricted by the rules," you say, "Anything goes." That is how it was meant, and that is the limit which I want to see respected.

II

Question: The positions of Popper and Hempel have remained the same. Popper criticized logical empiricism and Hempel attacked falsifiability. What is your opinion on these two points.

Feyerabend: I know both these gentlemen. I am the generation after them; they are 90, I am 70. I worked with Popper. I was and still am a very good friend of Hempel. We went out to restaurants, we discussed philosophical matters, also watched TV together. First of all, today the general climate in thought and philosophy is more or less anti-positivistic. There was a time when people were in favor of precision, clear concepts — in favor of a philosophy which seemed to be scientific. But this has become unpopular. And so, whenever the idea of the Vienna Circle comes up people sneer. But the real Vienna Circle was a very exciting movement. First, all the people were slightly Left. At that time one of them — Neurath — was already of socialist persuasion. So this was a group of people with firm political commitments. On a narrower level, the ideas were rather interesting. They arose in Austria. The latter was rather different from Germany as regards philosophy. In Germany there was Kant, and after Kant came Hegel, and after Hegel came the Hegelians. While Hegel may have had some intelligence, the Hegelians, like everyone who repeats a great philosopher, were very uninteresting. But they had great power. Hegel managed to place Hegelians in philosophy chairs in Germany, and the whole thing spread. In Austria, the situation was different because of the Catholic Church. This German flood did not enter Austria. There was a free space. The Jesuits, who were in favor of learning, encouraged the sciences and so on. This is the background of these people who started the first Vienna Circle, before the one of which Hempel and Popper were members. These people wanted to cut through the garbage being taught at schools and in public speeches that was supposed to represent philosophy. They wanted to make this vague area a little more scientific, to add some precision to it so that people engaged in a debate could get somewhere, so that in the end you did not have the impression that, well, both guys are right and nothing has really happened. This was very exciting to many people, poets and artists alike. Robert Musil wrote his dissertation about a predecessor of the Vienna Circle, Ernst Mach; other poets entered the whole business.

Ideas very popular today, namely that facts have a historical background, were already discussed at that time; so it was not all that backward. There was an attempt to bring more of the sciences into public education, because at that time public education was dominated by the history of literature, which is never

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very interesting. What you learn in school is to hate Goethe and Schiller, but not about the greatness of these guys. Instruction in philosophy was to think about these bores, Plato and Aristotle, instead of realizing their greatness. These people wanted to change all that. There was excitement because of the positive plan they had and because the opposition felt very insecure and attacked them. The important thing is that this movement, especially in Vienna, was connected with a public education movement of the socialist party. In the 1930s, the socialist party contributed to the building of workers' homes. These were small apartments with a bathroom and a faucet, not 5 to 6 apartments sharing a bathroom and a faucet. And at the same time, they had evening schools for workers. There they learned astronomy, physics, literature in interesting ways. They themselves were encouraged to write. This was connected with the Vienna Circle through Neurath, who found new ways to teach, and through Carnap, who was an active socialist. Later there were also connections with the Bauhaus. The impact of the effects of the Vienna Circle, first in Austria, then in Germany, with certain artistic movements, and then, when the Vienna Circle people emigrated (because practically all of them had to emigrate) to the US, has been tremendous. For example, Feigl, who founded the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science and was a good friend of mine, emigrated in 1929, long before Austria was occupied by Germany, Practically all the members of my generation, I mean, all philosophers of science of my generation, went through this center and now acknowledge that it was very important for their way of thinking. When I last met Hilary Putnam, he said his first big push in the right direction came from discussions at this center. This was a center where people met informally. They discussed over lunch and dinner. When we went out (Feigl, Paul Meehl some visitor and I), the waiter would come to our table and say, "Don't be so loud, you disturb the other guests," because we had a riotous debate over a glass of wine. Feigl devoted time to problems of psychology, especially the mind-body problem, and to problems of psychological tests. Psychoanalysis, for example, was supposed to be a cure for any kind of behavioral disturbance. But the question was, how can you find out whether it is a good cure, whether it is a good theory? And, secondly, whether it really cures? People did not know how to start testing. All this was discussed by Feigl in the Minnesota Center. All these things, of which I have only provided a very brief account, this was the excitement of the debates within the Vienna Circle.

***Question*:** Let us go back to the polemic between Hempel and Popper. Does that polemic have any meaning today?

***Feyerabend*:** Well, for whom? It has meaning for Popper, Hempel and some historians. The latter will be very interested in the fact that this kind of polemic went on for such a long time and that in the meantime the situation changed considerably. Hempel himself has changed, because the polemic is about the following question: Given a general statement, how do you select it from many

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other general statements? The assumption is that scientific theories are general statements and, of course, different people have different theories. Which general statement do you pick and what are the criteria for choosing? What Popper says is that the criterion is correct. Collect observation statements or basic statements, then, make more of them, and then you can either show that the general statement has a high probability of being true. Popper made the point, a logical point, that even if you have 50 black ravens, you cannot know or be sure that all ravens are black because the next raven you find may be white. Theories never provide a criterion of selection. However, if you have a statement, "All ravens are black," and you find a single white raven, then "All ravens are black" goes out the window. You do have a selection criterion, but it is a negative one. It is not a criterion which selects one statement as being true, but it does throw away lots of statements as false. What remains is thereby not proven as being true but rather as being better than the rest, and we can work on it until it also ends up being thrown away.

The debate concerning whether we should use verification or falsification always assumes this model of general statements versus singular ones. Hempel points out that in science the situation is never like that. We do not have one particular, general statement and two or three observation statements. What we have is a complete net of statements. For example, in the very general theory of the big bang about the origin of the universe, how do we test that? We make lots of measurements of the low-level radio waves. For that we need instruments. In order to interpret what comes out of the instruments, we need a theory of instruments. Our theory of instruments may be wrong or the instruments may not work correctly. That was the problem when the telescope was introduced. When Galileo used the telescope, he really did not have any theory that would help him eliminate bad from good things because, after all, all stars had colored fringes when seen through these early instruments. Were the colors properties of the stars or of the instruments? There was no way to tell. A theory is a whole net of assumptions. And when suddenly some kind of problem arises within this net, we can direct the danger at all sorts of things. We can direct it at the instruments or at the interpretation of the results or at one of the theories. There are many possibilities. This model of having one statement is completely unrealistic. Hempel also emphasizes background knowledge; the large amount of which is not even known. You cannot write it out. You do not know what you are taking for granted. The situation is much more complex. Hempel, who was at the same university with Kuhn for a long time, emphasizes this. The old debate of verification versus falsification has been long since superseded.

***Question*:** Both Hempel and Popper, however, reject metaphysics.

***Feyerabend*:** I don't think Popper was against metaphysics. In the Vienna Circle, people were very hostile toward what was then called metaphysics. What they meant by that was very vague general statements such as, for example,

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racist ideology. By metaphysics they meant what some philosophers wrote at the time. Thus Hegel's philosophy of nature is completely incomprehensible. The words go on and on, and it does not seem to make any sense. If you listen to debates between Hegelians, you are doubly surprised. There is someone saying something which does not make any sense. Someone else lights up and says, "Yes, I am completely in agreement," and blah, blah, blah, and you do not understand it either. So you ask yourself, what is going on here? This is a kind of deterioration of humanity, which also penetrated schools, especially in Germany but less in Austria because of the reasons I mentioned earlier. The Jesuits kept such fog away. I mean, although they were discussed in private circles, Kant was forbidden in Austria for a considerable time and so was Hegel. There were lots of private circles. This kind of garbage also goes on today within the sciences. Some outstanding scientists who pose as philosophers produce a lot of garbage on TV and other places. The Vienna Circle wanted to eliminate it. They wanted to have a criterion able to claim, "This book is on the list of garbage." They wanted to have an objective criterion. They did not want to be arbitrary. They wanted to have a measuring stick. You apply it: garbage. And they thought their criterion was: if it was not a statement of logic or a logical rule, and if it was not a statement which could be confirmed by observation, then it was garbage. Incidentally, they were not the first to claim this. In his *Inquiry*, Hume said, "If you take a book and ask yourself, is it a statement of a relation of ideas, logic or a matter of fact. If it is neither, throw it into the flames, because it is of no worth whatsoever."

The Vienna Circle people were very close to Hume. They were also very close to Plato, because Plato also reacted against what was going on around him and what passed for philosophy. He reacted by trying to make philosophy mathematical. *Theaetetus* is a dialogue about knowledge. The question is: what is knowledge? And as always in these dialogues, there is a fall guy. There is a guy who is being asked a question, and in this case it is Theaetetus. There is also Theodorus and, of course, Socrates. Young Theaetetus says, "Of course I know what knowledge is. Knowledge is mathematics and geometry, and it is making shoes," and he goes on to make a long list. Plato says, "I asked for one thing and you give me many." Theaetetus was a mathematician who made some mathematical discoveries. Later on he describes how he came to the definition of irrational numbers. Theaetetus responds to Socrates' objection that, "we have found the definition of rational numbers. . . and it is one phrase which covers everything." Plato already wanted to introduce rigor and a mathematical way of thinking into the ordering of objects. For example, he wanted to eliminate the arts, drama and Homer. They have to be thrown out of a well-ordered society because they confuse people. The Vienna Circle did not say they had to be thrown away: they just had to be declared nonsense, then they can be thrown away if we can take over the education system. Popper reacted against this. He

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wants to have a criterion of separation, but a separation not between nonsense and sense, but between non-scientific and scientific, granting that in non-scientific areas lots of statements might be true and meaningful. Without metaphysics, science cannot work, because many ideas which inspired scientists were actually metaphysical. In this respect, the Vienna Circle in the 1930s and Popper were very different.

Question: What would you say is the most important problem of knowledge today?

Feyerabend: This question overlooks the complexity of things, as if there were *one* most important problem. I think it would be very important to have a form of knowledge which does not encourage inhumanity. The attempt should be to make things objective, so that knowledge stands there and has no relation to any particular person. Whenever there is a relation to a particular person, that is bad. It is moving in the direction of inhumanity. If such a knowledge is praised and regarded as the basis of existence, then something inhumane is regarded as the basis of human existence. This was one of the reasons why I side with the Church in his famous dispute. The knowledge which somehow seemed to accumulate on the side of Galileo was not objective. Of course, at that time it was very exciting: it was something new. There are forms of knowledge which, if spread around and regarded as the basis of existence, encourage inhumanity

Question: Popper claimed that truth is a predicate: a proposition is true if the state of affairs it describes exists *de facto*. Do you agree with that?

Feyerabend: He can define it that way. But then he has a special notion of truth. Has this special notion of truth any application? It does in mathematics. It was introduced in this way by Alfred Tarski, to whom Popper often refers. He said mathematics is not just a collection of symbols with no meaning whatsoever, which we shove around according to well-defined rules as we shove around chess pieces, which in themselves have no meaning either (they only have a position within the rules of the game). But symbols in math also refer to something because, after all, mathematical systems, sooner or later, have to be applied to reality. In order to discuss what seemed important to mathematicians at that time (decidability), Tarski introduced a notion of truth in terms of criteria of adequacy. The sentence, "It rains," in quotes, is true if and only if it rains. These are criteria of adequacy for a notion of truth for dealing with mathematical systems where truth plays a role. One can also say that speaking the truth before a judge means to state the facts as they are. Now, if you speak about something like the truth of science, that cannot be applied. What are the facts? Since science is full of conflicts, there are many different approaches. So you have to spell it out. Besides, there are many ways of using the truth. There is true love, which is not a love that agrees with facts. To assume we have caught what is behind all the different usages of the word "true" is a deception. To eliminate all the others

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as metaphysical, would be a reduction of our humanity.

***Question*:** You have in your pocket an appeal for teaching philosophy signed by philosophers and scientists such as Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida and Prigogine to educate the youth about critical judgement and the fruitful encounter with different civilizations. Do you agree with this appeal?

***Feyerabend*:** No. I do not think things can be improved by teaching a certain subject world-wide. Besides, who would teach it? There are so many schools in philosophy whose representatives hate each other and think of each other as idiots, fools or criminals. Philosophy is so many different things. There is dialectical materialism; will that be taught? This leaves lots of questions open, and I really do not think that teaching a subject improves character. You read certain books in connection with a certain way of life. The appeal mentioned in the cultural melting pot of the classical world, an eternally effective elixir of life was generated. It was not only an elixir of life, it was also an elixir of death. Whoever has written this refers only to the Western account because it does not speak about China. When philosophy arose in the West, there were lots of philosophical movements in China and they went in a very different direction. There were also philosophical movements in India and they went in very different directions. This is more or less a Western document. At any rate, what happened at that time? There was already a means for shaping people's character. What was the mode of instruction? Reading Homer. And there was another instrument of shaping people's character: public performances. Greek tragedy and comedy were performed before all citizens. At the end of the festival, there were evaluations. There were special judges, but the judges' evaluation was influenced by popular sentiment, then somebody got a prize. These outstanding writers were writing for a public which was going to judge them, and they wanted to get a prize. This is a wonderful arrangement. Where are the philosophers who are being judged by the general public so that if they write a rotten book it becomes general knowledge? No, they will be praised by their fellow philosophers, to hell with the general public. In these tragedies, the most basic ideas about human life, social life and social institutions are being discussed and debated. Whatever was a problem turns up on stage in an emotionally charged manner. Now, what does Plato say? "In the perfect state there will be no poets, no tragedy, no Homer. We have to throw them out!" When philosophy comes in, it is a judgement of death. In many respects, Plato was a strange guy and that is why I admire him. He is not philosophy, he is just a thinking person. He represents a new movement which wanted to get people in its claws. This movement was directed against Homer, Aeschylus, painters and sculptors. The painters' aim is to create illusion, to create some illusion to look like a chair. This means they want to deceive. These bastards, away with them! This is how philosophy arose in the West.

The answer to Plato was Aristotle's *Poetics*, one of the most influential

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books about theater. Brecht wrote about it, Dürrenmatt wrote about it, and so on. But the first step of philosophy was narrowing down, and it showed in an impoverishment of language. There is an idea of an objective world, of the right relation of the often deceived subject to this objective world. There is a special spring cleaning of language. The richness of language collapses as we go over to philosophy. It wants to take over and run culture. I am absolutely against it. I am in favor of having intercultural poetry. In the last issue of *The New York Review of Books* there is a review of a book by Harold Bloom. He says how through psychoanalysis and philosophy the whole vocabulary of love, which is very precious and differentiated, collapses into a few meaningless terms. You have to have a rich language to even notice the richness that surrounds you. And poets who come from other cultures say, "Well, you will not understand my language, so I want to talk to you in your language, but I want to twist your language around in the way which may perhaps make it much, much better." Religious people have more insight into human nature than philosophers. I do not deny that among philosophers there are some wonderful people who have the touch of the poet. Plato was one of them. I don't read much philosophy nowadays. Rorty talks in a not too technical way, he talks rather freely, and there are some journals that try to bring together poets. But poets have become rather technical also. There are much more important things than adding new subjects to the collection of already time-consuming and boring subjects. History might be much better than philosophy.

Question: What do you mean by relativism when you claim to be a relativist and how have you changed?

Feyerabend: I don't know whether I ever considered myself a relativist. I might have played the relativistic game in front of people to shock them. I cannot stand the presumption of some people, "we know the right way to live, the right behavior, the right way of eating pasta," and stuff like that. If you really want to achieve something and if you also want different people to live together, you have to consider other ways. Maybe these other ways will be better. But you have to consider them in connection with concrete problems. You cannot sit back and ask "Is knowledge objective or are there different types of knowledge?" without having any problem in mind. For example, if suddenly a modern hospital is put into the jungle, I think it happened in Brazil somewhere, common sense already tells you that most people will not be able to afford it, and if people who cannot afford it are brought there out of generosity, they go back to bad surroundings again, so what is the use of the whole business? You have to consult other ways of living and other things than what is truth. Does this mean that you will not interfere when you see some really bad things happening to people? When you see people being murdered or suffering? Even if you are a relativist, you can say, "Well, I shall act on my opinion." In this exchange you have to do what you think will hurt the least people. Western

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nations should have interfered in Yugoslavia long ago, instead of saying, "Well, we cannot touch them." I am in favor of paying attention to the opinions of others and of assuming there might be something much better than the best achievements of science. Science is not impressive. I am interested in it, but this is my personal interest. I am not in favor of saying, whatever other people do is their own choice, their own way of life, we must not interfere with it. First, this is unrealistic, because interference happens all the time. I am in favor of asking people, "What do you think?" For example, if somebody wants to put a nuclear reactor somewhere in the middle of a community, the community should be consulted. It should have a chance to say something. Maybe it will be enforced, but these are exceptional cases. These things have to be done in concrete circumstances and not according to a general recipe. I regard the philosophical position of relativism as silly because it assumes what never happens, namely, no exchange. I also regard the philosophical position of objectivism to be silly. They are two sides of the same coin. Objectivism means there is one thing which is closed and must not be interfered with: the truth. The other side of the coin is relativism: there are many things which are closed and must not be interfered with. When you go into different surroundings with different people, you cannot lay down any ground rules. They must grow out of the situation. To have general principles in knowledge or anything else is deadly, absolutely deadly.

III

***Question*:** Philosophy is generally understood as the discipline of abstract thought. What is abstraction?

***Feyerabend*:** It is a very common procedure, but some people do not understand what it amounts to. Let me take an example. Here we have a piece of paper, it is white, there is something drawn on it, it can be bent. It makes noise, it has a certain shape. Now, I can abstract from the color and what is drawn on it. This means I think about the paper without the color, without paying attention to it and without the drawing on it. The next step is that I think of the paper as an object which has a certain size and a certain thickness. After that, I can try to forget about the thickness and then I simply get an area, also of a certain size and shape. Now comes a very interesting step, namely, I assume that this area is limited by some entities one does not find anywhere in this world, namely lines, things which are infinitely thin, straight — not crooked in the slightest way — and which have a property called length. That is a very abstract entity, and I shall try to show that it is not the only way one can treat such an object. Having introduced this line, which is not a taking away but an adding of something abstract, and after having taken away something concrete like color, I can now try to ask for the area of this abstract entity, having omitted the color, the drawings of it and the thickness, and then a certain definition of length of the line gives me a simpler formula, namely: "area =

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length x breadth." So I get a magnitude which is useful when I want to do certain things with a concrete object, but which has no existence separate from this concrete object. Unfortunately, many people who have gone through this process of abstraction have not noticed that what they introduce, after having taken off a certain property, is something which has no existence whatsoever. They think that when they approach these abstract notions they have come to the real nature of the object. There cannot be any such real nature. You can measure the length of a line with a measuring stick; you will get one number, and it will not be precise. Take a smaller measuring stick, you will get another number. It will not be precise either, although, according to many people, closer to reality, as they think of it. If you go to the molecular level, things become confused once again. You do not get more precise, but then quantum effects come in and, in the end, you do not come to any definite size. To speak of a definite length for an object is not to speak about reality but about the results of a certain approach which can be replaced by a different one.

Question: It is said that philosophy is a Western product because our culture is the only one which uses abstraction. Is this correct?

Feyerabend: Abstractions are found in every culture, in every language. Normal everyday language, not a technical language, contains words such as: "man," "woman," "snow," "heavens," "earth" and so on, which omit lots of details of the object to which they are applied. There are other languages like, for example, that of the Eskimos, which are much more concrete. For example, an Eskimo has a phrase for "snow lying on the earth," another for "snow slowly falling down" that is an entirely different process, and still another for "snow being whirled around by the wind," which is still another process. He does not have a word for "snow," because he regards these processes as completely separate and he describes them in an indivisible way. When he starts speaking (so I have read) he does not put down the words he has, he adds to the phrases which are very concrete more concrete specifications in order to come to an individual event. Some cultures go from more or less concrete descriptions to more abstract ones. For example, "man," "animal," "thing," "being," once you have those you can construct out of them more concrete ones. Western science is quite unique. It is very different from, say, Chinese science, which was much more concrete. The Chinese collected many specific items of information; that is why astronomers can find from them information about new stars, meteor showers, and biologists can find information about animals and so on. They also developed a technology adapted to specific surroundings and therefore much more ecological than one based on abstract concepts. In the 14th-15th century, Chinese technology was far ahead of Western technology. Western technology was barbaric. This information I take from sinologists, especially Needham. The Western way was introduced into China, was accepted and now both these countries develop in the same general way. At any rate, there are abstractions in

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practically every culture, only at different levels.

Question: You cannot deny, however, that the abstract approach to reality has been a great success.

Feyerabend: For whom and where? For example, the abstract approach has not made people more loving, less brutal, or more civilized. This is a century in which there is a lot of killing going on. The most advanced century scientifically is one in which barbarism has returned. Of course, what we got from the abstract approach is information and advice we did not have before. We have new information and we can build new gadgets, which means, if you really look at this seriously, you have a new way of choosing. The question is: is the new information useful for your purposes? There is always a tremendous amount of information around and if you try to learn everything you will never get anywhere. You have to make a choice: you have to make a selection. What will you select? If you are in a certain tradition, within the Western tradition, you will select scientific information. The fact that there is choice involved is hidden by how scientists present their results. They say, "we do not merely offer information, we say what is real." But this inference is completely unjustified. From the fact that you have some information which helps you practically, it does not follow that the information is true in the abstract sense. If you choose the correct initial conditions, the old idea that the earth rests and that all the planets go round it in epicycles will get you very far. Now we have elementary particle physics and quantum theory. But if you do not want to know about elementary particles or about chemistry, or about the physical properties of spheres and so on, you use old mechanics.

The fact that something is useful does not mean it is true and has something to do with reality. In antiquity there were at least two different astronomical systems, both equally good at predicting the path of the planets, the moon and solar and lunar eclipses. The Babylonian system started from certain observable events, like the first appearance of the moon after a new moon. Full moon was another important event. The last appearance of the moon before it disappears again is another major event. Babylonian astronomy had an arithmetical procedure of predicting solar ellipses and so on and so forth. In Greece people used circles and circles upon circles, something entirely different. Both made the same predictions. What is reality? All you can say about the abstract approach is that it generates certain results sometimes useful, sometimes not, sometimes absolutely off and sometimes very helpful. You have a choice, but to infer you have captured realities is an assumption which comes from religion and has nothing to do with the process of abstraction itself.

Question: Is the concept of reality acceptable or one to be rejected?

Feyerabend: No, no, no. The concept of reality or of real things makes very good sense. For example, someone has been very drunk and imagined certain things. Well, this is just his imagination; it is not how real things are. Or,

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somebody dreamt and mixed up dreams with reality. The concept of truth, of reality, makes excellent sense. In ancient Greece all the events on the surface of the earth were described in common sense terms and explained by many different causes, including the gods. There were different gods fighting with each other, and this explained why on the surface of the earth things were so complicated. In the course of history, the notion of gods slowly thinned out. It became more abstract, not as the result of the work of philosophers but of travel. People started moving around and noticing that the gods in a different area had some similarities with the gods at home, and being homesick they emphasized the similarities and omitted the differences. This means they engaged in abstraction — not consciously but unconsciously. The notion of a divine being became more abstract and, to that extent, more inhumane. Although they were not always friendly, the earlier gods had a human face and, in that respect, were not inhumane. Now we have a more abstract entity, and now come the philosophers. First of all, philosophers did not call themselves philosophers. They were simply cultural critics. They concentrated on this more abstract feature, and then defined divinity simply as power. The general development was toward the more abstract, and out of that to the concept of being. The latter is a dehumanized notion of divinity. Someone like Parmenides can say: "What can you say about being? Well, you can say it is and it is not the case." That is what you can say, and it is indeed true. Now, what can you say about change? If you are talking on the level of being, change would be shifting from being to non-being. But non-being does not exist. Therefore, change does not exist. But what about the things that surround us? Well, this is all deception. A process of abstraction leads to a division between what is real and what is deception, namely the whole of human life. It is very interesting how Aristotle reacts to that. He criticizes Parmenides in two ways; theoretically, he criticizes his arguments and, one might almost say politically, he criticizes his notion of reality. He says: what is most important in our city? All Greeks are political beings, human beings are political animals, in our city we have to vote, we have to change things, there are wars, constant change. It would be lunacy, he says, to call this unreal, implying that real is, according to this definition, what plays an important role in the society in which one lives. This is a notion of reality completely different from that of scientists.

Some scientists have been influenced by philosophical generalizations. They find something stable and so they call it real, despite the fact that it is very removed from common life. Aristotle advises us not to take this decision of the scientists at face value but to choose a notion of reality which is either a compromise between common sense and the scientific results or goes back to common sense and regards scientific results as predictive instruments which help in making predictions but which have nothing to say about reality. This, incidentally, is an idea shared by some scientists. I can describe to you certain

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experimental results about the position of planets at a certain time, but we do not speak about reality. This is exactly the Aristotelian position, this time adopted by scientists independently. Incidentally, the whole debate about Galileo was about this issue. The Church did not say "you must throw out Copernicus!" The Church said: "Use Copernicus as a calculating device, which is better than the calculating device given to us by Ptolemy. For example, if in your calculations it is simpler to assume that the sun is at rest and the earth moves, make use of it in your calculations, but do not assume that it is really so. It is only a calculating trick." Galileo wanted to say: the earth really moves, the sun really is still. Who was right? Two years ago Cardinal Ratzinger, who is, I think, an ideological adviser to the Pope (very similar to the old opponent of Galileo, Cardinal Bellarmino, who has been beatified in the meantime) brought up the question of Galileo again. It seemed that the Church was ready to revise its judgment on the matter. Ratzinger, in a speech in Parma in 1990, said the whole thing would not make much sense because there are now many philosophers who say that scientific theories are good for prediction, and different scientific theories are different predictive devices, not touching reality. In this connection he quotes, of all people, Ernst Bloch, the former Marxist philosopher. Now, if scientists just make predictions and if the predictive success of the sciences can be explained by saying we have found the right instrument of prediction, then how shall we decide what reality is or is not, according to the concerns of human beings? At the time of Galileo many people believed the earth to be a center, not only because they felt it was solid under their feet but also because Christ was earth-centered. Christ came just to this one fixed spot full of humanity, not to any other. Christ was not a space traveler who got crucified in one planet after another. He came only to this one. There was a centered earth in the consciousness of many people, which provided some solidity to their lives and to their faith. This is the measure of reality. I would say that measures of reality should be chosen in such a way (not, perhaps, exactly like Ratzinger said, but taking the interest of the great majority of people into account), and not by deifying or "realitifying," some instrument of calculation simply because it has been so successful. The idea of reality is very important. It has been misused by scientists for their own purposes. The misuse has been successful because many people embrace the sciences today as they did Christianity in the past.

***Question*:** What are the dangers of abstraction?

***Feyerabend*:** If you assume with Parmenides (who is the most radical abstractionist) that the world is a solid block which never changes, then you devalue human life, because human life is full of change. You can, of course, decide to change such a viewpoint (which some Buddhists do), but it should be a matter of choice. How far this Parmenides business has gone and how influential it remains today we see when we read a letter Einstein wrote to Michel Bessot's wife, after he had just died: "For us scientists all these events, like living and

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dying, are only illusions; we know that reality is stable and does not change." Now, if you regard your life as an illusion you will take a less aggressive stance toward events within this illusion, like the killing of people and so on. If you take it to be real, you will take a more aggressive stance toward dangers. If you have a view of reality of a certain kind you may ruin human life: your own, your relatives' and so on. Another example is molecular biology. Niels Bohr thought about practically everything, and he was one of the founders of quantum theory, of an older version of it. When a new version was introduced, and people did not know what to make of it, he provided an interpretation in which the word *complementarity* played a large role. According to this interpretation, when investigating nature what we find, in a nutshell, is not what is there independently of our procedures but things which very much depend on them. For example, if through an experiment we localize a particle, we know that it is here, and then we go over and try to measure its speed. We cannot say: "the particle *whose location is. . . has this speed so and so*," because by measuring its speed we have created an entirely new situation in which the idea that it has a location does not make sense anymore.

This was the idea of complementarity. It was then extended to other alternatives besides position and momentum. He extended it to love and justice. If you want to be just to someone you must forget about loving that person. And if you love a person you cannot try to be just. These two things are mutually exclusive. He also applied it to life. Namely, you can either describe an organism while it is alive with qualitative, morphological terms, or you can find out what keeps it alive. But then you have to kill it. But you then have a dead organism, so you will not find out what keeps it alive: you will only find out how the dead organism looks. This generalization came from an interpretation of a full-fledged, detailed theory, quantum mechanics. Delbruck, a physicist, tried to create a biology as detailed as quantum mechanics to find out whether there was a scientific basis for the complementarity argument. This is how molecular biology started: from physicists. The result was that there is no complementarity of the kind Bohr thought. Molecular biology has become very widespread and people think it is possible to provide a completely objective account of human beings. Human beings have sympathy with each other, they can smile. A lot of phenomena are not captured by molecular biology. Personal relations can change, which can be described partly in psychology, but much much better in novels, which are much more detailed in that respect. If you say reality is molecular biology, the rest is moonshine. This answer throws out personal relations regarded as less important, and it may have a very bad effect. There are great dangers in putting reality at the wrong place and letting experts determine what reality is, generalizing what they found in a narrow field of research.

Question: Positivism has long been the dominant philosophy in the West. Can you describe what positivism is and what are its limitations?

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***Feyerabend*:** Positivism took its cues from the sciences. It started around the time when the theory of relativity became generally accepted, and it lasted through the time when quantum theory was formulated. In these two cases, scientists had made discoveries which conflicted with philosophical doctrines, for example, about space and time. Kant had a very abstract philosophical doctrine about space and time, very different from the common sense views. Einstein had also a very abstract doctrine about space and time. His arguments seemed to be more straight-forward and more believable than Kant's arguments. Some people started saying: "instead of philosophizing about space and time, we should rather use the method of the sciences to find out what the nature of space and time really is." Then came the next step. Kant had also written about causality. In quantum theory it seemed the methods of science, whatever they were at the time, had led to the result that you cannot assign well defined causes to various kinds of very important events, not even to microscopic events. These scientifically inclined philosophers of the Vienna Circle said: "if we want to find out about causality, we should take our cues from the sciences once again, not from philosophy." They found themselves in sympathy with older philosophers, for example, Locke or Hume, who had also taken their lead from the sciences and had, in addition, speculated on their own. They developed an account of the sciences. What do the sciences do? They said "we should listen to science about space, time and causality, introduce their methods." But, when they discussed the methods of science they made statements that were utterly untrue. How can one show this? By showing how, for example, relativity was discovered, how Newton made his discoveries and established them, how Heisenberg and Bohr made their discoveries and established them. They started telling a story about the sciences which was a sheer fairy tale. This fairy tale was attacked by historians, and Kuhn was one of the first attackers. Some of you may say: "Oh, yes, but Popper came long before that." But Popper was still one of the philosophers who just changed some assumptions but did not change the approach.

The main drawback of this so-called scientific philosophy was that it made general and abstract assumptions about how scientists proceed. Some people said they collect facts, then they have a calculus according to which they reason their way to theories and give some kind of weight to these theories. Popper called them "inductivists." He said scientists make conjectures and then refute them by making experiments. Those are very general and abstract statements about scientific method, and both are wrong. For example, a year or two after the special theory of relativity was introduced, there was an experiment made which refuted one of its consequences, namely, the way in which the mass of an electron increases with speed. Did Einstein say: "Oh my God, I am wrong!" No! He said: "These people worry too much about verification of little effects, the theory is reasonable as it stands," and he was right. Are scientists dogmatic for

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this reason? Not at all. For any scientific theory, there are always lots of facts that do not agree with the theory. It would be an absolute miracle if, given a very complicated theory, all the experiments carried out on this earth, which all have their own sources of error, were to agree with each other and with the theory! There will always be experiments which say something different. A scientist cannot say that with one contradictory experiment out goes the theory; he has to use some kind of imagination. Einstein says: "a scientist must be an opportunist, the situation is too complex to stick to one particular rule, depending on the situation you have to use different rules, and in this respect be opportunistic." Therefore, he differs from the epistemologist who, quite unrealistically, looks beyond the scientist's behavior for some simple rules to which he attends.

This led to the downfall of neo-positivism in some circles, but it is still very powerful. When the theory of relativity came up, philosophers said, "Einstein says that space and time have these properties. But we can prove, with our philosophical reason, that it is not so." And it was conceit. How can these people with just a few thoughts disprove something after long experiments, thought, and so on? The neo-positivists also said scientific theories, as formulated by scientists, are very confused. Since they were in love with precise logic, which scientists often are not (because they are too busy to pay attention to consistency and stuff like that), philosophers had to make these scientific theories clear. They also knew how to get around a contradiction. They wanted to reconstruct it — that is the famous logical reconstruction of scientific theory — translating it into a simple logical form to find out what it really means. But that translation would never lead to the discoveries which the unreconstructed, sloppy, original version of the theory did. The one is fruitful, the other is completely fruitless. It is comprehensible to a few people who do not know enough science but who know some logic.

Question: The culture of the founders of modern physics — Galileo, Kepler, Newton — was pervaded with religion, astrology, even magic. Then science detached itself from all this. What has this detachment meant for science?

Feyerabend: That is a very interesting development. Of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, Galileo was the least influenced by religious considerations in his worldview, although he was, I guess, as religious as they. Kepler derived his ideas mainly from religious considerations. The trinity played a very important part, and so on and so forth. Newton is an absolute miracle. His story is indicative. In 1939, in Sotheby's in London, some Newtonian papers were put up for sale — the papers Newton had written about religion and magic, and all that stuff. They were bought up by two scholars: John Maynard Keynes, the economist, and by Yahuda, a Jewish Arabist. Yahuda was a strong opponent of the new Jewish state; he did not want anything to do with Zionism. So he migrated to the US and took a position. Having bought Newton's religious works, he offered them to various universities: Yale, Harvard, Cambridge. They

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all rejected them: "Well, actually, this is not science, or stuff like that." Einstein, a friend of Yahuda, enclosed a letter which said: "With a great person like Newton, one should know all sides of his personality." These matters should be studied. These papers were lying around, and only about ten years ago people started studying them. Now the whole thing is in full steam, because nowadays people are very interested in these cross-connections.

As it turns out, the volume of Newton's theological writings is much larger than the volume of his scientific writings. Secondly, Newton very often was annoyed when forced, by external circumstances, to return to science from his theological studies, which for him were most important. Before one thought that Newton was a great scientist who sometime was a little batty and so he wrote about religion. Nowadays, Richard Popkin, the historian of ideas, says, "Newton was the leading anti-trinitarian theologian of his time and, by the way, he was also a scientist." The whole thing starts from Newton's belief, which goes back to Tertullian, that there are two books, two sources of knowledge: the *works* of God, which are the universe, what God has created, and the *word* of God, which is the Bible. Both must be studied in order to get a coherent view, and both must be studied without the intervention of human ingenuity, because the universe has been created by God for people to behold and to learn from. Therefore, to speculate within the sciences is contrary to its divine origin.

Newton's extreme empiricism — start from the phenomena, do not try to infect the phenomena with theoretical terms — has a religious origin. Both his books have to be studied to come to a complete view. How did it happen that suddenly there was a separation between religion and science? It came about in various steps, and one of them is really very interesting. According to Newton, God is constantly present in the universe. Newton had speculated on the basis of his theory that motion would be gradually lost in the universe, partly by inelastic collisions and by friction; slowly things would slow down. He had also inferred that the mutual disturbance of the planets would gradually cause the planetary system to fall apart. This was an early attempt to apply the Newtonian theory to the entire planetary system. He thought that God constantly intervened with the universe, restoring motion to it and, also, restoring the shape of the planetary system. He knew, from ancient Babylonian data, which had come to him from Ptolemy, that the planetary system in ancient Babylonian times was very much the same as that of his time. What he had was an active God who interfered with the universe, who constantly builds and rebuilds it. This also agreed with his religious idea of God as a benevolent father who takes care of his children, who is constantly present, not only spiritually but also materially, to improve their surroundings. This was Newton's viewpoint.

There is this great exchange between Leibniz and a representative of Newton, because Newton always said: "I don't like to get involved in debates." He always had a representative to whom he said: "Say this, say that." But he himself

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remained in the background. In the famous Clarke-Leibniz correspondence, Leibniz says: "What a silly idea of a divine being! For me a divine being is a perfectionist. He creates the universe in such a way that He does not have to look at it a second time. Like a self-governing mechanism. The Newtonian God is really incompetent: He creates the universe and it falls apart. He has to reform it and it falls apart. My God is a perfect watchmaker." Leibniz assumes there are eternal laws of nature which, independently of research, religion and so on, go on forever. How did he come to believe in such laws? That to me is a real puzzle because, at that time such laws were not really known. There were restricted laws, there was Kepler's law and so on, but basic laws, which remain the same for all objects and remain stable forever, had never been found. He makes an assumption not supported by the evidence which, as a matter of fact, goes against the evidence, and regards it as obvious. Now you may say: "Well, wherever he got his assumption from really does not matter. In the end it was successful." But was it successful? After Newton people tried to calculate whether the planetary system, using Newton's laws alone, would really fall apart or not, whether, given gravitation and the law of inertia and nothing else, there will be a stable planetary system — stable over long periods of time. Well, they did not succeed for a long long time, until at the end of the 18th century.

Using very subtle mathematics, Laplace found that the planetary system was stable over long times, although it had long periodicities. Leibniz seemed then to be right until one discovered that the series — because Laplace used series development to make his calculations — first converged. This means seemed to provide a definite number, and then diverged. If you developed the series further than to the point where they seem to converge, you did not get anything definite. They did not make any definite prediction unless you stopped at a certain point arbitrarily. A few years later, someone showed that the only way of making quantitative predictions about the planetary systems was by means of the series developments, which means the problem was still unsolved in the 19th century. Until Poincaré said "Let us try an entirely new approach, a topological approach." Now it seemed to work. It is a long development with lots of difficulties. But where did this original idea come from? God exists, yes, He has created the world, but having created it He now attends to other business because the world is perfect enough. Where did this idea come from? There are sociological explanations which, as far as I am concerned, are not detailed enough to explain the phenomenon.

One of the most critical scientists, Wolfgang Pauli, was known to the physical community as a terror. People sent their papers to him with fear and trembling, and got them back with the crudest remarks one could expect, and he was almost always right. He was called the conscience of physics, because when there were sloppy papers Pauli would come down on them like a ton of bricks. This man was very interested in Jungian psychology. He was analyzed

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by an assistant of Jung, with whom he had a long epistolary exchange about the methods of psychology, depth psychology, physics. Pauli said: "the solution for our time is a *religion*." Our idea of science must be reformed in such a way that it is open to religion." It has been reformed by quantum theory, because in quantum theory the old notions of a solid object, of a mass point and so on, have no objective significance. He called them symbols. They indicate a reality different from their first appearance. They are symbols of a backline reality. Depth psychology also used symbols. There are three areas using symbols. Uniting them would be of great importance for Western civilization, because having religion separate from life leads, Pauli explained, to bad events, wars and such. The separation did not take place because there was evidence you should leave God out of the matter. On the contrary, there was evidence that God constantly interfered, but for different reasons. In the case of Newton, God was left out of physics but not of a complete world view, because you had to approach the universe with reverence, which means without preconceived ideas. Newton's empiricism was religiously founded. In the case of Leibniz, it was different. It did not do any harm to the sciences, but it did harm to many people and, maybe, to culture and the arts. The sciences never brought forth the great art works which the Roman Catholic Church brought forth, and now there are attempts to reunite these things. People such as Paul Davies talk about God and physics. We have the beginning of a change of attitude. In this respect, incidentally, post-modernism is not so bad. It is the beginning of a new synthesis, only not one imposed from above, but which everyone, with guidance from people such as Pauli, can carry out on its own.

***Question*:** One last question: you respect Plato, the founder of objective idealism. Is it not a contradiction?

***Feyerabend*:** There is no contradiction because Plato was also intelligent enough to see the other side. If you look at the *Dialogues*, they start very discursively up to the *Republic*, where it seems to become an abstract program for the ideal society. Then comes the *Theaetetus*, where the question is asked: "What is knowledge?" And there is no one answer. Three answers are listed. Abstraction goes on, concepts are formed and suddenly Socrates says: "Well, we now come to a point where we cannot go on in this fashion, so I shall have to tell a story." *Mythus* is the word, and *mythus* is also used by Aristotle for the plot of a tragedy. This means Plato realized at certain points you cannot go on with the abstract business and you have to fall back on older forms, namely, myths, long stories which tried to explain something. He was completely aware of this. Also, he started science, but he also immediately saw its limits. In the seventh book of the *Republic* he talks about arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Arithmetic, geometry and music, he says, are of practical importance, to the leaders of society. Why? Arithmetic, for counting troops and people. Geometry for building barracks and houses. Music, for having the right melodies for putting

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people in the right mood. But, he says, knowledge does not arise in this way. You have a certain way of doing something, you do not know *why* it works, you only know that it does. To know why, you have to have theory. In arithmetic there already were a large and very detailed number of theories, namely the theories of the Pythagoreans — what one today calls number theory. On the basis of this theory one even found out that the diagonal of the square cannot be represented by natural numbers. A really amazingly simple proof is found in Euclid, but in terms which indicate that it is of much earlier origin. We have the theory of harmony, we can relate to every well-sounding interval certain number relations, four over three, that is the third. He says we need astronomy for navigation, for finding our way around at night, for orientation, and so on, but so far there is no theory. He recommends mathematical models based on the circle. As a matter of fact, all medieval astronomy, up to and including Copernicus, is based on the circle. Copernicus says in his early tract, the *Comentariolus*, that "all systems of astronomy are empirically adequate." What is displeasing to him is that the circle has lost its dominant role. True circles are used, but they are not centered; the points on the circle, of the circumference of the circle, do not run with constant angularity around the center of the circle. Galileo never accepted Kepler's ellipsis because, for him, the circle was the perfect shape. In the *Timaeus* Plato says the world is very complicated. There is the *Demiroke* (Demiurge) and there is a plan. A *Demiroke* is a divine entity and has a divine plan which lays out what the most perfect universe would be like. But then there is matter, and matter has a contrary force. It cannot be completely subjugated to the *Demiroke* when there are constantly deviations. There is not perfect knowledge in certain realms concerning matter. Perfect knowledge can be achieved only by leaving the domain of matter by an act of imagination guided by a good teacher; to get in touch with the good, and so on. Plato was much more complex than is usually thought. Of course, he was a great friend of abstraction, but Aristotle tells an anecdote: Plato came out of the Academy and gave a public lecture on the Good. People expected to hear something about how to run a household and how to behave in war. What they heard was about the indivisible unit, the possible divisibility of indivisible units, etc. They all went home. He was very abstract, but he also realized that abstraction alone does not get you where you want to go. He was aware of it and he paid attention to it. The *Laws*, which comes after the *Republic*, are already much looser.

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Corruption and Greed: Western Academic Aid to Eastern Europe

Aviezer Tucker

Farewell to Money

Helping East European education, academics and research is about as uncontroversial as funding cancer research or giving charity to orphans. The communist regimes left much of their education system in worse condition than their industry. In addition to being hopelessly outdated and inefficient, it was morally corrupt, intellectually bankrupt and authoritarian. Short on money and lacking a qualified work-force, East European governments could have done little to ameliorate the situation even had they had an interest in creating an intellectual class.

Clearly, Western financial and professional help from public and private charitable sources is needed. It should aim not just to update academic education, but also to lay the foundation for democracy in *practice as well as in theory.* Yet, for all the assistance that seems to be pouring into this region, there has been very little change. Thus it is worth exploring what happens to the money on its way to Eastern Europe. Some of it is siphoned off in the West before delivery, some reaches the region but is funneled back to the West soon afterwards. When delivered, it too often supports an interdependency between corrupt Western academics and institutions, on the one hand, and incompetent Eastern academics, on the other.

Rotten Symbiosis

Noble causes attract the most noble and altruistic, as well as the most corrupt and hypocritical actors. In the case of East European education, the first group is moved by ideals such as spreading democracy and human rights, while the second sees an opportunity to utilize a fashionable cause as a cover to amass money and power. The corrupt Western academic finds common cause with the incompetent university apparatchik who survived the fall of communism only to be threatened by higher-education reform.

Corrupt Western academics may have an interest in democratic theory, but not in democratic praxis. Experienced at playing the academic game, they aim to buy patrons and install themselves at the forefront of academic fashion, since fashions attract money. They may draw a personal plan of research or introduce a scheme spewing the post-communist babble about "democratic theory," "free market," "civil society," "transition," etc. Supported by powerful academic patrons, they raise funds "for Eastern Europe" but have little or no intellectual interest in East Europeans because they lack money and power. To maintain the

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charitable front, some money has to be spent on East Europeans, but it is kept to a minimum. Most of it is actually spent on increasing their power within the Western system through spreading favors to buy influence and impress patrons.

The other partner is the academic apparatchik, whom East Europeans would call a "communist" — an opportunistic collaborator solely interested in career advancement. As long as the Communist Party was in power, they talked Marxism-Leninism. Now they talk about "transition," "democratization," and "civil society." However, their ability to adapt is limited. At their age, they are unable to catch up with what has been happening for the past 50 years. Had they had some commercial talent, they would have been selling weapons to Yugoslavia or be local distributors of Marlboro, as are some of their former colleagues. Had they been fluent in foreign languages, they might have earned four times their academic salary working for Philip Morris or McDonald's. Since they have none of these talents, they seek to preserve and advance their position within the academic system. To survive, they must curb competition. They must forestall competent colleagues, block the acquisition of contemporary books (in languages they do not know) that would educate the next generation. They have three groups of enemies: former dissidents, who are morally pure; competent academics, mostly young people who had access to Western scholarship; and lecturers from the West. Their mission is to keep these groups away from the university by all the bureaucratic tricks they learned under communism: they claim that departments are full and there is no money for new people, that universities are already teaching everything and any new academic would merely repeat what is already taught; they assign competent teachers to teach courses in fields other than their own, deny necessary resources from university housing to photocopying, and may design the courses of new competent academics as electives that give no credit to students.

Corrupt East European academics have formed a view of the world as essentially corrupt. It is useless and quixotic to try and change it, as the dissidents did; better to manipulate the system to their own advantage. Even if they cannot immediately benefit from the corruption, they maintain a hope for the future. They tell Western visitors thay were not official dissidents, but they did try to reform the system from within. They too were victims of communism: they were not promoted as they should have been; they had to wait for ten years until their family was assigned an apartment, undoubtedly because they were considered politically unreliable. So they really were dissidents. They are very interested in America, though they have never been there. Can you help them?

To the extent that corrupt Eastern academics have a philosophy, it can be called *vulgar* postmodernism. They have never read Derrida or Lyotard. Even had their books been available at the library, these apparatchiki would not have been able to follow their arguments. Instead, they pick something here and there from tertiary sources to support the principles that buttress their philosophy: First, there is no person and therefore no personal responsibility; second, all values are relative. Both fit their earlier acquaintance with Marxism, as well as their

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actual need to come to terms with their past. If there is no personal responsibility, they cannot be held responsible for their behavior under communism; if there are no absolute values, nobody (dissidents, Westerners) can judge them. As consistent relativists, they ingratiate themselves with the powers that be.

Institutional Corruption

The European Community has been allocating considerable sums for East European educational reform and research. However, as in the case of Attali's European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the money rarely gets there. An East European university that wishes to apply for a grant from the European Community must form an association with a recognized West European university as a *senior* partner. Naturally, the senior partner controls the budget, most of which remains in the West in consultancy, overhead and travel costs for Western academics.

The terms of cooperation dictated by Western partners are negotiated through East European education ministries over the heads of the universities in the East. European Community grants are given only in certain disciplines, determined by each East European government. As a result, the hierarchic authoritarian nature of the education system left by the communists is preserved and strengthened. Naturally, governments are not going to designate the humanities as a preferred academic area of great priority for EU help. The humanities do not create material wealth, but they do tend to create intelligent critics of government policies.

Various Western agencies give grants for travel and research in Eastern Europe; for example, TEMPUS in the European Community and IREX in the US. Longer periods of research are financed by such organizations as the Fulbright Commission or the National Endowment for this or that. Some of the people who receive such grants are indeed dedicated educators who contribute much to East European universities. Others are using these grant giving institutions as tourist agencies. If a Western academic plans a "comparative research" of 7 countries in 14 days, one does not have to be a genius to understand that the objective is sightseeing rather than research. Irrelevant lecture tours are also a major draw on institutional funds: technical experts lecturing on machines that East Europeans could never afford; American constitutional scholars lecturing on the finer points of an amendment to the American constitution and its relation with the Supreme Court; British university administrators lecturing on building polytechnics and computerizing libraries in countries where there are no funds for higher education expansion and no libraries to computerize. Such junkets are directed usually toward the tourist attractions of East Europe — Prague, Cracow, Budapest, Talin, and St. Petersburg — to the exclusion of less aesthetically attractive places.

Misused Resources

The one obvious case when Western academics did affect Government policies in Eastern Europe through "shock therapy" demonstrates the limitations of Western

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intellectual advice. Harvard economists attempted to apply their abstract models, based on a Scottish Enlightenment concept of man and rationality, and brought about the return of former communists to power in all of Eastern Europe. Western experts out of touch with East European reality but generous in providing advice about "transition to democracy and the free market" end up as the butt of local jokes.

The only relatively successful reform program in the only country that did not see the return of the communists, the Czech Republic, was devised by locals, disregarding foreign advice. Academic advice from the West is useless without local expertise in the real world. Even visiting lecturers whose subject is relevant for Eastern Europe can be ineffective and wasteful. When a Western university invites and pays an academic to give a few lectures and spend a period of time there, the audience is already familiar with the visitor's work. In Eastern Europe, the audience is unlikely to be familiar with the works of the visiting lecturer. Consequently, either the visitor talks above the audience or is reduced to giving an introductory lecture. Either way, the actual effect of the visit on East European culture is minimal. Either way, the money would have been better spent in buying copies of the Western academics' books and distributing them in Eastern Europe.

East European academics, including former dissidents and younger people, are likely to be relatively uninformed about recent developments in their fields in the West, but this does not mean they are less intelligent than their Western colleagues. East European intellectuals are as smart as their Western colleagues. They are likely to have a much better knowledge of the classics and they are likely to read them in the original languages. Under constraining circumstances, they directed their talents to what they were able to do. A Czech philosopher would have a far better knowledge of Greek and German, Plato, Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger than a comparable Western scholar. Former dissidents have far greater intellectual and personal integrity than their Western counterparts. They risked their lives for the kind of reforms that should be instituted in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Eastern Europe needs support in updating *local* talent. One of the prejudices of corrupt Western academics is that their East European colleagues are stupid. Partially because corrupt Western academics cooperate with incompetent apparatchiki from the East and assume they are representative, partially because greedy and corrupt Western academics believe smart people must be rich. East European intellectuals are poor, ergo they must be stupid. Since corrupt Western academics are confident in their financial and hence political and cultural superiority, they do not socialize with East European intellectuals.

The Prague conference associated with the journal *Constellations* has been criticized elsewhere for the deliberate exclusion of East Europeans and the separation of the conference into an elitist and an "inferior" section in which the members of the "elite-jurassic" group did not participate.[1] In this case, shock therapy had some

1. Aviezer Tucker, "The Former *Praxis International* in Prague," in *Telos* 98-99 (Winter 1993-Spring 1994), pp. 255-259.

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effect. This year (1995) four Czechs participated, and the class division within the conference was eliminated. Still, the underlying problems of this group were manifest. The basic problem (of which I was unaware when I reviewed the conference) is the undemocratic nature of the leadership. The group and the yearly conference are directed by ten *unelected* "directors," who are also the directors of *Constellations*. This unelected Central Committee rules with an iron hand. Critiques by group members are rejected by threats and denunciations. The Central Committee circulates letters accusing the dissidents of opportunism, Trotskyism, associations with me or even worse, with Paul Piccone. This nature of the Central Committee became apparent at the beginning of the conference this year. In charge were Axel Honneth, Peter Dews, and Jean Cohen. When I came, Honneth approached me and said: "the directors had a meeting last night, and we thought you may come, so we thought perhaps we should not allow you to participate." Then came Dews, literally jumping up and down demanding again that I go away, which he repeated in his speeches as session Chair. I replied that unless they bought the Villa Lanna from the Czech Academy of Sciences, the only way they could get me out was by force, in which case I would call the police; and that was the end of that. Few of the participants (fewer Americans agreed to participate this time) expressed solidarity with my criticisms. This approach to criticism as something to be suppressed rather than discussed is typical, as I am informed by dissident members of the Central Committee. Though the Central Committee was gracious enough this time to allow four members of the Czech Academy of Sciences to present papers in their conference, none of the members have attempted to communicate with them or with the former dissidents, who are the interesting people to meet in Prague. They refused to listen to my advice to go to the former dissidents, apologize for their previous behavior and start a clean slate. The Central Committee of *Constellations* must keep its doctrine of infallibility. The result became a subject of local Prague jokes: When visiting Westerners socialize among themselves, they end up going to places beyond the financial means and below the taste of local intellectuals. The participants in the *Constellations* conference were invited by Honneth to meet the first night of the conference in the beautiful art-nouveau hotel Europa, where locals would not go, not just because of the outrageous prices but also because the place serves at night as a business center for expensive hookers, their pimps, and their tourist-clients. Had they bothered to talk with local intellectuals, they would have been told that a block away, in the cellar of the Lucerna complex (owned by the Havel family), there is a wine cellar where former dissidents and contemporary intellectuals mingle for much cheaper prices. Intellectual apartheid has its price! Dissident members of the Central Committee told me Jean Cohen suggested that, since "Czechs are boring," they should move the location of the annual conference from Prague to Berlin. Honneth objected because he would have had to organize it.

The Institute for Human Sciences

A near perfect example of all types of corruption is the Institute for Human

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Sciences in Vienna. In 1982 Krzysztof Michalski, a professor at Boston University, founded the *Institut für Wissenschaften Vom Menschen* (IWM), apparently to promote East-West intellectual exchange and understanding. In fact, he has been using this institute as a front to channel money from the European Community, Austrian public sources, and private donors to students from his home institution, Boston University, and to other clients. Excessive funds have been misspent on a lavish building and guest-lectures by Western academic "stars," whose patronage Michalski wishes to buy, excluding the East Europeans for whom the money was intended. In effect, The Institute for Human Sciences is the Viennese equivalent of Atali's London-based Bank for Reconstruction and Development, founded by the European Community to lend money to the emerging economies of former communist countries. Under Atali's leadership, it has spent more money on itself than on the whole of Eastern Europe.

As the glossy brochure of the IWM puts it: "The Institute was founded at a time when the division of Europe appeared to be an unalterable matter of fact. When established in 1982 IWM's intention was to mitigate the negative consequences this division had for intellectual and scholarly life. Its objective was to provide intellectuals and scholars from East and West with a forum for contact, exchange, and collaborative work. IWM aimed to promote the independence of intellectual life in East Central Europe by facilitating access to Western research and scholarly discourse. Conversely, it sought to introduce and incorporate Eastern European ideas, perspectives, and experiences into the Western context. When the Iron Curtain fell, the dream of overcoming the division of Europe seemed destined to come true. However, it soon became evident that the collapse of communism was merely the precondition for bridging the enormous gaps which had been created between East and West. The heritage of the past continues to exert an influence on the present, giving rise to new tensions and risks. This situation intensifies the need for an institution such as IWM. . . ."[2] A noble cause indeed.

The IWM grants "Junior Visiting Fellowships," purportedly for promising young scholars of Eastern Europe, to pursue research in Vienna for six months. The fellowship carries a stipend of $9000. From 1989 to 1993 more fellowships were granted to people from *Boston University*, Michalski's home institution, than to the *whole of Easern Europe*. To believe that the selection process was fair, one has to believe there are more budding experts in East European philosophy, culture, society and economics in Boston University than in the whole of Eastern Europe. Of the 47 fellowships granted, 22 went to Boston University students; 17 to East Europeans; 1 to an American not from Boston; 4 to Germans; 2 to Oxonians; and 1 to a person from Estland. Of the Bostonian fellows, 3 (George Blackwell, Maria Leao, and Wanda Torres) received two fellowships each. All the Bostonians but two were

2. Lonnie Johnson & Klaus Nellen, eds., *Institute for Human Sciences* (Vienna: Institute for Human Sciences, 1993), p. 7. All the factual information in this article is taken from this brochure.

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from Michalski's own department of philosophy. The total value of the fellowships diverted to graduate students of Boston University is $197,000.

There are four permanent fellows in residence in Vienna. Besides Michalski, the director; the other powerful fellow is Cornelia Klinger (previously visiting fellow 1983-1986), a Gender Studies expert from Cologne with no particular interest in Eastern Europe. The other two, Klaus Nellen (a Patocka archivist) and Janos Kovacs (a Hungarian economist, previously a visiting fellow 1987-1990) do not have power and may disagree with the management decisions of Michalski and Klinger. There are two permanent non-resident fellows, Gottfried Boehm, an art historian from Basel, and Josef Tischner, a philosopher and theologian from Cracow. These two, together with Michalski, are on the administrative board of the IWM.

The ratio of East/West visiting fellows seems right. But the process of selection is closed and opaque. There is no open competition or public announcements for fellows. Instead, Michalski and Klinger select the visiting fellows, largely on the basis of personal patronage. For example, there has never been a fellow from outside Europe and North America. Although one of the projects of the IWM was the history of Jews in Eastern Europe, there has never been an Israeli fellow. In response to a letter from Professor Gewurzman, an Israeli academic, alerting Michalski to the poor record of the IWM regarding Israeli participation and requesting a change in policy, especially considering the sad history of East Central Europe, Michalski sent an insulting letter to Tel Aviv, concluding: "my mother would call it [the request for change of policy in light of Jewish history] shame. But of course, I cannot expect you to share my mother's moral sensibility."

Professor Jean Cohen from Columbia University can serve as just one prominent example of how fellowship money is misspent. A protege of Klinger, she and her husband, Andrew Arato, taught together with Klinger in the summer school of the IWM in an Italian resort. Klinger got Cohen a fellowship for 1994. One of her projects was the organization of a conference in Prague on "Democracy: Identity and Difference," half of which she and Klinger attended. However, Cohen deliberately excluded East Europeans from participation in the conference either as observers or lecturers, despite requests from the Czech Academy of Sciences. In the process, she lied to the Czech Academy of Sciences and insulted many in the Prague intellectual community. It is obvious she could not care less about Eastern Europe. Why should someone like that receive a fellowship from an institute such as the IWM? Only Klinger and Michalski know the answer.

In 1992 the IWM moved to a lavish new building at Spittelauer Lände 3. I do not know how much it cost to purchase and refurbish the building, but by all appearences it must have been more than the IWM has ever invested in East European scholars. The IWM has also been paying honoraria to academic "stars," none living in Eastern Europe, which are thinly veiled junkets that have more to do with Michalski's upper mobility than with East European research. These junkets receive names like "Tuesday Lectures" and "The Wednesday Club." Since 1987 a special annual lecture of an academic "super-star" in memory of Jan Patocka has

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been established. Generally, the lecture has nothing to do with the philosophy of Patocka and none of the lecturers have ever been Czech. Most are members of the IWM's advisory board, are academic patrons with whom Michalski wants to ingratiate himself. One can only imagine their honoraria. They are: Gadamer (also a board member); Leszek Kolakowski (also a board member); Brzezinski; Ricoeur (also a board member); Charles Taylor (also a board member); Derrida; Mario Vargas Llosa and François Furet (also a board member).

The IWM has instituted, along with the Körber Foundation, "The Hannah Arendt Prize" worth 300,000 DM. Why Hannah Arendt? She has been lauded in Western Europe and North America as a great philosopher, but she knew nothing about nor ever had any interest in Eastern Europe. It is a deliberate attempt to instrumentalize Arendt's name. Since the prize is earmarked for East European universities, it is impossible to divert the money westward, as Michalski has been doing with all of the IWM's other projects. However, "Candidates for the prize will be nominated by the IWM on behalf of and in consultation with the Körber Foundation." The IWM has also been financing a program of "European Chairs" for respectable academics to teach in Eastern Europe. This is not only corrupt, but wasteful. If academic stars (competent as they may be) deliver a series of guest lectures in a university, it will not change much. Change from above rarely takes place and is never lasting.

Some of the best minds in Europe serve on the IWM advisory board. However, many of them are octogenarian and older, and others are too busy to control what is happening in the IWM. Undoubtedly, they have no idea they are lending their reputation to the service of a corrupt institution. From their point of view, they support a noble cause and are invited to attend (if they are not too old) a colloquium at Castelgandolfo, the summer residence of the Pope. The honorary chair is Gadamer. The actual chair is Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (a law professor at Freiburg and judge on the German Constitutional Court). Vice-chairs are Le Roy Ladurie, the late Edward Shils (visiting fellow in 1991), and Charles Taylor (visiting fellow in 1995). The other members are: Franz A. M. Alting von Geusau, Jan Blonski (visiting fellow in 1986) Furet, Clifford Geertz, Kolakowski, Reinhart Koselleck, Levinas, Bernard Lewis, Johann B. Metz, Helga Nowotny, Ricoeur, Robert Spaemann, Fritz Stern, Gerald Stourzh, Jerzy Szacki (visiting fellow in 1984, 1985, 1886, 1987, & 1993), Marton Tardos, and Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker.

Using the noble cause and the respectable reputation of the academic advisory board, Michalski has been collecting money from public and private sources. European public sources include the Commission of the European Communities in Brussels and the European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam. Private donors include the various Soros funded foundations (that have been doing so many wonderful, indeed magical, things for East European culture), the Ford Foundation, the Getty Grants Program, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Pews Charity Fund, and other American, German, and Austrian based foundations. Austrian public sources include the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research,

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the City of Vienna, and the Federal Chancellery Office. Not enough control is exercised to ensure that the money goes where it was intended.

The people who should step in now and rectify the situation are the patrons of the IWM: George Soros; Prince Schwarzenberg (whose family has been doing much for the preservation of Czech culture, especially under the communists); Lord Dahrendorf (the Warden of St. Anthony's College, Oxford); Lord Weidenfeld (owner of St. Martin's Press); Franz Vranitzky (Chancellor of Austria), Kurt Biedenkopf (Prime Minister of Saxony), Erhard Busek (Austrian Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister for Science and Research), Leopold Gratz (Former President of the Austrian National Assembly); Professor Geremek from Warsaw and Professor Tuppy from Vienna, and finally, Cardinal Franz König. All these are very good people. Some of them have been doing wonderful things for Eastern Europe, but the following steps should be taken to eradicate corruption:

1. Open all positions within the IWM to free, public competition. The IWM should publish all its prospective positions in appropriate journals.

2. Establish clear guidelines for granting fellowships, making sure the money goes to scholars of East European civilization rather than proteges.

3. Establish an independent advisory board of about a dozen persons of good academic reputation in the field of East European studies, who are not paid by the IWM in any other capacity and have the time and energy to select the best qualified candidates according to the guidelines.

4. Demand of Boston University's department of philosophy to pay back the funds funneled to its students through Michalski.

5. Give Michalski and Klinger a very long leave without pay.

For an Effective and Honest Democratic Reform

Fundamental change in East European education must not just raise the competence of teachers and students, it must also create the intellectual conditions for the flourishing of democracy. Democracy cannot be built from the top down. It is pointless to parachute some Western academics into Eastern Europe and expect the effects to trickle down. Western corruption and apparatchik incompetence of the middle to high management in East European universities blocs the trickle down effect and nothing changes on the ground, the money never gets there. The money should be directed at the kind of local intellectuals who will stay in Eastern Europe and have an interest in democratically reforming the system.

Democratization from below and increase in academic competence can be achieved through the funding of *Research Libraries*. There are none in the Western sense in Eastern Europe. Libraries stopped buying books from the West after the communist takeover. Today, buying Western books is at the bottom of priorities of East European governments. There are many good people and organizations who donate books. But it is not enough to get books from point A to point B to make them usable. Though the buildings of the national libraries are in many cases very beautiful, they are too outdated and small for housing a modern

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research library. Some librarians are not prone to keeping books in foreign languages; it is possible to find in the garbage donated copies of novels by Saul Bellow and old issues of the journal *Mind*. Even the few foreign books that are donated get stolen, in many cases by lecturers, continuing the communist tradition of stealing public property, especially one that can increase the competence of competing academics. The dissident *samizdat* tradition is the exact opposite — the sharing of information at personal risk. Even some valuable manuscripts and incunabula are stolen as well. If money is found to buy buildings, books, journals, modern storage and retrieval systems, and to hire reliable librarians (people who used to distribute *samizdat* are competent by definition), it would be the most effective method of distributing information in the whole of society, raising its academic competence and laying the foundations for participatory democracy. Equal access to information breaks the hierarchy based on unequal distribution of Western knowledge.

The new twenty-something generation of lecturers and students and the older generation of dissidents are the great hope for the future. After the creation of research libraries, they are the best investment for the future in Eastern Europe. Assisting students and young lecturers is much cheaper than financing Western visitors. An extra one or two hundred dollars per-month may be enough to keep a local young student or academic in clover. This is the principle that guides the Research Support Scheme of the Central European University (financed by George Soros), funding hundreds of East European intellectuals every year.

It is important to keep the process of selecting candidates for financial grants open and public to prevent corruption and patronage on the expense of merit, and to show in practice how democratic meritocracy operates in contrast with the closed and opaque dealings of communist bureaucracy and its Western equivalent. Whistle blowing and naming the names of corrupt institutions and academics are also very important, not just because corruption dies in day light. The communist system thrived on the helplessness of the individual facing a corrupt, faceless, grey, and irresponsible bureaucracy. Exposing corruption and naming names creates a new culture of fearless honesty and personal responsibility. For the same reason, whistle blowers should not hide under pseudonyms or anonymity. Honest whistle blowing creates a public sphere and a basic form of democracy. I do not think that private and public donors would pull out of Eastern Europe just because they discover that some of their donations have been misused.

Whistle blowers are also human, and the corrupt and incompetent may attempt to retaliate. But compared with the odds and risks of dissidents who put their lives on the line fighting totalitarianism, the odds and risks of contemporary whistle-blowers are insignificant. If we decided to go to Eastern Europe to do some good, we might as well aspire to reach the moral standards, honesty, and authenticity of the dissidents.

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Federalism as Balance: Reply to Piccone and Ulmen

Thomas O. Hueglin

A good deal of Piccone's and Ulmen's criticism of my article "Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the European Tradition" in *Telos* 100 has to do with basic misunderstandings. It takes some time until theorists trying to talk to each other for the first time begin to understand one other. Words like "liberal," "progressive," "state" and "community" are so loaded with subjective and contextual meaning that misunderstandings at first encounters are not surprising. There may be more fundamental disagreements as well. Few North Americans tend to appreciate the Althusian alternative to Hobbes, for example, and there seem to be some obvious differences about what the essence of the federal principle should be.

I certainly do not intend to dismiss subsidiarity as one of the most important conceptual tools of federalist thinking; on the contrary, what I am trying to do is to show that one has to be very careful in retrieving subsidiarity from all kinds of dubious past meanings, such as in Catholic doctrine. Such retrievals *can* lead to misconception and abuse, and I provide some examples of that. My point is that subsidiarity in the sense of federalist balance not only comprises a commitment to particular autonomy but also to solidarity across particular boundaries. It is a guiding principle of balanced compromise.

In that context, I further point out that subsidiarity as a tool of achieving balance is incompatible with the liberal tradition of contractualism that governs Europe as a marketplace. My critique of the current usage of subsidiarity in the European Union discussion is that it serves more as a figleaf hiding the unabashed promotion of national or regional economic interests in an unregulated European marketplace than as a device promoting regional autonomy and identity. To be sure, subsidiarity *can* be a tool to achieve negotiated compromise, and as such it constitutes one of the fundamental principles of a renewed federalism. "Enlightenment" does not teach compromise.

My "condescending"(?) critique of the editors' characterization of the European project as a "truly pluralist geopolitical alternative" likewise seems to have invited a misunderstanding, which I am sure is a consequence of my own poor writing. All that seems to separate us here is that I am probably more pessimistic about that project's chances of success in a "progressive" way. The editors speak of progress as an "Old Left" and "Enlightenment" category which is not mine. The kind of compromise federalism entails does not permit under any circumstances a unilateral enforcement of "political and economic equality."

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But without *any* agreed common standards of political and economic conduct, there would not be any federalism either, only a re-feudalized array of local fiefdoms. "Progress" in my understanding refers to balanced compromise in the gradual achievement of equality among autonomous territories — and I do not think that I have said anything otherwise.

The editors place me in a "social-democratic" corner. 20th century social democracy, which is now as dead as 19th century liberalism, lived from the central administration of a compromise between capital accumulation and welfare handouts. That kind of compromise is certainly not my position. It seems to me that the editors leave out an important qualification in their critique of my reference to class as a continuing and important source of identity: Instead of writing (as Mouffe does) that "political identity cannot be conceived in terms of social class," they should write that it cannot be conceived so by class *alone*. Then I would have no disagreement with them at all.

Why I am, at the same time, classified as a "liberal," I do not quite understand: The term "critical associationalism" is taken from Michael Walzer (another liberal?). It refers to plural communities as elective and open *communities of choice* rather than however ordained *communities of fate* (as in some of the new ethno-nationalisms). In that way, it surely cannot be misunderstood as an attempt to "explicitly relegitimate the state." If I have said anything legitimating the state, then it was based on the historical and contextual observation that it obviously still forms *part* of peoples' identity, and that it will for the time being continue playing an important role within a federal system that may include a supranational level above as well as a regional level below. In that sense the state will become one of several organizational units, but it will no longer be endowed with notions of supremacy.

The crucial issue in all this is to clarify whatever "viable federalism" may be. The editors persuasively suggest that it must be the possibility for particular territories to "determine their own affairs." But what are the "particular territories," and who is to determine their boundaries, or what their own affairs are, in an "exclusionary" manner? Can the Lombards decide that Sicilians should no longer have residence rights? Can the Catalans decide that the Castilian-speaking majority in the region is no longer allowed to be educated in their own langauge? Can a Swiss canton maintain that women should not have voting rights? Should an American state have the right to reintroduce the death penalty? Could a German *Land* decide that Turkish workers have to wear yellow stars?

I am not at all saying that the answer to these questions can be given *a priori* on the basis of abstract or "metaphysical" guarantees. But if the answer was always and automatically "yes," it seems to me the end result would amount exactly to the kind of libertarianism the editors seem to dislike in diZerega's market approach. The undisputed "primacy of localism" embedded in the principle of subsidiarity does not logically have to mean "exclusionary" decisionism.

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My exploration of Althusian thought meant to suggest that the essence of federalism is autonomy within a mutually agreed charter of solidarity. That kind of compromise rules out any notion of the Hobbesian (or Hegelian or Schmittian) state. Such common agreement (to human individual and social rights) must not be anything like "abstract universalism." The editors seem to propose federalism = particularism as the opposite of state = universalism. In my view, this is a mistake. Particularism is the opposite of universalism, all right, but federalism is a compromise between the two that attempts to avoid the authoritarian potential of either.

In their critique of Johnstone, the editors state there are no universally valid human rights. But surely, then, there are no particularistic absolute truths either. The idea of federalism once again denotes a common search for such rights on the basis of compromise, never written in stone, never giving way to universal *or* particularistic decisionism, but always open for joint reconsideration. As Althusius taught long ago, politics is a perpetual process of community building, not a final and irreversible set of norms and institutions.

Misunderstandings often stem from a theory and practice problem. Political theory should be a practice-oriented enterprise. The editors are looking at American reality and place their theoretical hope in the *potential* the European Union suggests to them. I look more at the European *reality* and find far less hope. But this does not mean I do not see the potential for a truly federalist "project." To distinguish that potential from its "perverted" practice is what Critical Theory is all about. The concepts of federalism or subsidiarity contain no value *per se*, progressive, democratic, or otherwise. The argument in practice can only be that they are auxiliary forms more suitable for the organization of a just and democratic polity than the Jacobin state.

A final observation: It is not surprising that Johnstone and I would share considerable reservations about the "anarchy of the market" praised by diZerega as the "most intricate" among human achievements. From a Canadian political economy perspective in particular, it is a lived experience that free markets do not create autonomy but destroy it. The kind of confederal federalism Fleming suggests, including an essential right of secession, may not be possible under free market conditions. Quebecers may find that out very soon.

Moreover, Fleming's ahistorical reference to the "natural" sanctity of the family points to another problem with market solutions. Like all other units in complex social formations, families produce externalities. Without child protection laws, for example, abused children will likely become abusers of others later on. The free market has had no answer to that. Similarly, in the case of the European Union, national sanctity as practiced by Britain in the name of subsidiarity seeks to reap the benefits of a European free market while externalizing, i.e., Europeanizing, social costs. That was my point.

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Reply to Piccone and Ulmen

Gus diZerega

One of the risks of slicing the conceptual world differently than is the current fashion is the likelihood of being firmly stuffed into old categories no matter how hard one tries to stay out of them. I believe this is the case in much of Paul Piccone's and Gary Ulmen's critique of my article, "Federalism, Self-Organization, and the Dissolution of the State." Added to this difficulty is the fact that my arguments generally arise out of the liberal political tradition, whereas Piccone and Ulmen appear to be more tied to Continental traditions. Translation can sometimes be difficult. But I will try.

Their first paragraph begins our difficulties.[1] Democracy as the authors use the term is associated with popular sovereignty in the style of the French Revolution. This view emphasizes majority rule as the primary characteristic of democratic polities. It views politics as irreducibly coercive. Basically, a popular majority has supposedly captured an institution of domination initially imposed upon it by military conquest.

Democracy as I use the term has its roots in consent. Its earliest theorist is Aristotle, particularly his theory of uncorrupted polities. Its more contemporary form arose from the thinking of the democratic republicans of the American Revolution. Their political ideal was not majority rule but practical consensus. Their constitutional task was not to empower the majority but to so structure decision-making that the political choices made would tend to have the support of much more than a majority, yet not require so much agreement that no decisions could be made at all. New England town meetings and Quaker meetings are examples of this kind of democratic self-government.

These two different understandings of what is most characteristic of democracy subtly color a person's understanding of what is important and what is not in political theory. The consensual model seeks to understand how rules and processes can promote cooperation. The sovereign model focuses on where power over others lies. Because the democratic state employs coercive power, yet is structured by procedural rules promoting cooperation, there will be aspects of both. The critical questions are which feature predominates and how the two dimensions interact. I argue that the self-organizing dimension predominates, my

1. Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen, "Rethinking Federalism," in *Telos* 100 (Summer 1994), p. 12.

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critics basically ignore it entirely.[2]

Piccone and Ulmen take me to task for somehow confusing federal and democratic political and legal principles with social principles.[3] But the quote they cite fails to support their point. I wrote that the early United States attempted to unify two different societies, one slave and one free, and that over time the South "developed increasingly in directions fundamentally antithetical to free democratic principles."[4] Unless Piccone and Ulmen want to say that any society can be equally adapted to any political or legal principle, which I doubt they would do, their criticism makes no sense to me.

I will pass on commenting at length about their denial that people have rights.[5] Pursuing it would take us too far afield. However, to the extent a polity is self-organizing, its basic procedural rules must apply equally to all citizens. In that sense the notion of a political right is inherent in a polity's being democratic. (Of course, under Piccone and Ulmen's majority rule model, I assume the majority can do whatever it wishes to a minority). If they will agree with me that states do not have rights either. If they do not, their metaphysics is far stranger than mine.

They then get to a meatier problem. The authors deny my argument that the *Federalist* inaugurated an innovation in political thought by basing the proposed government on "popular sovereignty rather than on the sovereignty of the states or the nation as a whole." According to them the people were most appropriately conceived as citizens of their respective sovereign states rather than as isolated individuals. But that is not the choice I presented in my paper. For *The Federalist* I wrote: "The people exist in two capacities: as citizens of respective states and as citizens of the nation as a whole."[6] Not a social atom in sight.

As soon as we can argue that people can legitimately belong to more than one political entity, each enjoying a sphere of independence from other such entities we have abandoned the traditional notion of sovereignty and all the coercive and hierarchical thinking that goes with it. Our problem is no longer which political body should be sovereign, but rather what should be the legitimate sphere of

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
4. Cf. Gus diZerega, "Federalism, Self-Organization and the Dissolution of the State," in *Telos* 100 (Summer 1994), p. 59. Other writings of mine have explored how the self-organizing model sheds light on additional aspects of democratic politics. See "Democracy and Peace: The Self-Organizing Foundation for the Democratic Peace," in *Review of Politics* (Spring, 1995); "Unexpected Harmonies: Self-Organization in Liberal Modernity and Ecology," in *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* (Winter, 1993); "Elites and Democratic Theory: Insights from the Self-Organizing Model," in *Review of Politics* (June, 1991); "How Informed Need Voters Really Be?" in *Public Affairs Report,* Institute for Governmental Studies, Univ. of California, Berkeley (November, 1990); "Democracy as a Spontaneous Order," in *Critical Review* (Spring, 1989); and "Equality, Self-Government and Democracy," in *Western Political Quarterly* (September, 1988).
5. Piccone and Ulmen, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.
6. DiZerega, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

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authority for any given political body, none of which are completely sovereign.

Among its other virtues, far from leading to atomic individualism this approach provides one avenue for developing a liberal theory of community. We also no longer have a simple dichotomy of nation versus federation, we have instead a wide variety of "federalisms" which, as Madison perceptively saw in the case of the Constitution, are neither purely national nor purely federal. This is why I consider both the Articles and the Constitution as devised by the Founders to be federalist proposals.

Our two very different views of popular sovereignty then lead to our differing interpretations of *The Federalist*. Piccone and Ulmen apparently see it as simply nationalist.[7] I readily grant that *The Federalist* is not a traditionally federalist work In fact, it provides a critique of traditional federations which has not been answered by those now praising the Articles of Confederation.[8] But neither is *The Federalist* a traditionally nationalist argument. It breaks new ground.

The Constitution grew out of compromise and practical politics. Theorists had relatively little direct influence, which was probably fortunate. Their ideas entered into the situation only after having been distilled through the political experience of the mostly very untheoretical people who comprised the Constitutional Convention. Yet there is a theoretical coherence to the Constitution which the authors of *The Federalist* were led to explicate as they sought to make a telling case for it in public debate. The logic underlying the Constitution is rooted in the fact that the polity being proposed arose from equals negotiating with one another to find mutually agreeable general rules by which they could build a government. The result was a brief statement of largely abstract procedural rules most believed to be fair enough for them to live under. These rules existed to promote compromise and cooperation among the new nation's constituent states. They existed to facilitate public action while minimizing the likelihood particular states would lose as a result. That the attempt was not ultimately successful and led to civil war should not hide the fact that this is what was attempted. Few at the time anticipated such a serious North/South division.

It is instructive to compare their approach with that of contemporary state constitutions. In most cases these are hundreds of pages longer than the national Constitution. Much of their verbiage is devoted to creating special privileges and favors for specific partial interests, giving them unequal weight within the political process. The Constitution did this to some extent, most notoriously with regard to how members of the House were apportioned among slave states. But it is mostly free from such corruptions.[9] What did get in was probably necessary for the union to

7. Piccone and Ulmen, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

8. My discussion of the Articles shows both why it was a second best then and why something like it may be far more desirable now. See diZerega, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-74.

9. When Publius has to defend these measures, he pleads expedience rather than attempting to integrate them into the theoretical framework which underlies so much of his writing. This is because they contravene the theoretical logic underlying the Constitution.

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include both free and slave states (whether it should have done so is another issue).

Had the Founders followed this alternative path, incorporating their own transient interests into the workings of the government, the result would have been more rigid, far less democratic, and probably rather brief in duration. Its self-organizing capacities would have been severely hampered. Rather than a fascinating theoretical work *The Federalist*, would have ended up being simply a defense of the momentary privileges of the *status quo*. They did not, and so created something new. The genius of Madison in particular was to see this.

Madison did not have words for what had come out of the Constitutional Convention. Nobody did at the time. My concept of self-organization is an attempt to supply the word, and with it the theoretical framework, to make sense of what they created. Liberal democracy turns out to be part of a social mutation that eventuated in the modern world — a mutation rooted in an unprecedented dependence upon self-organizing social structures.

Rather than making so much of the more nationalist sympathies of Hamilton, and even Madison, those discussing *The Federalist* should ask how two men, quite different in temperament and political beliefs, and both quite critical of the proposed Constitution, could have managed to develop such a coherent argument on its behalf. The theory was implicit in the Constitution, and was therefore in many ways *discovered* by *The Federalist*'s authors.

Once this point is grasped, much of the rest of Piccone and Ulmen's critique of my use of federalism becomes irrelevant. Their argument against my concept of "the people" as an entity extending over time is silly. My practical examples[10] more than show the irrelevance of my critics' taunt that our great grandfathers cannot meet with our great grand children.[11] Theirs is the ultra-individualistic conception so prized by economists. Mine is not.

Despite this, Piccone and Ulmen apparently think I am giving a "market based" or "economic" theory of self-organization and of federalism.[12] This is a misunderstanding. The market is an instance of self-organization in liberal civilization. It was the first to be thoroughly explored theoretically. But politics and markets deal with different values, and no one could be more appalled than I at the current fad of trying to reduce political issues to market or "rational choice" issues.

On my final page I do say that a contractual framework is superior to a hierarchical one for intergovernmental relations. But contract encompasses more than the market. It is simply a means for making binding agreements. The market is not "a paradigm for political institutions."[13] Or if it is, so is science, because it is *equally* a self-organizing process, albeit one obviously quite different from the market.

This point brings me to Piccone and Ulmen's attack on my "conservative

10. DiZerega, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
11. Piccone and Ulmen, *op. cit.*, p 14.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 12 and 14.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 14.

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and bureaucratized" portrayal of science.[14] How this interpretation can be gleaned from my discussion of self organization[15] or my discussion of how science needs to be *free* of the conservative control of large bureaucratic organizations[16] is beyond me. Without writing a paper on science and self-organization, I do not see how I could make my point any more clearly.

Piccone and Ulmen seem finally to have found the cubby hole into which my analysis can be placed: it is "conservative and conformist." Their proof is that I supposedly write that the welfare state is "a necessary outcome of modernization."[17] Alas for their rebuttal, I neither believe that nor imply it. I do not believe history runs on predictable tracks, even after the fact. My discussion of the welfare state is simply to show that it needn't depend upon large size in order to provide a wide variety of services, which is the standard defense of nationalist American liberals. At the same time, conservatives often argue that had the Articles of Confederation been preserved, we would not have welfare states today. But American states are often larger than European countries with extensive welfare institutions. Both conservatives and liberals are unjustified in their claims.

I agree that the welfare state is largely rigid and conservative, and often unaffordably wasteful. I agree that it is destructive to viable local communities. I am in near or total agreement with Piccone and Ulmen when they discuss the importance of the "third sector."[18] (My reservations would be along the line of perhaps having financial aid to very poor regions for matters such as education, should local and community efforts fail to provide sufficient assistance.) So my conservative conformity seems to me quite close to their own

In conclusion, I think Piccone and Ulmen's troubles with my argument arise principally from their not taking seriously my claim that shifting from an instrumental organizational to a self-organizing framework subtly but deeply alters the meaning of many traditional political terms, such as federalism. Ironically, given their view of my treatment of science, I am presenting the case for a major paradigm shift.

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14. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
15. DiZerega, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 and 77.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
17. Piccone and Ulmen, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
18. *Ibid.*

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Federalism in the Age of Postmodernity: Rejoinder to Hueglin and diZerega

Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen

One of the unexpected consequences of the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Empire was the reactivation of geopolitical crises which had been in remission since WWI. Unlike the various projections for "New World Orders" immediately deployed by conformist liberals in the effort to recycle and extend "new and improved" versions of that very imperialism allegedly rendered obsolete by the "Great War," the new federalism debate, which began at the same time in Italy, Canada and various other countries, addresses those very same geopolitical problems by proposing a break both with the Enlightenment project of nation-building and that homogenizing modernity providing its ideological legitimation. Far from attempting to return to some idealized pre-modern *status quo ante* by rejecting new technologies, modes of communication and cybernation, the project of a new federalism is predicated precisely on these new developments, which obviate earlier arguments for centralization, rationalization and gigantism.

Not only do new technological and historical developments render viable small, local operations previously deemed inefficient and wasteful, they also promise to provide solutions to those increasingly unmanageable rationality, motivational and legitimation crises impossible to resolve within the formal and instrumental rationality of the modernist and bureaucratic-centralist state. Contrary to that continental tradition spanning from Max Weber to Theodor W. Adorno, which dreaded the indefinite extension of the modernist logic of domination but could find no way to break out of it, the crisis of the modern state increasingly presents itself as the result of the erosion of these previously unacknowledged internal control mechanisms brought about precisely by the seemingly irresistible unfolding of modernity. By proposing to re-engage the total individual not only as a citizen but also as a moral agent within self-regulating communities, the new federalism promises to reconstitute those informal internal control mechanisms without which social systems cannot function effectively.[1] In this sense, the new

1. For a prefiguration of this analysis, predicated on the system's failure to deploy "artificial negativity" as a last-ditch bureaucratic effort to reconstitute these internal control mechanisms and therefore regulate and stabilize itself, see Paul Piccone, "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," and Tim Luke, "Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity," both in *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 43-72.

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federalist project confronts the past in a much more sympathetic way than does modernity. It proposes a political model altogether different from anything that has ever existed before, one commensurate with the postmodern predicament of axiological heterogeneity, instant communication and economic globalization.

This emphasis on the *postmodern* character of the new federalism is essential to avoid old arguments about the inevitability of rationalization, centralization and massification, which may have appeared credible at the dawn of modernity (and which probably contributed to the gradual displacement of federal systems by unitary states) but have turned out to be groundless in the computer age. Today it is becoming increasingly clear that "big" is not efficient, effective or even desirable.[2] The exhaustion of the project of modernity, spectacularly exemplified by the collapse of the USSR, necessitates a recasting of all standard political categories, first and foremost those traditionally used to articulate federalist ideas. This is why, while apparently discussing the same things, those who for many years have "been working on federalism, decentralization and other aspects of spacial politics from a critical rather than a conformist perspective"[3] find it difficult to understand new postmodern reconfigurations of federalism. They do not seem to realize that before 1989 federalism implied something rather different from what it does within the new context.[4] Cold War federalism meant, first and foremost, "intergovernmental relations," i.e., a mode of aggregation and rationalization of diffuse power centers as coordinated administrative entities within an otherwise centralized authority. The new federalism has altogether different objectives. It seeks precisely the opposite: to

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2. Already in the early 1970s, well before it took its terrorist turn, the Italian extra-parliamentary Left began to develop an analysis — never completed — of the logic of industrial and administrative centralization/rationalization as dictated by *political* rather than practical imperatives. Innovations such as the assembly line and the development of large integrated factories with an extremely differentiated division of labor may not have contributed very much to higher production, but they certainly succeeded in quashing whatever "class-struggle" there may have been. The historical displacement of the AFL by the CIO marks the watershed between two different eras: those of entrepreneurial and state-directed capitalism. See Mario Tronti, *Operai e Capitale* (Turin: Einaudi, 1971) [an English translation of the "Postscript," has appeared in *Telos* 13 (Winter 1972), pp 25-62]; and Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974). With the advent of postmodernism, the bankruptcy of bureaucratic centralism (both in industry and in politics) prefigures not only a new mode of production but also symmetrical political forms.

3. Thomas O. Hueglin, "Federalism, Subsidiarity and The European Tradition: Some Clarifications," in *Telos* 100 (Summer 1994), p. 37.

4. As Gianfranco Morra put it, today "there is a *modern federalism* and a *postmodern federalism*. In our epoch, which witnesses the ruin of modernity and of its constructions (the sovereign modern state among them), modern federalism has become useless: what is needed is postmodern federalism." See Gianfranco Morra, "Federalismo e Postmodernità," in Paul Piccone, Robert D'Amico, G. L. Ulmen, M. Rainer Lepsius and Ludger Künhardt, *La Rivoluzione Federalista* (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1995), p. 113.

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vindicate the autonomy of local power centers against a central authority deemed increasingly overextended, wasteful, doctrinaire and illegitimate. In the US context it means restoring the primacy of the 10th Amendment over the 14th, local authority over Washington wherever it is not dictated otherwise by the Constitution, and the disempowering of experts and technocrats to mere *advisory* roles with severely limited *legislative* and *executive* prerogatives.

This predicament helps explain the many differences between modernist readings of federalism and alternative postmodern analyses proceeding from Schmittian and Critical Theory perspectives.[5] What at least since the New Deal had seemed immediately obvious suddenly becomes highly problematic. This helps explain our differences with Thomas O. Hueglin and Gus diZerega. Since key theoretical concepts which collectively constitute federalism as a political system today mean something other than or even antithetical to what they did during the last couple of centuries, it is impossible to proceed with the debate without first clarifying exactly what has happened to these concepts and how they reconfigure the new federalism as something continuous with, but also different from, earlier versions. This explains why practically all of our differences with Hueglin and diZerega are not mere "misunderstandings." They have to do with fundamentally different models of federalism in particular and politics in general.[6] Our main objection has to do with what from the viewpoint of a postmodern federalism appears as an uncritical acceptance of arguments long since rendered obsolete by changing historical conditions. To clarify what is at stake, it may be helpful to take up a number of the problems with Hueglin's and diZerega's replies to our earlier criticism.

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5. Paradoxically, these new postmodern analyses tend to correspond to those historically put forth by the traditional advocates of confederalism. See Thomas Fleming, "The Federal Principle," in *Telos* 100 (Summer 1994), pp. 17-36. The latter can be traced back to the arguments advanced by John C. Calhoun. The question of slavery and, most importantly, the fact that the South lost the Civil War, have curtailed any serious discussion of these issues in the US for over a century. Carl Schmitt, no federalist himself but a careful constitutional scholar, readily recognized the validity of Calhoun's arguments and the extent to which the Union's imposition of its reading of the Constitution prefigured the eventual dissolution of federalism in the 20th century. See Carl Schmitt, "The Constitutional Theory of Federation (1928)," in *Telos* 91 (Spring 1992), pp. 26-56. Other leading contemporary constitutional scholars, such as Gianfranco Miglio, are in substantial agreement with this interpretation. See Gianfranco Miglio, *Una Costituzione per i Prossimi Trent'Anni. Intervista sulla Terza Republica*, Marcello Stegliano, ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1990).

6. In the case of Hueglin, this is complicated by the fact that he does not seem to have the political strength of his intellectual convictions. His scholarly treatise on Althusius [*Sozietaler Föderalismus: Die Politische Theorie des Johannes Althussius* (Berlin-New York: Walter deGruyter, 1991)] is indicative. Althussius does offer "federalism as an alternative" to the centralized state, but postmodern federalism is a *radical* alternative. Hueglin, however, seems unwilling to take the gamble.

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Subsidiarity

From the viewpoint of the old modernist federalism, subsidiarity meant the delegation of tasks impossible to fulfill at lower levels to higher ones. Thus it was primarily a tool of centralization and standardization. In a postmodern context, when in the US the federal government has managed, through the commerce clause, to take over the determination of, e.g., local speed limits, educational standards and criminal behavior, by blackmailing the states with the threat of withholding federal subsidies, the direction of subsidiarity has to be reversed — all governmental tasks should be tackled at the lowest possible level, unless they require a broader jurisdiction. This seemingly irrelevant semantic rearrangement shifts the emphasis from state-building, in the first case, to federal dissolution, in the second. Whereas discussions concerning federalism have hitherto focused on the concentration of powers at the center, in the postmodern context it is a matter of diffusing those powers back to localities or regions. As Gianfranco Miglio puts it: "The old federalism was developed in order to reach the goal of unity. The new federalism tends to guarantee plurality and diversity."[7]

To Hueglin this smacks of selfishness and greed: in the context of the European Union, it is an ideological "figleaf hiding the unabashed promotion of national or regional economic interests" while forfeiting the goal of economic equalization. What is no longer immediately obvious, however, is why rich regions federalizing with poorer ones should bankroll economic equalization through what is increasingly an inefficient, wasteful and usually corrupt central federal apparatus empowering a New Class of unelected unaccountable professionals, thus deploying new relations of domination. Why should Lombards finance Sicilian economic development? Even if the equalization project could work, why should all regions be alike? Why, e.g., within the European Union, must Corsica be like Bavaria, Catalonia like Saxony, Lombardy like Sicily? Hueglin wants "solidarity across borders." But solidarity is not a bureaucratic category: it can only obtain among individuals or groups in a personal and direct relation. Mediated by the state, it turns into entitlements, fiscal obligations and other formal relations which destroy the very essence of solidarity, i.e., the informal ties among people whose articulation over time constitute the "organicity" of communities and eventually result in forms of social organization adequate to the specificity of the individuals having to live with them (and people here cannot be reduced to some universally valid abstraction independent of their particular history, culture, customs, mentality, etc.). Solidarity may be a social value, but this cannot and should not translate into a state prerogative enforced through compulsory taxation and administered by an apparatus usually interested more in its own agenda.

Enthymemetic Enlightenment presuppositions about the universal validity of fundamental norms (and therefore the compulsion to implement them divorced

7. Gianfranco Miglio, "La Prospettiva Teorica del Nuovo Federalismo," in *Federalismo e Società*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), p. 27.

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from any particularistic objection) lead Hueglin to confuse his version of the old modernist federalism with nation-building. This is why he thinks that to federalize is to open "new paths toward the democratic organization of social space." But democratization can no longer be confused either with modernist homogenization or New Class representation obtaining at all governmental levels. Committed to the preservation of particularity, specificity and otherness, federalism must be sharply differentiated from nation-building where the state, democratically legitimated, homogenizes a territorially-defined population into a "nation" by imposing common standards having little to do with federal preconditions for effective interaction among the various units. Why do people in, e.g., San Diego or Miami, need Washington mandarins to tell them that smoking is bad for their health, that high schools must meet certain scholastic standards, or that they have to provide certain services? The liberal and profoundly antidemocratic argument, which assumes the "obvious" universal validity of particular norms and the inability of local people to acknowledge and implement them (because, presumably, they are not yet ready for democracy and self-determination — the traditional argument for "federal" empowerment and local clientization) has absolutely nothing to do with federalism. The latter is based on contractual arrangements conforming to particular values spelling out proper procedures for collective behavior and specific tasks to be carried out in the interests of all the members. Democracy is a *political* category pertaining only to the particular units as defined by their particular constitutions. The federal framework must operate on the basis of what the federal contract rigorously outlines as a collective mode of interaction. This is why Hueglin is wrong in assuming that "subsidiarity" has anything to do with achieving balance or that, therefore, it is "incompatible with the liberal tradition of contractualism." If solidarity is no longer confused with *raison d'état* and balance *qua* homogenization is dropped as an undesirable Enlightenment residue, then there is no contradiction between contractualism and subsidiarity.

Hueglin seems horrified by the possibility of confusing subsidiarity with Catholic doctrine, even though there is a Catholic tradition of subsidiarity. Presumably, everyone knows, or at least should know, that the Catholic Church is a reactionary institution terminally committed to the oppression of women and that *Quadragesimo Anno* is essentially a plot to keep women in their traditional roles of social inferiority. Ask, as he does, any "moderate feminist of the liberal persuasion."[8] Although Pope John Paul II recently extolled the role of women and, by implication, apologized for any anti-feminine attitude, when did these "moderate feminists of the liberal persuasion" become the ultimate authority on family matters or when did "feminism" itself become a legitimate professional specialization entitling a self-appointed and aggressively upwardly mobile group of female academics to speak for all women. Similarly, Hueglin may want to explain to millions of devout Catholic men and women how the traditional family, with its

8. Hueglin, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

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internal organic distribution of roles, is an oppressive institution legitimating, e.g., the Catholic Church's "traditional grip on family life in fascist Italy." Why should everyone accept the "moderate feminist" Enlightenment assumption of the desirability of abstract individuality or of the family as a political institution predicated on formal equality? When did these groundless tenets, blown out of the theoretical waters by, e.g., Hegel's devastating critique of Kant and the Enlightenment, and more generally, by the whole counter-Enlightenment tradition in the 19th century, become absolute values? Feeble attempts, such as Habermas' regrounding of modernity on a Kantian metaphysics, are at best questionable idiosyncratic proposals whose alleged universality is accepted only by his acolytes.

To be sure, there was an opportunistic dimension in the Catholic Church's sponsorship of federalism and subsidiarity. Only when it became obvious, after the failure of the Counter-Reformation, that there were no chances whatsoever for the Catholic Church to become ever again a *potestas directa* did it attempt to reestablish its authority as a *potestas indirecta* by seeking to weaken the secular state through federalism and reduce its influence through the doctrine of subsidiarity. Does that make subsidiarity itself suspect? Does the fact that Attila the Hun may have once claimed "2+2=4" automatically invalidate that proposition? Is it conceivable that not *everything* the Catholic Church has ever done is *completely* wrong? Hueglin should not simply dismiss the Catholic notion of subsidiarity by hypostatizing an academically fashionable gang as the ultimate authority on family life.[9] Unlike modernist federalism which today, under the pretense of protecting women and children from "domestic violence," "sexual harassment," etc., seeks to penetrate and regulate every crevice of everyday life in a way Orwell and Huxley could never imagine, postmodern federalism does not assume or seek to institutionalize any particular system of values. Its ultimate objective, as with many earlier versions of federalism, is to protect diversity, understood not as trivial gastronomical predilections or sartorial preferences but as real axiological heterogeneity, where even Catholic values may have an opportunity, for those ascribing to them, to become institutionally objectified. Otherwise, why bother with federalism at all? The nation-state homogenizes, standardizes and sterilizes much better than even the most corrupted federalism ever will.

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9. Hueglin's New Class inclinations lead him not only to suggest handing family matters over to a bunch of *wildgewordene* "liberal" feminists, but to call for further bureaucratic intervention into family life on the standard bureaucratic pretense of "protecting children." He buys lock, stock and barrel the therapeutic professions' claim that "without child protection laws . . . abused children will likely become abusers of others later on." Aside from the fact that these laws do not and cannot prevent any such abuse, since any state intervention in the matter can only take place *after* the abuse has taken place and it has been brought to the authorities attention, the impact of such laws is to legitimate bureaucratic regulation of family matters (and thus a score of "family" professionals) and to further erode authority within the family — what the very first study by the Frankfurt School, *Authorität und Familie*, identified correctly as the main cause of contemporary social disintegration.

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Progress, Class and Exclusion

Although the concept of progress has gone through a terminal theoretical beating in the 20th century, it constantly reappears as movement toward an ultimate goal either never quite spelled out or hardly ever defended. Thus Hueglin tries to recycle "progress" as "balanced compromise in the gradual achievement of equality among autonomous territories." When did the "achievement of equality" become a federalist objective and why would such a loss of particularity be either "desirable" or "progressive"? Why is homogeneity "better" than heterogeneity? At any rate, here the question is concerning what *kind* of homogeneity. Federalism presupposes common agreement on fundamental principles, without which no political community can exist. But it also seeks heterogeneity in order to safeguard difference while facilitating as much as possible social-economic and cultural interaction. Equality is a particular value, which some communities may want to embrace — to the point of socializing all functions and abolishing private property, but it is not a *precondition* of federalism. If Hueglin wants "the gradual achievement of equality," why does he bother with federalism? The nation-state will do a much better job. And if his hopes were ever to be realized and all the "autonomous territories" eventually became truly equal, federalism would either degenerate into a mere administrative system or become altogether irrelevant. Schmitt foresaw eventual equalization as the inevitable outcome of successful federations. Unlike Hueglin, however, he did not defend federalism but relegated it to a *transitional* mode of organization.

Hueglin also defends "class" as a component of identity. No one, not even Marx, has ever come up with a concept of "class" sufficiently sharp to function as an analytical tool. At best, it is a crude generalization from arbitrary income stratifications, with no substantive theoretical import. It has never helped to explain anything, from voting behavior to cultural norms, beyond reinforcing predominant preconceptions — first and foremost, those of the Marxists. As a constituent of social identity, it rates no better than a long series of other characteristics which collectively differentiate individuals into separate groups. Hueglin, along with many *Marxisant* academics, may have a soft spot for it, not because it helps explain anything in particular but because it helps uphold a particular philosophy of history predicated on "progress" understood in terms of the achievement of "equality" in a unified world "excluding" no one. But no community can exist unless it spells out criteria for membership, thus providing at the same time exclusionary mechanisms. While in the age of bureaucratic centralism "exclusion" is practically regarded as a crime, political theory is impossible without it. The fundamental friend-enemy division is itself a criterion of inclusion and exclusion. Hueglin has serious reservations about all this. He does not approve of "exclusionary decisionism." But without something of the kind it is impossible to have particular territories. As Schmitt points out, what defines a political entity is precisely the political decision of a particular people to constitute itself as a

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"community" attached to a particular territory.[10] Otherwise, who decides? Sovereignty cannot be bestowed by some other political entity (in which case the presupposed relation of dependence would demean it) but must be posited. Political entities can, of course, enter into agreements which may forfeit some prerogatives, but without a decisionistic foundation there can be no politics. The compromises so important to federalism have to do with jurisdictional authority. When push comes to shove, however, what counts is the will to make a particular decision and to defend it with whatever means.

The "primacy of localism" Hueglin finds problematic has to do with the very principle of *democratic* legitimacy in a context where "legality" has displaced it as the foundation of contemporary political orders. If localities do not determine their own destiny, who does? From where could external agencies seeking to, e.g., tell a German *Land* it cannot force Turkish workers to wear yellow stars, or Castilians they cannot educate their children in their own language in Catalonia (to use two of Hueglin's examples) derive their authority? Today, whenever external agencies tread on local sovereignties without explicit constitutional mandates, they do so on the basis of "human rights" allegedly transcending all existing rules and regulations. Since the absolute validity of these human rights has never been shown and turns out to be the unwarranted universalization of a particular axiological framework to legitimate particular political objectives, it ends up as an ideological cover for *Realpolitik*. In an age stained by Bosnia and Rwanda, it is hard to defend the "sanctity" of local decisions, even when they may sport an impeccable democratic legitimation. But why is it necessary to invent fictions such as "human rights" (which are obviously not universal, since the parties allegedly at fault do not acknowledge them) in order to take punitive actions — actions whose success has nothing to do with right or wrong, but only with military superiority? Could this have anything to do with the legitimation of a New Class of enforcers of a new international PC ideology? Without indulging here in a detailed analysis of new power relations, it is enough to indicate that any political gambit positing higher authorities is ultimately fatal to federalism. If Hueglin is serious about a lasting federal arrangement, he will have to become considerably more suspicious of the hidden agendas of any allegedly higher authority.

Lastly, Hueglin's argument (against Fleming) purtortedly showing the impossibility of secession on the ground that the market destroys autonomy is questionable at best. As the Czechs and the Slovaks have already found out, secession need not entail all the pathologies of the Yugoslav break-up. It does not mean the severing of all economic relations but only their realignment. As for Quebecers, they could function as badly as they do now within Canada as an independent political unit outside it by redirecting economic relations Southward or toward the international market. In the coming years what will keep them in or lead them out of the

10. Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (1950), 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), pp. 48-51.

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federation will certainly not be exclusive economic interdependence with Canada. In the age of NAFTA, Canada and the US will have to rethink their identities as obsolescent geopolitical entities. At any rate, Hueglin's standard New Class answer to all problems, i.e., to deploy additional layers of bureaucracy, is not only undesirable in the European case but also very unlikely to work. The last thing the existing state needs is to become embroiled in "a federal system that may include a supranational level above as well as a regional level below."

Self-Organization or Disorganization?

Unlike in the case of Hueglin, whose modernist federalism clashes with our postmodern alternative along predictable lines, diZerega's reply seems to lack coherence. From our claim that the modern nation-state grew out of the French Revolution he concludes that popular sovereignty is exclusively associated with representative democracy and, therefore, that we subscribe to that model of democracy as the only viable one. Popular sovereignty can also result from direct and participatory democracy. But our differences with diZerega have to do with other matters, e.g., his hypostatization of self-organization to the level of an original metaphysical principle and his claim that the US Constitution is a perfectly coherent document.

As for the principle of self-organization, it appears either trivial or, if understood as diZerega proposes, i.e., as capturing what the Founding Fathers created, as a major confusion. If society is not self-organized, how can it possibly come together? Through divine intervention? Neighborly kibitzing? Natural gestation? Only people can create social and political organizations. In that sense, all social and political organizations not imposed by outside powers are necessarily self-organized.

DiZerega also seems to confuse the social and the political. A federation does not unify different societies: it simply federates them, i.e., compels them to behave in accordance with those contractual obligations spelled out in the federal constitution. Anything beyond that, usually the social dimension, remains entirely a matter of the particular units' prerogatives. To the extent the US Constitution was "neither purely national nor purely federal," i.e., a confused document, it was based on people endowed with the kind of rights spelled out in the "Bill of Rights." But who decides who is the "people"? What if the people are only what the states recognize as "citizens" or "property-owners"? The answer is not immediately obvious and it is conceivable that those Southern slave-owners who helped frame the Constitution had in mind a definition of "people" rather different from those entertained by, e.g., the abolitionists. In a rigorously coherent federal document, the determination of what constitutes citizenship is not a federal matter but something for the particular units to decide. If the federation takes over those prerogatives, then it is well on the way to becoming a nation-state with the particular "federal" units turning into administrative arms

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of the central government — precisely what has been happening in the US. DiZerega is free to call this fundamental constitutional ambiguity "self-organization," but that does not make it any less confusing and eventually destructive of the federal principle.

The argument that people can belong to more that one political entity is trivial if understood in the sense that, e.g., one can belong to a state, a county or a country. It is wrong if that means there is no hierarchy in those political units. Federal laws always override state laws, state laws override county laws, county laws override city laws, etc. The Civil War was fought because of a disagreement concerning the federal domain — a disagreement made possible precisely by that original ambiguity in the Constitution whereby, as the guarantor of the people's rights, the federal government could overrule the states in internal matters. The US gradually turned from a federation to a unitary state because the North won in the battlefield the right to give the Constitution its own particular interpretation.

DiZerega is right on one point: after 1989 there has been a major paradigm shift concerning the constitutional theory of federalism. It has nothing to do, however, with semantic chicanery such as instrumental and self-organizational frameworks. Rather, it consists in the contraposition of a new *postmodern* to the old *modernist* federalism at a time when it has become obvious that the latter inevitably degenerates into a unitary nation-state unable to function effectively or satisfactorily.

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Reviews:

Undermining Community

John McKnight, *The Careless Society, Community and its Counterfeits* (New York, Basic Books, 1995), 194pp. + xiii, $21.00.

Over the last decade both Left and Right have collapsed in disarray.[1] Out of the ideological ruins, however, new political configurations are emerging which may develop into a broad movement inspired by Christopher Lasch's vision of populism.[2] Such a development is predicated on the fact that the most significant political

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1. See David Frum, *Dead Right* (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Paul Gottfried, *The Conservative Movement* (Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1993); and Charles Derber, *What's Left?* (Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995).

2. In 1991 Lasch called for a reconsideration of populism as an indigenous American democratic tradition. Although all but submerged by modernity, he saw this populist tradition as still relevant and able to provide guidelines for political and cultural reconstruction. See Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and its Critics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991). See also *Telos* 88 (Summer 1991), Special Issue on "Populism vs. the New Class," with contributions by Lawrence Goodwyn, Christopher Lasch, Tim Luke, Robert D'Amico, Andrew Fraser, Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen. In his last book, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), Lasch reviewed the crisis of democracy from a populist perspective and described transformation of the US from a self-governing republic where "even the humbler members of society" had "access to the knowledge and cultivation" required for active citizenship to a "therapeutic state" ruled by mangerial elites increasingly insulated by their culture and lifestyle from the concerns of the rest of the people. Although "the American dream" is now understood as social mobility, and equality as equality of opportunity — the opportunity to rise to a position among the educated elites in an increasingly stratified society — Lasch argued that this was a "sadly impoverished" interpretation. The title of one of the essays tersely conveys today's choice: "Opportunity in the Promised Land; Social Mobility or the Democratization of Competence?" Similarly, he harbored no illusions about the welfare state. Denouncing "the reign of specialized expertise" (p. 79), he asked: "Is it really necessary to point out at this late date, that public policies based on a therapeutic model had failed miserably over and over again? Far from promoting self-respect, they have created a nation of dependents. . . . The professionalization of compassion . . . institutionalizes inequality" (*ibid.*, p. 211). Lasch was part of a growing number of intellectuals who have come to realize that the distinction between Left and Right is no longer meaningful. Thus today Left demands for state intervention on behalf of marginal populations in the name of social justice have the exact opposite effect of rationalizing new relations of domination between New Class professionals and the rest of a population increasingly degraded to the status of mere "clients."

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division in the US today is no longer between Left and Right, but between a new class of politicians and professionals "committed to an extension of the state redistributive apparatus allegedly meant to solve all social problems" and "populists committed to local autonomy, fiscal austerity and participatory forms of democracy."[3] Within such a context, John McKnight's short but pithy book constitutes a major contribution. According to McKnight, it is the cure that has been killing the patient. The welfare state and the ideology of professionalism are the primary obstacles to the reconstitution of communities in the US. He writes: "The enemy is not poverty, sickness and disease. The enemy is a set of interests that need dependency masked by service" (p. 98). Along with Lasch, McKnight regards the definition of social problems in medical terms as the prerequisite for stripping individuals of their citizenship and permanently relegating them to an inferior caste of "clients." Whatever resources or "service" they are then "entitled to" cannot compensate for this degradation. He succinctly describes the therapeutic ideology as follows: (1) "The basic problem is you, (2) The resolution of your problem is my professional control, and (3) My control is your help. . . ." (p. 61).

McKnight has not been hoodwinked by the pervasive ideology of professionalism. "The power to label people deficient and declare them in need is the basic tool of control and oppression in modern industrialized societies of democratic and totalitarian persuasions. The agents with comprehensive labeling power in these societies are the helping professionals. Their badge bestows the caring authority to declare fellow citizens 'clients' — a class of deficient people in need" (p. 16). As such, his book can be seen as a sequel to Andrew J. Polsky's examination of welfare state programs and Theresa Funiciello's insider description of the welfare system.[4]

Polsky and McKnight do not engage the ideology of professionalism on its own terms. Rather, they analyze its political functions. As Polsky put it: "By treating therapeutic activists as political entrepreneurs in their own right and reviewing their tactics, I endeavor to account for the initial triumph that saw their doctrines incorporated by various state agencies."[5] The therapeutic state has successfully deflected all challenges during the Reagan-Bush era and has emerged weathered but stronger than ever. This is, in large part, because of the ingenuity and flexibility of therapeutic entrepreneurs "who learned to mobilize their better-off clientele to protect their budgets from retrenchment-minded politicians. Meanwhile, as new problems of marginality have come to public notice, social

3. Paul Piccone, "Confronting the French New Right: Old Prejudices or New Political Paradigm?" *Telos* 98-99 (Winter 1993-Spring 1994), pp. 9-10.

4. Andrew J. Polsky, *The Rise of the Therapeutic State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Theresa Funiciello, *Tyranny of Kindness; Dismantling the Welfare System to End Poverty in America* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993).

5. Polsky, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

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personnel have stepped into the breach to offer their services."[6] Today therapeutic tenets have become so integral a part of public discourse that even critics of the welfare state who deplore its deleterious effect on the work ethic typically recommend that "policy response include, along with mandatory employment, therapeutic counseling and instruction."[7] Polsky shows how, during the Progressive era and in the 1960s, the therapeutic approach was challenged by settlement workers and community action proponents who argued that the direct exercise of power by marginal groups was the path to social and political empowerment. At the end, however, "when presented with the chance to support political activism among their clients, social personnel made clear that they preferred instead to treat marginal groups as objects upon whom power might be applied. They dismissed client organization or sought to co-opt client militancy. Having helped to shut off the political path to social membership, therapeutic activists hardly speak of it and policy elites have followed their lead."[8]

After nearly two decades of involvement in the welfare system, from a homeless welfare mother to an organizer of other welfare mothers, to an establishment insider as a special assistant to the Commission of New York State's Department of Social Services, Funiciello finally decided to break the code of silence: "The social welfare practitioners and policy makers have acquired a stranglehold on public policy and, to a growing extent, the economy, and they aren't about to let go. . . . If stupid people like me broadcast their obvious conflicts of interest, then the real bad guys might take away not only the junk but the salaries and perks, too. Then there would be no one left to 'advocate' for the poor. That bugaboo was firmly planted in every poor activist's ear. . . . Telling the truth about the industry of helpers, about fraud, perhaps legal graft, abuse of power, and all that goes with it would bring the Wrath of God (or the Republicans, whichever came first) pounding on the poor. The trouble was, not telling it did, too."[9] Like McKnight, Funiciello argued that poor people have been robbed by their alleged benefactors: "Countless middle class people were making money, building careers, becoming powerful and otherwise benefiting from poverty. The poverty industry once again substituted its own interests for that of poor people and got away with it. To me, that's welfare fraud."[10] Funds designated for the poor were actually "spent on an army of social welfare professionals whose interests are protected by the elected officials they helped put into office and by the press that naively reports all of it at face value."[11]

Unlike Funiciello, McKnight does not present empirical and anecdotal data. Unlike Polsky, he does not provide a detailed historical examination. McKnight's

6. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 16-17.
9. Funiciello, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
10. *Ibid.*, p. xix.
11. *Ibid.*, p. xx.

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assets are the aphoristic quality of his prose, the vigor of his critique and his ability to convey a vivid sense of an alternative. These strengths clearly derive from the fact that he is inspired by a vision, "the vision of community." He argues that there are several visions of society that compete for the people's loyalty. The dominant one, antithetical to the "community vision," is the "therapeutic vision" which sees "the well being of individuals as growing from an environment composed of professionals and their services. It envisions a world where there is a professional to meet every need and where the fee to secure each professional service is a right. This vision is epigrammatically expressed by those who see the ultimate liberty as 'the right to treatment' "[12] (p. 168).

The central premise of the therapeutic vision is that professionals possess expertise in living based ostensibly on technical scientific knowledge. That makes them indispensable to their ever-increasing population of clients, who do not have and cannot develop the capacity to overcome or to cope with life's challenges without professional assistance. As McKnight puts it, the client invariably receives the message from the professional: "You will be better because I, the professional, know better." He describes the disabling consequences of this ideology both on the poor and on those who are psychiatrically labeled —those regarded by psychiatrists and most of the indoctrinated public as "mentally ill." It conceals relations of domination behind the "magic cloak of therapeutic help," thus facilitating the cultural production and reproduction of a society stratified into competent professionals and deficient clients.

Various efforts aimed at reforming the human service sector miss the point. First, these efforts underestimate the severity of the problem and presume that the service system is "a given good." Thus some claim that the system is inefficient or that many professionals have become arrogant and insensitive to the needs of their clients due to the bureaucratization of the field and the dehumanization of modern training programs. Various palliatives are recommended: "the consumer movement" seeks to give "human service consumers" more power to evaluate and influence professionals' behavior, to *force* them to be more sensitive. The advocacy movement seeks to surround clients with an army of advocates to protect them from abuses in the system, and to improve the quality of service. But the system is intrinsically abusive. Movements for reform only coopt opposition and strengthen the hegemony of the human service system, obscuring the fact that the problem is not that the system has flaws but that it does the exact opposite of what it is ostensibly intended to do: it is counter-productive. The illusion fostered by reformers is that "an heroic effort can rectify professionalism and create a new class of professionals in the useful service of humanity" (p. 21). McKnight, on the other hand, contends: "The hopeful future

12. McKnight neglects to mention that many so-called advocates for the "mentally ill" insist that this right requires society to vest psychiatrists with the power to *force* "treatments" on individuals who do not want them.

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for helping work is more likely to result from the fall of the modernized professions and the development of new definitions of good work" (p. 21).

Second, since most critiques underestimate the severity of the problem, it is not surprising that they fail to identify the reason the human service sector fails, despite the enormous resources devoted to it and the highly educated professionals, to achieve its manifest goal: its latent goal is the opposite. The objective is not to ameliorate the plight of needy people, but to *create* them. "In business terms the client is less the consumer than the raw material for the servicing system . . . . His essential function is to meet the needs of services, the servicing system, and the national economy" (p. 40). At a time of automation, the US manufacturing sector has shrunk to a negligible fraction of the GNP. Daniel Bell has projected that by the year 2000 nearly 80% of work in the US will be translated from production to the service sector. In order for the government to increase the GNP and control unemployment, it must increase the number of service sector jobs. Furthermore, the privileged groups, college graduates and housewives entering the paid labor force expect the prestige accorded to professional work (p. 22). McKnight reveals the awful truth which few dare to face: behind the professional's mask of concern hides "the servicer, his systems, techniques and technologies — a business in need of markets, an economy seeking new growth potential, professionals in need of an income" (p. 39). This is why the number of clients is constantly increasing: "It is now clear that the economic pressure to professionalize requires an expanding universe of need and the magnification of deficiency. This form of marginal professional development can only intensify the ineffective, dominating, and iatrogenic nature of the professional class as they invade the remaining perimeters of personhood" (pp. 23-24). Efforts at reform are based on "a profound misunderstanding of the current professional problem. The basic issue is the profession itself, dependent upon the manufacture of need and the definition of new deficiencies" (p. 24)

Each "discovery" of new deficiencies creates a "demand" for a new profession. Unfortunately, McKnight's examples of this process overlook the most dynamic growth sectors of the human service industry. In the last twenty years, psychologists, psychiatrists and educators have come to the conclusion that children not motivated in school suffer from a variety of "learning disabilities." This has spawned a new industry resulting in thousands of children being administered toxic psychiatric drugs, stigmatized and sequestered into special classrooms where they fulfill the expectations conveyed to them that they will fail to develop the skills of reading, writing and arithmetic. This takes place despite the fact numerous studies show that at the time they are labeled these children have cognitive abilities equivalent to their scholastically more successful peers. They are simply less motivated by the school curriculum or their families.

In the 1980's, with the growth of private psychiatric hospitals, the number of children hospitalized for "mental disorders" increased dramatically. In 1987, the

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American Medical Association's official newspaper reported that "Psychiatric admissions to private hospitals nearly tripled between 1980 and 1986 for those younger than eighteen."[13] This phenomenon took place because the mental health industry had managed to convince an increasing number of parents that previously normal behaviors were, in fact, pathological and required hospitalization. Even childhood itself was redefined as a pathology. One of the most common diagnoses used to justify incarcerating children in mental hospitals was "Oppositional Defiant Disorder." The 1987 edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental-Disorders* (the Bible of the mental health professions) described the symptoms of this ailment. "Children with this disorder commonly are argumentative with adults, frequently lose their tempers, swear and are often angry, resentful and easily annoyed by others. They frequently actively defy adult requests and rules and deliberately annoy other people. They tend to blame others for their own mistakes and difficulties."[14]

Reforms are futile. The corrective required is the realization of the community vision. As McKnight ironically puts it: "The central reform is the conversion of clients to citizens" (p. 62). The community vision seeks to reallocate power from the centralized and professionally dominated service system to neighborhood "associations" such as local churches and the neighborhood taverns where two centuries ago "some of the most basic discussions about the formation of the government of the United States and its Constitution occurred" (p. 18). The community vision seeks to provide every citizen, no matter how "fallible," the opportunity to participate as a political equal with other citizens in the process of community decision-making and neighborhood-building. It seeks to "recommunalize" exiled and psychiatrically labeled individuals. "It sees community associations as contexts in which to create and locate jobs, provide opportunities for recreation of multiple friendships, and become the political defender of the right of labeled people to be free from exile . . . . [Adherents to the community vision] see a society where those who were once labeled, exiled, treated, counseled, advised and protected are, instead, incorporated into community where their contributions, capacities, gifts and fallibilities will allow a network of relationships involving work, recreation, friendship, support and the political power of being a citizen" (p. 169).[15]

While McKnight clearly identifies the forces opposed to the imposition of any limits on the human service sector, he underestimates the hegemony of the therapeutic vision. Outside isolated pockets of dissidents, psychiatrists and psychologists are regarded as savants with solutions for every human dilemma. Their years of training, professional credentials, medical knowledge and the

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13. *American Medical News*, (September 11, 1987), p. 44.

14. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 3rd ed. revised (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1987).

15. My analysis of the problem is strikingly similar to McKnight's. For an account of the destructive effects of the child welfare system on families and children, see Seth Farber, "The Real Abuse," in *National Review* Vol. XLV, No. 7 (April 12, 1993), pp. 44-51.

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mastery of a lexicon of psycho-babble makes them venerated figures. Today psychology has become the most popular religion in America and it is buttressed by the power of the state. How can the community vision compete on such a lopsided playing field?

Nor is there much chance of a revolt within the helping professions against their misuse as agents of social control. There are, of course, dissidents who have criticized the dominant paradigms. Beginning with Thomas Szasz' seminal work,[16] there has been a formidable assault on the dogma of "mental illness." Yet students in graduate schools are not exposed to such critiques. Rather, they are systematically indoctrinated into two dominant paradigms: the biological and the neo-psychoanalytic model. The former assumes that individuals are mentally defective as a result of genetic flaws which cause "biochemical imbalances." The latter claims that human beings are defective as a result of inadequate parenting during early childhood. Although in theory there is the possibility of a mentally healthy person who has escaped the ravages of mental pathology, in clinical practice such a person is virtually never "discovered." This is because any behavior may be construed by professionals as symptomatic of pathology, thus requiring professional help.[17] Perhaps there would be more opposition if the elite press, e.g., *The New York Times,* was not so favorably predisposed to the mental health establishment.[18]

Since the last several decades have been, as McKnight notes, "an era of blaming the client for many of the iatrogenic practices of the human service professionals" (p. 102), it is not surprising the public has become convinced by

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16. Thomas Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (New York: Hoeber-Harper, 1961).

17. See Seth Farber, "Institutional Mental Health and Social Control: The Ravages of Epistemological Hubris," in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior,* Vol. 11, Nos. 3-4 (Summer/Autumn 1990), pps. 285-301.

18. Consider the following. In January 1994 eight prestigious representatives of the mental health establishment published the results of a 17-month investigation. See "Lifetime and Month Prevalence of the DSM III-R Psychiatric Disorders in the United States (Results from the National Co-morbidity Survey)," in the *Archives of General Psychiatry,* Vol. 51 (January 1994), pp. 8-19. This study reported that 48% of all Americans suffer from a lifetime mental disorder. At that time press releases were sent all over the country announcing this new discovery. *The New York Times* dutifully published this finding on January 14, 1994. A study conducted several years earlier by the National Institute of Mental Health had claimed that one third of the population was afflicted by mental illness. The author of the *Times* article explained that the earlier study "used less exacting methods," thus reiterating the rationalization for the discrepancy between the two figures provided by the authors of the new study. The reporter fails to mention that the article also discovered that "the majority of people with psychiatric disorders fail to obtain professional treatment" and that there is a need for "more outreach and more research on barriers to professional help-seeking" (p. 8). Nor did he report that the authors of this scientific study, published in a journal read almost exclusively by psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, confided to their readers that their research "provides the first nationally representative data *that can be used* in the current debate about health care policy in the United States" [emphasis added] (p. 10).

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the press that the continued presence of a large population of social deviants apparently unable to cope without public funds and psychiatric assistance is a manifestation of the intractability of mental illness and the product of the failure of "deinstitutionalization" undertaken, according to this mythology, in the 1960s under the influence of critics such as Thomas Szasz, R.D. Laing and Erving Goffman.[19] Having declared deinstitutionalization a failure, the debate now focuses on whether the solution is to place mental patients back in state mental hospitals or to subject them to forced psychiatric treatments on an outpatient basis. Except for a few heretics, no one dares to suggest that psychiatry itself has failed.

Yet deinstitutionalization never took place. The more sincere advocates of deinstitutionalization described it in the early 1960s as a process of removing mental patients from state mental hospitals, providing them with counseling and rehabilitative services, and *reintegrating them into the community.* As Szasz has put it, what actually took place was "transinstitutionalization": transferring individuals from state mental hospitals "into de facto psychiatric facilities that are not called 'mental' or 'hospitals'."[20] This movement took place in response to an explosion of social welfare programs which provided states with the opportunity to transfer costs away from the state budget onto the federal government.[21] In 1984 Andrew Scull pointed out that: "It is only an illusion that patients who were placed in boarding or family care homes are in the community . . . . These facilities are for the most part like small long-term state hospital wards, isolated from the community . . . Little effort is directed toward social and vocational rehabilitation . . ."[22]

McKnight realizes that clients in human service institutions are constantly under supervision, surrounded by service professionals, programs and plans, by a "forest" of services. He knows that institutions create an environment entirely different from that of a neighborhood or community. "The uniqueness of this environment is emphasized by large buildings, walls, fences and so on" (p. 108). Nevertheless, forests can be created without these architectural features in group homes, halfway houses and other institutions for those labeled deficient. McKnight's analysis corroborates Szasz' contention that the process egregiously termed "deinstitutionalization" was in fact *trans*institutionalization. Although McKnight's description of life in these forests are poignant, he rarely provides specific illustrations. Thus he might have mentioned, e.g., that clients in "day-

19. See R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (New York: Pantheon, 1967); and Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situations of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (New York: Anchor Books, 1961).

20. Thomas Szasz, *Cruel Compassion* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) p. 171.

21. As Szasz described it, "deinstitutionalization is simply a new fashion in mental health care, consisting of storing unwanted persons in dwellings not called 'mental hospitals' but, nevertheless, treating them as if they were mental patients who required lifelong psychiatric supervision." *Ibid.*, p. 171.

22. Andrew Scull, *Decarceration, Community, Treatment and the Deviant* (New Bunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), p. 247.

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treatment programs" for the "mentally ill" are in effect being trained for careers as professional mental patients. A very small percentage of these clients are helped to procure education or employment. In fact, the psychiatric drugs clients are forced to take upon threat of expulsion from the programs have such a generally debilitating effect that those who take them would be unable to handle the challenges of work or education, if such opportunities were offered.[23]

Apologists for psychiatry[24] blame psychiatry's colossal failure to help people on psychiatry's critics, who have opposed measures to force clients to submit to debilitating "treatments," principally psychiatric confinement, "medication" and electroshock.[25] Ostensibly, "anti-psychotic" drugs significantly ameliorate the symptoms of psychosis and make patients feel better. Because a number of patients are mentally ill and irrational, however, they often refuse to take medications meant to help them and consequently become violent or homeless (ostensibly, they become so disoriented that they abandon their homes). This mythology flagrantly ignores several facts. First, "anti-psychotic" drugs (neuroleptic) were introduced not to enable patients to function on a higher level, but to make them easier to warehouse in state mental hospitals. This was candidly admitted by the promoters of these drugs in the psychiatric journals in the early 1950s when the drugs were first discovered. Heinz Lehmann, who introduced the first neuroleptic drug (chlorpromazine) wrote: "The aim is to produce a state of motor retardation, emotional indifference and somnolence, and the dose must be increased accordingly as tolerance develops."[26] The emotional blunting produced by these drugs, the reduction of drive, initiative and spontaneity, their disruption of higher levels of cortical functioning, led many of the promoters of these drugs to compare them to frontal lobotomies. Lehman himself enthusiastically described chlorpromazine in 1955 as a "pharmacological substitute for a lobotomy."[27]

Second, patients have many reasons for their reluctance to take these drugs. Not only do they produce the lobotomizing effect described by those who introduced them, they also produce serious neurological disorders. The most common one is tardive dyskinesia (TD). In 1978 the American Psychiatric Association Task Force estimated that 60 to 65% of those who take neuroleptic drugs develop TD.[28] Current APA estimates have downgraded the rate to 25%. Considering that almost all mental patients are advised or forced to take neuroleptics regularly, even if one takes the more conservative estimate there is an extraordinary number of

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23. Peter Breggin, *Toxic Psychiatry* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991).
24. Myron Magnet, *The Dream and the Nightmare* (New York: William Morrow Co., 1993); and Rael Jean Isaac and Virginia Armat, *Madness in the Streets: How Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally Ill* (New York: Free Press, 1990).
25. Peter Breggin, *Psychiatric Drugs: Hazards to the Brain* (New York: Springer, 1983).
26. Cited in Breggin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
28. *American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1980).

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people who will be suffering from a severely disabling and disfiguring disorder.[29] Breggin graphically described the symptoms. "TD often begins with uncontrolled movements of the face including the tongue, lips, mouth and cheeks; but it can start with almost any group of muscles. The most common early sign is a quivering or curling of the tongue . . . The hands and feet, arms and legs, neck, back and torso can be involved. The movements displayed are highly variable, and include writhing contortions, tics, spasms and tremors. The person's gait can be badly impaired . . ."[30]

Third, despite psychiatrists insistence that these drugs are necessary for the treatment of schizophrenia, evidence indicates otherwise. As David Cohen and Michael McCubbin put it: "Considerable evidence from controlled, random assignment studies clearly shows that *given the proper social environment*, most newly identified 'schizophrenics' can be treated successfully with little or no psychotropic medication."[31] Almost all of the individuals who had "schizophrenic" break-downs and fully recovered from them, going back to work or school, reintegrating themselves into the community, weaned themselves off of psychiatric drugs and extricated themselves from the mental health system.[32] The American Psychiatric Association continues to ignore this evidence and to insist that "schizophrenia" is a chronic illness which can be "controlled" only with the use of neuroleptic drugs. The fact that there have been only a relatively small percentage of former mental patients who have succeeded in or even attempted to extricate themselves from the mental health system has nothing to do with the alleged intractability of mental illness. Rather, it is a result of the intractability and the power of psychiatry, whose tentacles enthrall most individuals who enter the mental health system. More than ever today psychiatry *needs* schizophrenics when its credibility is under question: bombarding the public with images and tales of deranged psychotics serves to re-legitimate psychiatry's authority.

This is demonstrated most vividly by Magnet or Isaac and Armat or any of the various journalistic accounts available. The spectre of the schizophrenic is constantly evoked to warn the public that this particular ghoulish manifestation of social disorder is a product of psychiatry's critics, whose misguided commitment to such "1960s countercultural" values as the right to personal freedom has

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29. David Cohen conservatively estimates 1 million in the US. See his "The Political Economy of Tardive Dyskinesia: Asymmetries in Power and Responsibility," in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* (Summer/Autumn, 1990), pp 425-465. This was in 1990, and the incidence increases yearly as more individuals are inducted into the mental health system.

30. Peter Breggin, "Brain Damage, Dementia and Neuroleptics," in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* (Summer/Autumn 1990), *op cit.* p. 425-465.

31. David Cohen, "The Political Economy of Tardive Dyskinesia: Asymmetries in Power and Responsibility," in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* (Summer/Autumn, 1990), *op. cit*, pp. 468-469.

32. See Seth Farber, *Madness, Heresy and the Rumor of Angels; The Revolt against the Mental Health System* (Chicago: Open Court, 1993).

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prevented the Psychiatric Grand Inquisitor from ensuring collective security and well being. Usually, the schizophrenic appears in the guise of the deranged madman who threatens murder and mayhem, thus evoking popular terror and anxiety. The epigones of psychiatry do everything they can to convince the public that the schizophrenic is essentially a wild person, whose violence can only be contained by the scientific powers of the psychiatric profession. Thus Magnet does not doubt that the social control of criminals deemed mentally ill by psychiatrists should be granted to psychiatrists rather than the criminal justice system, despite the fact that for decades psychiatrists have been fomenting social disorder by carrying on what Szasz aptly termed "a war against responsibility": by going to court as expert witnesses to exculpate criminals on the grounds that, because they do not meet psychiatric standards of sanity, they do not have "free will" and are *ipso facto* not responsible for any of the crimes they commit. According to Magnet, the same bunch of scoundrels who exonerate the guilty (in order to induct them into the mental health system) and persecute the innocent (in order to induct them into the mental health system) are the legitimate guardians of social order, protecting the fort against the barbarians at the gate: the hordes of lunatics, critics of psychiatry, anarchists — the whole scurrilous bunch of "1960s counterculturalists."

The schizophrenic also appears as the "homeless mentally ill" person Magnet presents as a pathetic creature truly deserving pity. It is the demonic Szasz, assisted by his countercultural and civil libertarian allies, who by thwarting the benevolent designs of the Psychiatric Grand Inquisitor is responsible for their tragic plight. Magnet asks rhetorically "Is it not a deplorable notion that it is freedom to be left enslaved to madness . . . that it is freedom to rave and defecate on the street, to be left untreated and afraid?"[33] The implication is that the problem of homelessness is in large part the result of "deinstitutionalization." Actually, the emptying of state mental hospitals began in the late 1950s and was completed in the 1960s, whereas homelessness became a major problem only in the last decade. The fact of the matter is that ex-mental patients were a minority among those individuals squeezed out by the housing policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1974 and 1983 almost one million housing units renting for less than $200 a month were lost to conversion (to expensive office buildings or condominiums) or demolition. In New York City the number of people living in single room occupancy hotels (SROs) declined from 100,000 in 1965 to less than 20,000 in 1986. With the help of apologists such as Magnet, the psychiatric industry can capitalize on the plight of the homeless by convincing the public that homelessness is a *mental health* problem and thereby charge the taxpayer exorbitant fees to house homeless individuals in psychiatric facilities — allegedly to treat their mental illness — where they will remain permanent wards of

33. Magnet, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

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the state and be forced to take psychiatric drugs that cause neurological damage and make it virtually impossible for them to go back to work or school.

Magnet is not unique. Journalists constantly inform the public that, in order to be relieved of the scourge of deranged killers and the blight of homelessness, it is imperative to eliminate the few remaining juridical protections against psychiatric abuse and subject individuals psychiatry deems abnormal to yet more tortures termed "treatments" — forced drugging, forced electroshock and forced hospitalization. Although Magnet feigns to be troubled by the decline of democracy and the plight of the deserving homeless mentally ill, the solution he proposes does not rest on the inclusion of marginal individuals into the community but rather on their continued exclusion (in the name of their "right to treatment").

Szasz and other critics of psychiatry recognized that the practices of psychiatrists and their allies lead to the social degradation of mental patients, their total isolation from the community and the deprivation of their rights and responsibilities as citizens — in effect, to their spiritual destruction. To the consternation of his colleagues, Szasz has argued that the madman, the social deviant, the Other, is not a victim of mental illness but of psychiatric violence disguised as medical treatment: "The labeling of persons as mentally healthy or ill by psychiatrists . . . constitutes the initial act of validation or invalidation, pronounced by the high priest of the modern scientific religion, the psychiatrist; it justifies the expulsion of the sacrificial scapegoat, the mental patient from the community.[34]

McKnight's approach (recommunalization) is more radical. He situates the solution to the problem within the context of a larger project: the broadening of the powers and responsibilities of citizens, and the regeneration of communities. One extraordinary feature of his analysis is that he demonstrates that the crisis of democracy requires the incorporation into the community of all those citizens who have been transformed into clients, and the solution to so-called "personal/psychological problems" requires the incorporation of "clients into a democratic social order." Since professional ideology focuses on the clients' putative deficiencies, it cannot even envision the possibility that they might have something to *contribute* to the community. It thus denies them the opportunity to engage in the kinds of activities that can restore their sense of self-worth.

Are those individuals labeled "mentally ill" more "fallible" (McKnight's term) than other citizens? For McKnight, the question is irrelevant, since whatever citizens' fallibilities, their putative defects, they also possess unique capacities that enable them to contribute to the community — capacities which will grow if they are given the opportunity to exercise them.[35] Accordingly, "as we

34. Thomas Szasz, *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 267.

35. McKnight provides an example of a "developmentally disabled" person with a beautiful voice who was incorporated into the local town choir: "It is the marvel of the democratic ideal that persons of every fallibility are citizens. Effective associational life incorporates all of those fallibilities and reveals the unique intelligence of community" (p. 166).

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exile our fallible neighbors to the control of managers, therapists, and technicians, we lose much of our power to be the vital center of society. We forget about the capacity of every single one of us to do good work and, instead, made some of us into the objects of good works — servants of those who serve" (p. 172). While McKnight does not directly discuss "mental illness," the implication is clear: the solution to the problem is political — not psychiatric, therapeutic, or medical.

Yet the problem is also cultural, as critics of psychiatry from Szasz to Laing to Ken Kesey realized. The federal government and the human service system are concerned with social control. They presuppose a schema of mechanical perfection that is unmenaced by the threat of change, history and the unexpected. There is no room for "fallibility" within such a culture, as fallibility is a manifestation of an individuality that impedes the clients' ability to follow orders, to comply with standardized routines, to enact meaningless rituals. The enactment of repetitive rituals serves to banish the threat of disorder.[36]

McKnight realizes that communities and institutions embody antithetical cultural values. Yet he does not elaborate the point. He observes, however, that "communities viewed by those who only understand managed experiences appear to be disordered, messy and inefficient. There is a hidden order to community groups that is determined by the need to incorporate capacity and fallibility" (p. 178). He senses that there is something in the ideal of service that lends itself to the kind of grotesque corruption represented by the welfare system today. He muses: "I wonder whether the human reality is always to make service into lordship," into "a system of control" (p. 178). It does not occur to McKnight that the reason this happens is because the liberal welfare state, with its service ideal and its ideology of professionalism, is a manifestation of what Adorno and Horkheimer described as the dialectic of enlightenment. As such, it is confronted with an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, it desires to annul the Other whose otherness poses the danger of disorder. On the other, it requires the existence of the Other. The ideology of service sets up a dichotomy between servicer and client which can never be

36. In the mental health system one sacrosanct ritual consists in the mentally ill taking their "medication" at pre-determined times from their human service provider and swallowing it in their presence. An individual reluctant to take medication is described as "treatment resistant." This ritual serves several functions. It confirms the client in his identity as a patient and the professional in his identity either as doctor or as doctor's helper. The effect of the drug is not to make the clients "feel better" or to "cure" them, but to produce a state of apathy that undermines their capacity for autonomous action, and makes it almost physiologically impossible to act defiantly. The enactment of this ritual reassures the professional that the client can be expected to follow orders. It exorcises the threat of an interruption of business as usual, of the unpredictable, behind which lurks the ultimate threat of chaos, of madness. The "treatment-resistant patient" arouses the profoundest fears of human service providers, and all the forces of persuasion and coercion — if necessary, psychiatrists obtain court orders to force patients to take drugs (this is invariably done in the name of upholding their right to treatment) — will be brought to bear on them in an effort to regain the patients' "cooperation."

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overcome: existential security is sought through control and mastery of the Other, not through the recognition of otherness. Clients must be sustained in their otherness while at the same time being compelled to constantly re-enact the rituals of submission. They cannot be permitted to transcend or legitimate their otherness by acquiring the rights and powers of citizens, by becoming full subjects. In that case there would be no Other to manage control.

Szasz dared to turn the tables on institutional psychiatry by arguing that mental patients were socially accredited scapegoats for social ills, as "witches" had been in another era. While pschiatric histories uniformly extolled psychiatry as an heir of the Enlightenment and an agent of scientific progress, Szasz denounced psychiatrists as founders of a new religion of Science and as the heirs of the Inquisition. Laing was even more disquieting. He went so far as to assert the *superiority* of the schizophrenic in whose cryptic utterances, violating the conventions of syntax, grammar and logic, Laing saw a protest against the inequity of society not altogether different from his own. In his autobiography,[37] he noted that Abraham Myerson had written that Kierkegaard's book, *The Concept of Dread*, demonstrated that the writer "is a psychiatric case himself," and Myerson cited several passages in order to prove that "his book is a schizoid and certainly utterly non-comprehensible presentation by a mind which is quite deviate." When Laing read this diagnosis in his early twenties, at the start of his career, he realized "with some dread" that he was "on the other and wrong side of the great divide" that psychiatrists contend separate the mad from the sane.[38]

The radicalism of Szasz and Laing resided not merely in the nature of their proposals for reform but in the thrust of their critique, according to which the Other was but a sociological construction necessitated by the nature of the psychiatric project. Laing, however, equivocated on the social implications of his

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37. R. D. Laing, *Wisdom, Madness and Folly: The Making of a Psychiatrist* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1985), pp. 11-12.

38. See Abraham Myerson, "Kierkegaard's Psychopathology," in *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 101, No. 3 (1944), pp. 839-44. Several years before his death in 1985, Laing put on a demonstration before an audience of several thousand therapists: He engaged with a "schizophrenic" in a mutually enthralling conversation for over half an hour. During the question period, a psychiatrist stood up to complain that nothing had really occurred. Laing availed himself of the opportunity to articulate again his belief that compared to "normal people," the schizophrenic was more aware and less able to tolerate the kinds of meaningless social interactions that serve as a substitute for genuine communication. Laing stated that the questioner was too mendacious to realize that Laing and the schizophrenic Other were communing with each other: that in fact, therapy without communion (which Laing implied was common today), without an experiential bond of kinship with the client, was an act of social pretense that "doesn't get anywhere with those people [i.e., schizophrenics] who find it difficult to live in the world of the interpersonal and can see how stupid it all is, how ugly it all is, how inexpressibly confused it all is, and yet are just regarded as crazy or mad for realizing that and are either locked up or run away." Cited in Carlos Amantea, *The Lourdes of Arizona* (San Diego: Mho and Mho, 1989), p. 156.

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analysis. He was not clear about alternatives. Should the Other be assimilated? Or was there not a wisdom in madness which assimilation would destroy? It was as if he was groping to discover the principle that, in another context, de Benoist has articulated as "the right to difference," which includes the duty "to find in this difference the source of new norms."[39] The early Foucault also argued that it was precisely because madness harbored within itself the source of new norms that it was silenced by Reason,[40] and lunatics were confined, managed and repressed. With the "constitution of madness as mental illness at the end of the 18th century, "psychiatry — and society — turned a deaf ear to madmen, and effectively deprived Reason's other of its voice."

Although McKnight nervously avoids even mentioning "madness," except in code words, he brilliantly outlines a viable alternative to strategies of exclusion or assimilation. As opposed to the pseudo-community envisaged by human service professionals who seek to reduce all individuals to a uniform standard of "normality," McKnight imagines a heterogenous community embodying individual diversity. He realizes that the tension between the individual and the community is both necessary and valuable. Refusal to tolerate this tension leads either to disorder or totalitarianism — or both. "While institutions and professions war against human fallibility by trying to replace it, cure it, or disregard it, communities are proliferations of associations that multiply until they incorporate both the capacities and fallibilities of citizens. It is for this reason that labelled people are not out of place in community because they all have capacities and only their fallibilities are unusual." (p. 178).

Given the various obstacles he discusses, is not the community vision doomed to remain a utopia without any major impact? Is it possible to transcend a social order based on management and domination and create one based on a fellowship of political equals? The prospects are dim. Responding to pressures from advocates of the therapeutic vision, the Clinton Administration has enacted federal legislation that mandates that states reorganize their educational system to meet the cradle to grave agenda of "Goals 2000." Each school will provide every American family with an array of human services and every family will be provided with a "parent educator" who will enter their house at the time of a child's birth, make regular visits to instruct the parent on child rearing, and continually monitor their parental competence. David Hornbeck, author of the restructuring plan for many of the states, has described the purpose of this reorganization: "At the state level we should promulgate legislation that would create a new affirmative duty for government to insure the health and nonacademic well-being of every child until age eighteen . . . . That duty would begin with the

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39. Cited in P. Taguieff, "The New Right's View of European Identity," in *Telos* 98-99 (Winter 1993-Fall 1994), p. 120.

40. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Psychiatry in the Age of Reason* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

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mother's pregnancy with appropriate prenatal care . . . . As the child becomes school age, the duty would apply before and after school, on weekends and in the summer." [41] As if inspired by Huxley and Orwell, today's policy-makers are seeking to implement a program that will transform parents into little more than state-approved guardians of their own children, who must work under the constant supervision of human service professionals carrying out the mandate of the federal government.

Yet the advance of the therapeutic state may carry within it the seeds of its own demise. When every citizen is at risk of being transformed into a client, the foundation of the therapeutic state becomes shaky. According to McKnight, the professional problem "will be resolved when the lives of enough people are so completely invaded by the professional need for deficiency that a popular revolt develops" (p. 24). If such a revolt occurs, it will not be either Left or Right, but predicated on a renunciation of professionalism and the cultivation of a populist faith in the ability of citizens to cooperatively govern their own lives.

Seth Farber

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41. Cited in Peg Luksik, *Outcome Based Education* (Louisiana: Huntington House, 1995), p. 122.

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